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While an operation's unlevered value is objective, the value of the debt tax shield is subjective since it depends on the capital structure policy of the firm that owns the operation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of this subjective nature of debt tax shield value for corporate investment decisions.

The study develops a simple theoretical model.

The paper shows that even a low probability of selling a project in the future to a firm with a different tax shield value can significantly affect a project's weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and total value.

Managers should be aware of this issue when making corporate investment decisions.

This is the first study to address the implication of the subjective nature of debt tax shield value.

This paper examines the relation between takeover likelihood and the documented underperformance of distressed company stocks while exploring two competing hypotheses. The failure risk explanation predicts lower returns to distressed firms with high probability of being acquired because the acquisition reduces risk and investors' required return. Conversely, the agency conflicts explanation predicts lower returns when acquisition is unlikely.

The likelihood of receiving a takeover bid is estimated, and portfolio tests explore the underperformance of distressed company stocks relative to non-distressed stocks across varying levels of takeover likelihood. Predictive regressions subsequently examine the relation between distress, takeover exposure and future firm operating performance including how the relation is affected by state anti-takeover laws.

Distressed stocks underperform non-distressed company stocks by economically and statistically significant margins when takeover likelihood is low, yet there is no evidence of underperformance among distressed stocks with moderate or high takeover exposure. Consistent with agency conflicts playing a key role, distressed firms that are disciplined by takeover threats invest more, use more leverage and experience higher future profitability. State-level anti-takeover legislation limits this disciplinary effect, however.

The results show that the well-documented distress anomaly is driven by a subset of distressed firms whose managers face limited pressure from the external takeover market. The evidence casts doubt on the failure risk explanation and suggests that agency conflicts play a key role.

The purpose of this paper is to offer a “how to” guide for applying Merton’s (1987) valuation adjustment for incomplete information, which depends on market capitalization, idiosyncratic risk and extent of investor ownership.

The paper illustrates Bodnaruk and Ostberg’s (2009) formula for Merton’s adjustment, and presents some example empirical estimates of the adjustment for some US stocks.

The adjustment estimates are material for many example stocks, particularly volatile stocks with a low percentage of shares held by institutional funds. However, the adjustment estimates are modest for many other stocks, including some smaller cap. stocks.

Measuring the model’s inputs requires using some judgment, particularly regarding the investor ownership variable. The paper will hopefully help stimulate useful empirical research on adjustment estimates and on best practices for applying the model.

The paper may encourage more use of the incomplete-information adjustment in practice, which should lead to improved discount rate estimates in valuation analyses.

No other “bridge the gap” coverage of the incomplete-information adjustment is available in textbooks or the applied literature.