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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that costs reduction is no longer a complete indication of performance and should not be attained at the expense of the firm’s sustainable social responsibility and environmental aspects. The question of whether outsourcing is a “blessing” or a “lesson” remains unresolved in the minds of practitioners and researchers alike. The literature is replete with the up- and down-sides of outsourcing, all going in different directions, making it very cumbersome particularly for practitioners to articulate when and what to outsource (if at all) and how to contain or mitigate outsourcing downsides.

Outsourcing as a two-edged sword can be value creating strategy or a firm’s soft spot. This paper focusses on the latter through a review of sourcing in two leading multinational companies: Benetton, in the fast fashion industry, and Nestlé, in the food industry.

Benetton experienced the biggest catastrophe in the garment industry, the Rana Plaza collapse. Nestlé went through the horse meat scandal, perhaps one of the most complex food crime cases in history. Both cases illustrated the strategic vulnerability that arises from the international outsourcing of production.

Clearly, production costs are no longer a complete indication of performance as the two cases unveil. Management control systems should be especially vigilant when outsourcing transfers social and environmental responsibility from one contract to another in a global business context. Monitoring costs cannot be outsourced when it comes to sustainable social responsibility and environmental aspects.

Firms can leverage relationships with stakeholder groups, activists and NGOs to help them to monitor their international operations. Institution-based trust to protect brands, increased integration and control are necessary mechanisms.

Indeed, global outsourcing in any industry should transfer not only industrial operations but also credible and responsible social and environmental benchmarks.

The purpose of this study is to examine role stress over the course of an alliance between supply chains. This study examines ambiguity as antecedent to multiple organisational outcomes.

This study subsequently uses a time series design that uses a close replication of the authors’ initial study. The design affords the opportunity to examine the dynamics associated with the evolution of the alliance.

This study recognises that the relationships developed by collaborating firms are enacted by downstream entrepreneurs in the supply chain, yet this observation is rarely incorporated into interfirm research. The authors illustrate that the alliances have a significant downstream influence on operations at the retail level.

This longitudinal research has the potential to reduce common method variance and enhance causal inference. The second limitation concerns the simultaneous collection of the predictor and criterion variables. The third limitation is the use of single informants as the primary vehicle for the analysis of the theoretical model when prior research indicates that multiple informants offer enhanced reliability and validity.

The findings contribute to the management theory of business entrepreneurship and strategic alliances and research on supply chains.

This study underscores the need to examine alliances via time series. Research that attempts to generalise from data collected at a single point in time is unlikely to be able to capture the dynamics associated with the development of a joint venture and offers limited opportunity to make inferences about the causal order of relationships. The model based on longitudinal data reveals that the stage of an alliance influences the level of vertical control and ambiguity and the effect of control on role ambiguity.

Trust is a crucial element of a viable banking industry. In the corporate market though, the characteristics of the relationships between each corporate customer and the bank is a double-sided problem. Both parties might trust the other or choose to behave opportunistically. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors have analyzed the effects of inter-organizational trust and opportunism on the perception of risk. The paper presents a structural equations model based on a prisoner's dilemma logic to analyze the unique effects of trust between corporate customers and their banks and its corporate customers.

The results based on 252 bank – corporate bank customers relationships reveal an intriguing mixed strategy between trust from one party and opportunism from the other.

The implication is that mutual trust seems to reduce the perception of risk in the market while bank opportunism significantly escalates perceived risk. The analyses also show that when the corporate customer trusts the bank, perceived risk is significantly reduced.

The findings emphasize the role of relationship marketing in the banking industry.

Despite the fact that inter-organizational trust is a crucial dyadic variable, few empirical studies have previously analyzed both sides of the relationship. This investigation is a preliminary analysis of how both sides of the same relationship affects the outcome. When trust erodes from one side of the relationship, it may lead to the same process on the other side of the relationship.

A substantial body of research employs agency theory and transaction costs analysis to explain ownership decisions in distribution channels. Agency theory identifies factors that prompt firms to favor behavior‐based contracting over outcome‐based agreements. Transaction cost economics is a complementary framework which maintains that the organizational form in a location should be the one that economizes on production and transaction costs. Prior research illustrates that independent variables (e.g. proximity to highways, dedicated assets) outlined in these theories provide a partial explanation for ownership decisions. Nevertheless, scant research has analyzed whether factors outlined in agency theory and transaction cost analysis are employed by executives when making ownership decisions. The purpose of this study is to investigate managerial rationales underlying plural contractual networks.

This paper investigates the role of the foreign local middleman in the information flows between the market and the exporter. Whereas a number of studies have examined the information behaviour of exporters (Benito, Carl, & Lawrence, 1993; McAuley, 1993; Hart, Webb, & Jones, 1994; Diamantopoulos og Souchon, 1996, 1997, 1998), limited attention has been given to the role of the local foreign partner¹ in this context. Once established in a market with a foreign intermediary as a partner, there are at least two reasons why information is needed by the exporter. First, the scope as well as the extent of information needed will depend upon the functional “division of labour” between the exporter and the middleman. The less responsibility left to the partner the more information is needed by the exporter to make appropriate decisions. Second, the exporter may want information to control the performance of the partner. Fear of opportunistic behaviour is the driving force in the latter case.