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The purpose of this paper is to examine the conditions that allow the co-existence of alternative logics in an institutional field for an extended period.

This is a case study that examined the complaint-handling processes of phone companies based on documentary research, which provided the information that allowed the development of a script to interview organizational actors in this field.

The explanation for this behavior that does not attempt to deinstitutionalize other institutions’ practices relates to the actors’ need for the other field participants’ collaboration to improve their activities.

The specific characteristics of the Brazilian context can only suggest that alternative logics may coexist, which therefore opens opportunities for future studies to discuss the possible reproduction of these results in other societies. Similarly, because this research was restricted to the complaint field, other studies conducted in fields where actors are faced with alternative possibilities, such as with the judicial system, should examine and expand on these concepts. This study sought to cover the viewpoints of multiple important actors in the field to cover the whys and hows these logics coexist. However, a more comprehensive availability of respondents might have brought still better insights to the study.

One implication of this study is the fact that firms in Brazil must be aware of the alternative redress channels that are available to consumers. The different procedural norms can cause a great deal of annoyance because firms have to be updated with all of them and eventually build specialized teams to address them. The awareness of the existence of multiple logics in this field should orient the Brazilian telephony industry’s regulator in formulating policies that take this fact into consideration. To do this, the regulator should consider a regular consultation forum in which the main consumer protection organizations and government agencies gather to discuss improvements given that there is already informal collaboration. Public policy should also take into consideration the fact that consumers do not complain most of the time for lack of knowledge or disbelief in supporting organizations.

The main contribution is the alternative logics notion in addressing complaints in this field. This is an issue that has not been practically explored in the literature. The difference between an alternative logic and a competing one lies in the fact that the practices, structures and symbols in the first case represent alternative possibilities for actors to achieve a specific objective, whereas in the second case, the weaker logics tend to disappear due to a stronger one.

Studies of institutional logics have emphasized two fundamental conceptions: first, that there is continuous competition between the various logics embedded in any context and, second, that certain mechanisms influence the promotion or modification of existing logics. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to these studies by broadening the propositions on the mechanisms used by the actors to disguise the fact that they are not prioritizing non-prevailing logics.

The paper examines the disguise mechanisms used in the regulation of the private health field in Brazil, which has still been rarely explored in the literature on the theme. The research strategy was qualitative, involving documentary research that provided information to create a script for interviewing different actors in this field, such as health plan companies, service providers, medical associations, trade unions, regulatory agency, consumer defense organizations and the judiciary, lending credibility to the study.

The field data suggest important findings. Field actors pursue exerting influence in defining the outcomes of the institutional logics prevailing at each event. In this pursuit, they work to keep representative parts of prescribed practices non-transparent to allow them a margin in which to maneuver when confronted with a non-prevailing logic.

This paper emphasizes that, in any context, actors, while following the prescriptions of a prevailing logic, might have to disguise not following the prescriptions of other logics; thus, they will have to seek for mechanisms to do so. This paper, by identifying disguise mechanisms that operate in the specific field of private health in Brazil, finally sheds light on disguise mechanisms, contributing to the general literature on institutionalism.

Despite the special attention given to consumers by the business and academic literature, the dissatisfaction of Brazilian consumers has increased significantly. This manifest mainly through the initiation of complaints’ procedures against companies at Procon and other civil society consumer protection organizations (CPOs) that began to take over these issues complementarily to governmental action. This paper aims to examine the accomplishments and relevance of these organizations in protecting consumers and in preparation of related public policies.

A qualitative case study was conducted involving an in-depth collection of information about a restricted system, which included multiple sources. The information was obtained through semi-structured interviews conducted with CPOs’ executives and documents from the other participating organizations in the consumer protection field.

The CPOs have been positively evaluated by participants from the consumer protection field, for their effective action in the intermediation of complaints and in proposing laws and regulations on consumer protection. However, this picture is contrasted with the difficulties imposed by the practices of other field logics, such as legal procedures, media priorities and business interests that, however, collaborate in various occasions.

CPOs’ relevance is more easily evaluated through social legitimation such as endorsements and declarations by the media, the public, by the CPOs’ own publicity and so on. As consumers can choose from alternative channels for redress, firms should be updated with the different procedural norms of each.

This paper draws a picture of the work developed by CPOs and indicates a possible assessment of their relevance in a scenario of logics complexity, which can be useful for policy makers.

The purpose of this paper is to question whether companies follow a deliberate strategic internal pattern while responding to consumer complaints or they always offer consumers a fair redress.

A complaint sample from consumers addressed to the main Brazilian companies in four industries were examined. The responses directly provided to consumers were contrasted to those given after the mediation of Procon‐SP, the main Brazilian consumer protection agency. As an additional source of evidence a documentary research was conducted with other participants of the complaint process.

Results showed that companies retain or postpone the solution of complaints in order to discourage complainants, but once they appeal to consumer protection agencies their demands are satisfied, even when companies do not fully agree with them. This seems to reveal a strategic intent on their part.

Although the sample examined was not probabilistic, the evidence generated by the data collection and also the documents examined confirmed the results, enhancing the findings.

Government and consumer protection organizations could use this information to envision new ways to perfect regulation in order to avoid a complaint increase.

The results call the attention to the ways companies respond to consumer complaints, suggesting they do have a strategic intent regarding the solutions provided that go beyond offering a fair redress, as is recommended by marketing models highlighting market orientation and consumer satisfaction.