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The purpose of this paper is to compare simple dynamic withdrawal strategies with the static withdrawal method, examining not only failure rates and ending wealth but also spending. All withdrawal strategies are adjusted for the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) required minimum distribution (RMD). In addition, this study investigates the use of small company stocks (SCS) in place of large company stocks (LCS). Results indicate SCS portfolios are superior to large. When returns are poor, some dynamic strategies will not ensure income for life. This study demonstrates that the simplest dynamic strategy is superior to two popular dynamic strategies.

Using historical overlapping periods, different withdrawal strategies are examined. Previous studies focused on failure rates and ending wealth. As discussed in Milevsky (2016) different statistical distributions can have similar tail properties (prob of failure) but dissimilar risk and return profile. The detailed examination of both spending and use of small stocks advances the literature in this area.

Results indicate that use of small stocks is superior to using large stocks in the portfolios. When US historical stock returns are adjusted downward, there is the potential that some dynamic strategies will not ensure income for life. This study demonstrates that the simplest dynamic strategy is superior to two popular dynamic strategies.

This paper is the first to examine, in detail, annual spending results for the retiree. Second, it is shown that, overall, SCS are superior to LCS for all stock/bond allocations. Even though absolute downside risk increases slightly, this increase in downside risk is dominated by the upside potential. In other words, the positive skewness of small stock returns along with the cumulative effects of compounding at a higher rate increases both the available wealth for spending and ending wealth. Third, IRS’s RMDs are taken into account for every withdrawal strategy examined. Lastly, it demonstrates that the simplest dynamic strategy is superior to two popular dynamic strategies.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the informational asymmetry (informational advantage of managers) in leveraged buyout (LBO) transactions.

Unlike previous studies of informational asymmetry in LBOs, this research uses a set of reverse‐LBO and re‐LBO firms. The paper proposes and empirically tests three hypotheses that draw on the informational advantage of managers in LBOs. Specifically, the value gain (VG) realized by the reverse‐LBO firms is compared with that realized by a control sample of firms; the wealth distribution between managers and pre‐buyout shareholders is studied; and, finally, the performance of re‐LBO firms relative to reverse‐LBO firms is evaluated.

The results do not support the view that managers use buyouts to exploit their informational advantage. Specifically; the performance of LBO firms under the private ownership is comparable to those of matching public firms; the management team's return in a LBO deal is not significantly more than pre‐buyout shareholders’ return; and repeating reverse‐LBO firms (re‐LBOs) do not necessarily perform better than the non‐repeating reverse‐LBO firms.

While reverse‐LBOs have been investigated to some extent in the prior literature, studies on re‐LBOs are quite scant – although these transactions offer a new and interesting avenue to examine the motivations behind LBOs in general. The use of the entire LBO − reverse‐LBO − re‐LBO cycle in testing the informational advantage of managers is a novelty. It is hoped that re‐LBOs will attract the amount of attention they deserve as these firms may offer interesting means to reinvestigate commonly debated theories of corporate finance.

To study the perception of dividends by the professional investor, for whom mutual fund managers are a proxy. The main line of research in dividends is based on using market data that are fit, ex post, to a cherished hypothesis. It is believed, however, that such data cannot measure motivation which is the underlying force behind generating market data. An understanding of motivation will give us more insight into the dividend paradox (why shareholders love dividends) than just the surface reality one can glean from market data.

Using a survey instrument, the method of analysis (not methodology) is factor analysis and hierarchical grouping that uncovers three distinct groups of professional investors re their attitude towards dividend. This categorization clearly shows that the dividends are perceived differently by the groups found here. Thus, research in dividends cannot follow a traditional route in which the phenomenon is treated as universal, or something similar to a natural occurrence.

Three groups from the more traditional: the more growth‐oriented, aggressive; and a middle‐of‐the‐road group are posited. Although there are some uniformly accepted tenets across the groups, nevertheless, the more traditional group attributes far more importance to dividends than the growth‐oriented group. The latter group perceives dividends as something needed to pacify the shareholder. It is also concluded that none of the academic hypotheses contrived to explain dividend behavior can be supported by empirical evidence. The interesting result is, nevertheless, that the ex post group performance is not significantly different between each possible pairing of the three groups.

As all empirical research goes, results cannot be all‐conclusive, because of time and participation in the sample. This fact alone should not grind to a halt all empirical work. This work is part of a segment of three different studies examining the perception of dividends by corporate managers, and across countries. The next logical step is obviously studying the perception of dividends by the non‐professional investor.

This kind of work was almost never done. This is a first, because unfortunately traditional research that dominates most finance journals does not believe that motivation counts. First, because it satisfies one's desire to better understand the dividend puzzle. But it should be of interest to all who want to study the dividend decision in the firm, and why shareholders love dividends, something entirely not rational as far as economic rationality goes.