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This paper examines the effect of political connections (PCs) on firms' profitability and market value in the Egyptian market after the uprising of 2013.

An empirical study is conducted based on 284 firm-year observations for non-financial listed firms on the EGX100 during the period of 2014–2017. To test the study’s hypothesis, two independent sample t-test, Pearson correlation analysis and ordinary least square (OLS) regressions are conducted.

The results suggest that PCs are common across all industries in Egypt, the PCs through top officers do not improve firm's profitability; however, it has a positive effect on firms' market value. Further, PCs through business owners improve neither profitability nor the market value. Finally, the results suggest that PCs through government ownership have a positive effect on both firms' profitability and market value.

The study’s finding encourages policymakers and regulators in emerging markets, e.g. Egypt, to develop stricter laws, policies and regulatory initiatives to restrain the potential conflict of interest in the politically connected firms.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is one of the first to examine the relationship between PCs and both firms’ profitability and market value in Egypt.

This study investigates the effect of earnings management (EM) and institutional ownership (IO) on investment efficiency (IE). It also investigates the effect of IO, as a governance mechanism, on the relation between EM and IE.

This study examines a sample of Egyptian firms listed on EGX100 during the period 2014–2019. The data are collected manually from firms’ annual reports and governance reports obtained from Egypt for Information Dissemination Company. We depend on the t-test, Pearson correlation, and OLS regression to test our hypotheses.

The results revealed a negative relationship between EM and IE. In contrast, IO has a significant and positive effect on IE. The results also show that IO mitigates the negative implications of EM for IE. Additionally, we find robust evidence for the governance role of pressure-insensitive IO, as it has a positive effect on IE and on mitigating the negative effects of EM on IE.

To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effect of IO as a governance mechanism on the relationship between EM and IE. The results of this study can be of interest to investors, regulators, and policy-makers due to highlighting the potential implications of EM and IO for firms’ investment decisions in Egypt–one of the important emerging markets in the Middle East and Africa.