Search results

This study aims to explore the factors whereby some international organizations (IOs) are more effective than others in international mediation and proposes three types of hypotheses through combining quantitative and qualitative analysis. First, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for gathering, exchanging and disseminating conflict-related information are more likely to mediate effectively. IO bias is another factor of influence in this regard. Second, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for deploying field missions and guaranteeing agreement are more likely to mediate effectively and maintain durable peace. Third, IOs with higher amounts of leverage are more likely to mediate effectively.

The study establishes two data sets: one on interstate conflict; the other on intrastate conflict, thus to cover as many research samples as possible and avoid sampling bias.

Results of the statistical analysis indicate that no matter interstate or intrastate conflict, IOs with higher institutional capabilities for diplomatic interventions are more likely to bring conflict parties to an agreement and thereafter maintain short-term peace. IOs with higher institutional capabilities for economic sanctions are similarly effective. Furthermore, IOs with greater institutional capabilities for field mission deployment mediate more effectively, whether in facilitating peace agreements or maintaining short-term and long-term peace after the agreement. IO bias and preference, however, have no significant impact on mediation effectiveness.

This study has made no in-depth explorations of such existing and important research areas as different third-party comparisons of the mediation effect.

This paper attempts to make some contributions to the topic of mediation effectiveness through applying a bargaining model to the research and performing a statistical analysis based on both an interstate conflict data set and an intrastate conflict data set.

This paper provides an in-depth causal analysis and thoroughgoing comparison of the effectiveness of IOs in both interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts.