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We investigate how firms’ responses to misconduct change when the institutional environment becomes more stringent. Organizational theory offers conflicting perspectives on whether new legislation will increase or decrease pressure on firms to take remedial action following misconduct. The dominant perspective posits that new legislation increases expectations of firm behavior, amplifying pressure on them to take remedial action after misconduct. A more recent perspective, however, suggests that the mere necessity to meet more stringent regulatory requirements certifies firms as legitimate to relevant audiences. This certification effect buffers firms, reducing the pressure for them to take remedial action after misconduct. Using a temporary, largely arbitrary exemption from a key provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we show that firms that were not required to meet all the regulatory standards of good governance it required became 45% more likely to replace their CEOs following the announcement of an earnings restatement after Sarbanes-Oxley. On the other hand, those that were required to meet all of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions became 26% less likely to replace their CEOs following a restatement announcement. Ironically, CEOs at firms with a legislative mandate intended to increase accountability for corporate misconduct shoulder less blame than do CEOs at firms without such legislative demands.

The common good refers to contextual conditions that contribute to human wellbeing and flourishing, such as prosperous communities and environmental sustainability. In this paper, we consider how entrepreneurship impacts society by investigating the generalized outcomes of social entrepreneurship on the common good. From a qualitative study of ten large and profitable social enterprises in the United Kingdom, we theorize how social entrepreneurship contributes to the common good in the short and long term. We also conjecture how some commercial practices undermine the common good and further, explain how the common good performs as a conceptual anchor for social entrepreneurship.

We propose a framework of constrained agency grounded in the actors’ resources and motivations within their structurally constrained context. Structural positions influence the resources available to actors and color the motivations that shape their actions. Resources equip actors to exert agency, while motivations propel them to do so. We derive a typology of network actions and illustrate how the form of constrained agency through which a particular network action is taken can affect actors’ ensuing structural positions and the nature of the constraints they subsequently face. Our conceptualization of constrained agency identifies new sources of endogenous change in network structure.

The purpose of this paper is to show the limits of a-hierarchical organization in the Wikimedia movement governance model. Wikimedia governance, as well as the dynamic transformations it is currently undergoing, remains to be covered by the literature on organization and management studies; yet, they exemplify the problems with the “organization of the future,” which is highly idealized throughout the management literature.

The research design relies on an ethnographic, long-term, participative study of the Wikipedia community at large. The methods used rely mainly on discourse analysis and interviews. The study benefits from the unique participant immersion of the researcher (who spent six years participating in the studied community, making over five edits each day on average, and being elected to several positions of highest trust within the organization).

The findings show that the open, participative, and democratic character of the organization, which in theory is oriented toward sustainable solidarity, as well as the semi-anonymous character of some of the members’ identities, makes the community more empowered yet more belligerent. Also, the entirely open and flat governance model makes it more difficult to establish a stable leadership consensus.

Research is limited due to its methodological design, as it relies on in-depth qualitative case studies, rather than wider analysis. Further quantitative research is needed to confirm the findings on a bigger scale and in other open collaboration organizations.

The findings show that participative organizational design, especially in open collaboration projects, have adverse effects in leading to overly confrontational and quarrelsome organizational culture, which not only makes decision making more difficult, but also deters people less used to debating and conflict.

The social implications of the findings suggest that even in highly democratized structures, some minimal forms of leadership, and governance are useful to facilitate the decision-making processes.

This paper extends the understanding of organizational dynamics and governance in open collaboration organizations, and exposes the shortcomings of this model, which are an inevitable trade-off for its indisputable benefits.