Search results

Adopting interdisciplinary comparative perspective, this paper seeks to study the variety exhibited by the post‐socialist democratic regimes of Central Europe (CE) in the constitutional status of supreme audit institutions (SAI). More specifically, the focus of this work is the degree of independence that SAI enjoy vis‐à‐vis the branches of government, as it is embodied in the constitutional provisions of selected countries of the region.

Cites the fight against fraud as a high priority for European citizens, European institutions and national parliaments. Asks what path the European institutions follow since the adoption of the founding treaties in order to combat fraud and its inevitable effects. Overviews the connection between the allocation of competence and the legal basis principle concerning anti‐fraud policy. Follows by tackling the effects of budgetary mechanisms and finishes by attempting to shed light on the development of internal anti‐fraud structures within the Commission. Allows the reader to understand the conflict between the acquisition of powers for the Community institutions to fight fraud and the protection of criminal law jurisdiction as the prerogative of the national state.