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Currently, our understandings of the dynamics behind the effects of politicization on values and on administrative decision-making remain largely muddled and far from complete. The richness of theoretical accounts, amassed over the past eight decades, has yielded only a limited number of empirical examinations. This failure to develop a coherent collection of empirical works can be for the most part attributed to the complexity associated with studying values, particularly to the lack of clear and testable theories and models. This article attempts to address this deficit and to add to our understandings of the association between values and administrative decision-making at the individual level by explicitly testing the Broker-Purist (BP) model (within a sample of public procurement specialists). It is found that the BP model fits the data well, which suggest the framework as a valid and useful perspective for conceptualizing the effects of environmental politicization on administrative decision-making in public procurement specifically, and in public administration in general.

The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous growth in the body of literature addressing the importance and the impact of contracting and public procurement within the context of devolution of government. The austere budgetary and financial outlooks of the future suggest that the significance of the area will only continue to grow. As such, generating explanatory frameworks, within dimensions such as decisionmaking and accountability in public procurement, becomes crucial. Drawing from original research this article suggests one possible frame for understanding administrative decision-making in complex environments. Based on semi-structured interviews with public procurement specialists, the study identifies two decision-making patterns— broker and purist. It is asserted that the decision-making dynamics exhibited by administrators are contingent on their perceptions regarding environmental instability, in particular the political volatility surrounding their work.

The last two decades have witnessed a tremendous growth in the body of literature addressing the importance and the impact of contracting and public procurement within the context of devolution of government. The austere budgetary and financial outlooks of the future suggest that the significance of the area will only continue to grow. As such, generating explanatory frameworks, within dimensions such as decisionmaking and accountability in public procurement, becomes crucial. Drawing from original research this article suggests one possible frame for understanding administrative decision-making in complex environments. Based on semi-structured interviews with public procurement specialists, the study identifies two decision-making patterns− broker and purist. It is asserted that the decision-making dynamics exhibited by administrators are contingent on their perceptions regarding environmental instability, in particular the political volatility surrounding their work.

Recently there has been an impressive growth in the scholarly literature on public procurement. The study of the administrative roles assumed by public procurement specialists is, however, one area that remains largely underexplored. Somewhat curiously, the professionals making a career in the field are often an afterthought when it comes to empirical research. Outside of anecdotal accounts, there is little that is known in terms of the roles that procurement specialists assume on daily basis. In this respect, there is an important knowledge gap within the field's body of literature. This article attempts to address this knowledge gap through an exploratory empirical evaluation of the administrative behaviors of public procurement specialists.

In recent years, public administration has been targeted by multiple reform efforts. In multiple instances, such initiatives have been ideologically couched in public-choice perspectives and entrenched beliefs that government is the problem. One unavoidable consequence of this continued bout of criticism is the fact that government currently has a noticeably decreased capacity of boosting creation of public value. Within this context, there certainly is an important need for approaches that would counterbalance the loss of public value induced by market fundamentalism. This article suggests that leadership, as a concept of theory and practice, due to its partial immunity to the private-public dichotomy, can provide a pragmatic avenue for nurturing public interest and public value within the devolution of governance, a declining trust in government and a diminished governmental capacity to propagate the creation of public value. While this article critically examines and assesses the capacity of different leadership perspectives in terms of creating and maximizing public value, its primary scope is not the provision of definite answers but rather the instigation of a much necessary discussion.

For a number of different reasons, some more rational than others, public sector management has often fallen for the allure of the “quick fix” promised by the latest managerial fashion. Although it is commonly accepted that complex problems rarely, if ever, have simple solutions − this has not hindered public organizations from eagerly experimenting with trendy, increasingly radical, managerial practices. More often than not, these experiences, when weighed on the background of the original promises and eventual outcomes, prove to be utter failures. In order to clarify the reasons behind this pattern of failure, this article deconstructs two of the most notable recent managerial fashions: Total Quality Management (TQM) and Business Process Reengineering (BPR). It proposes that management fashions fail to lead to effective and productive organizational change primarily due to the fact that their logical construct, which relies on over-dramatization and oversimplification of organizational realities, is at odds with the operational complexities of public sector management. In particular, they fail to account for politics. To this extent, then, they are more likely to be destructive than productive when zealously adopted in public service.

Scholars have suggested that the current dynamics within the provision of public services have shaped traditional administration into governance by contract. Under such conditions, restructuring public procurement, specifically within the technological capabilities available within e-procurement, has often been associated with manifold positive financial and policy outcomes. The supposed benefits of digitalizing public procurement are legion, yet they are often assumed and rarely grounded in hard evidence. Based on the results of a survey of procurement specialists (n=499), this article suggests that in its current form e-procurement adoption is failing to uphold the transformative benefits that it is regularly attributed within popular discourse. An extensive literature review is undertaken in order to construct practical understandings of the factors that could explain the rather disappointing early developments. The paper offers a practice oriented normative model that would increase the probability of achieving transformative dynamics as a result of e-procurement adoption.