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This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/09653569810223272. When citing the article, please cite: Alexander M. Goulielmos, Angeliki Pardali, (1998), “The framework protecting ports and ships from fire and pollution”, Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, Vol. 7 Iss: 3, pp. 188 - 194.

The scientific world has for a long time worked with linear tools to explain complex non‐linear phenomena. Also non‐linear relationships were transformed to linear in order to be handled. This was so despite the fact that nature has been giving us examples showing that the real world was complex, dynamic and non‐linear. This was so until developments in computer science provided the calculating means to the theory of complexity. Today, the theory of complexity is applied to many sciences and to disaster management as well. The application of complexity theory is attempted from a disaster management point of view. As the first attempt to incorporate management science into marine disaster prevention was the so‐called International Safety Management Code of the International Maritime Organization in 1998, we will attempt to connect the theory of complexity to the ISM code. The ISM code, being a safety standard, has been based on good management and organization rulesl. However, ISM code was accused of increasing the bureaucracy of the system with a result that no substance work could be done at the end. Moreover, a need has now emerged, i.e. to establish a “particular ISM code man” among the crewmen on board all ships. On the other hand, modern complexity management suggests more flat hierarchies where information travels faster, and this is something needed in a marine disaster.

Following the marine accident of Erika off the French coast in 1999 shipping administration (and especially the European Union) – in its familiar reactive way – is ready to legislate against tankers of more than 15 years of age, against negligent classification societies and against single‐hull tankers. The positive fact is the initiative of the European Parliament and the Council to set up a community framework for cooperation in the field of accidental or deliberate marine pollution. Moreover, the EU fears that all sub‐standard tankers will eventually be banned from the USA – due to the gradual enforcement of the Oil Pollution Act 1990 – and will come to European waters to continue their polluting habits. So, Europe is about to legislate its own Oil Pollution Act, on even stricter terms than the USA. Provides a survey of the issues involved by setting down the correct – in the author’s opinion – facts about marine accidents, the misunderstanding of which has negated the effectiveness of all measures taken so far against marine accidents.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster was due to the ship or the management, using the modern management theory of complexity.

The 75 pages investigation of the court has been studied and codified to the main aspects and mistakes producing the accident. After the mistakes were identified, a procedure adopted in analysis B to show how these could be avoided if a different management theory has been adopted.

The main finding was that management was responsible for the accident on shore mainly and on board and that a special communication mean which is called “dialogue” in complexity theory parlance had to be adopted.

Any shipping company and ship can identify itself through the common mistakes mentioned and adopt the proposed theory to improve safety and management's effectiveness.

The paper provides a concise analysis of the accident. A new theory is presented and linked to this case study. The study will be useful to management on shore and on board and for IMO of Flag administrations and departments of transport and others.

To follow the modern movement of using “positive feedback” to explain companies' behaviour with special focus on historical accidents.

To contribute to the emergence of new complexity theory as applied to management and prove that historical accidents matter, combining and bringing together literature sources.

The concept of unique equilibrium has been seriously disputed – the selection process is shown, as is the path dependent process using probability theory.

A location theory as case study is outlined – great for those fond of unique equilibrium.

To show another theory, which is dynamic, non‐linear, and complex as reality; to apply it to management underlying at the same time the role of historical accidents (random process).

The purpose of this article is really to provide an answer to the question: Why have marine accidents that result in ships lost have, over the years, been concentrated in two main areas by numbers? Indeed in the British Isles/North Sea/E. Channel‐Biscay Bay 367 ships were lost between 1992‐1999 and in S. China and E. Indies 433 ships also were lost. In contrast, in Cape Horn and in the Panama Canal only five ships were lost over the same period. This strange “attraction” of accidents to only two sea areas has induced us to assume that this phenomenon cannot probably be explained by random walk statistical/ mathematical methods, but by non‐linear chaotic methods and especially that of Hurst Rescale Range Analysis and Spectrum Analysis. Our numerical results – on rather limited data – have shown that in these ships lost a non‐random factor or factors have acted that further investigation may reveal. We consider this as an important fact with wide applications, e.g. in accidents in national highways that strangely enough the majority of road accidents occur mainly in certain locations! Another important conclusion is that man cannot and wishes not to interfere with “randomness” and simply accepts it doing nothing, transferring responsibility from his shoulders over to destiny. Things that are not random must be prevented. If they are random or not chaos/complexity theory helps us to see. Our analysis, we believe, is of special interest to the marine insurance companies.

Attempts to determine the main economic principles that should underline the policies towards safety of ships, cargoes and persons. They applied a model from welfare economics through which they established an “acceptable” or “optimum” level of marine accidents at a point where marginal cost of preventing marine accidents equals the marginal costs of fewer marine accidents. Using mainly graphical analysis they tested whether the Oil Pollution Act is a policy measure in the right direction or not. Similar insights were made for the International Safety Code of IMO which tries to establish quality in shipping through reducing marine accidents (and preventing pollution). This application, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, was performed for the first time.

Presents the status of public policy on protecting ports and ships and describes Greek law and practice regarding combating ship fires. Also “best practices” are identified with regard to preventing and suppressing fires on ships. Authors believe that a neglected topic is the protection of the port sea environment, a problem which made ESPO (European Sea Ports Organisation) create a code of practice for protecting the port environment and DG VII to implement it but are these sufficient for the protection of ports and ships?

The significance of operational human errors in shipping safety has widely been recognized. The accumulation of many shipboard operations on the bridge of the ship demands that a high level of efficiency must be ensured. Discusses the efficiency of the interface which depends on the success of incorporating the human factor in the engineering systems of ship control. At the time of diminishing crew quality, the bridge operator’s confidence, competence and communication capability must be in co‐ordination with the technology provided by these systems. Suggests that the areas of limitation in the bridge‐operator interface must be identified and the course of action for optimizing this critical relationship for safety must be determined.