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Just as the August 1998 financial crisis overturned the predictions of a Russian boom, the quick post‐crisis recovery of the Russian economy came as a surprise too. It has almost become a commonplace that ‘nothing is as strong or as weak in Russia as it seems’ and the need to understand how the Russian economy really works is still of urgent priority.

Western researchers studying the former Soviet Union first paid attention to the phenomenon of blat — to do with the use of informal contacts and networks to obtain goods and services or to influence decision making — in the 1950s. Yet although the importance of blat has been pointed to, there have been no attempts — and in fact no possibility — to study it. This article is based on original data gathered in 56 in‐depth interviews conducted during fieldwork in Russia in August 1994‐April 1995. The window of opportunity for such research occurred after people ceased being inhibited talking about blat, while still having a fresh memory of the Soviet period. These materials are unique. They enabled the author, first, to develop an ethnography of blat — that is to present it as a distinctive form of social relationship or social exchange articulating private interests and human needs against rigid control of the state; second, to record the daily problems which represent the ex‐Soviet system in a light not readily seen by an outsider; and third, to conceptualise the phenomenon of blat thus relating it to other informal practices. In this article focus will mostly be on the third angle of the research.

Stephanie McPhail's description above of the difficult living conditions of the judges in Mongolia in 1995 underscores their vulnerability to corrupt practices and their negative perception by the public. Judicial salaries during that year were comparable to those of civil servants but lower than those of lawyers in private practice and ranged from US$33 to US$51 per month (Quah, 2003a, p. 43). More importantly, the living conditions of judges were difficult, especially in the countryside, where one-third of the judges did not own an apartment, and were forced to live in their offices. Consequently, McPhail (1995, p. 45) concluded that the “relatively low salaries and mediocre working conditions” of the judges were “an impediment to attracting highly qualified candidates to the profession.”

The purpose of this paper is to establish a microeconomics model of corruption based on the behavioural sciences.

The methodology is a practical exploration, first in the convergence of the economics of corruption and the behavioural sciences; based on these conclusions, the microeconomic model of corruption is formulated.

The paper concludes in a model of the microeconomics of corruption.

There are no limitations in the model.

The practical implications are calculating the rent for corruption in the different scenarios.

The social implications are knowing the income from corruption.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper is original, and there is no microeconomics model of corruption formulated in the academic field, only in this work.