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This paper aims to clarify the relationship between institutional framework, concentration of ownership in family firms and results.

Data comprises two samples of family firms from eight Latin American countries and Spain in the year 2010. The first sample contains the largest 20 corporations from each country. The second comprises the 20 largest listed family corporations in each country. To test the hypothesis, the study uses ordinary least squares.

First, firms located in countries with a higher than average quality of the institutional and regulatory frameworks are less concentrated in ownership than firms located in countries with lower than average quality and development of institutional and regulatory framework. Second, the influence of the concentration of the ownership in the performance is more important in countries with higher developed institutional and regulatory frameworks. Finally, first-generation large family firms obtain higher results than large family firms in second generation or beyond.

The study is limited to one year and there are few family firms in Latin American countries. The study only considers some features of ownership, and there is no information about board of directors ' composition.

Institutional framework determines concentration of ownership in family firms and the influence of concentration of ownership in performance.

The study provides new evidence in areas of corporate governance and family firms, analysing a sample of Latin American and Spanish firms, representatives of the civil legal system and a weaker institutional framework. The study uses the corruption perception index like a control variable.