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The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of recent corporate governance reforms on the association between governance practices and earnings management.

This study examines the impact of corporate governance reforms by using a firm fixed‐effect, cross‐sectional analysis of 200 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) for the financial years ending in 2000 and 2005. This paper examines the association between firms' corporate governance practices and the quality of financial reports as measured by the magnitude of earnings management pre‐ and post‐the governance reforms (CLERP 9 and ASX Corporate Governance Council (CGC)).

The results of this study indicate that certain governance practices are important in limiting earnings management. In particular, board independence and audit committee (AC) independence, are associated with lower performance‐adjusted discretionary accruals, one commonly used measure of earnings management. However, increasing executive shareholdings provides incentives to manage earnings.

This study is important to investors, academics and policy makers as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices reduces the likelihood of earnings management.

There is limited research on the association between corporate governance practices or the recent corporate governance reforms (ASX CGC Recommendations and CLERP 9) on earnings management in Australia. This study extends the literature by demonstrating the impact of recent corporate governance reforms on board independence, AC effectiveness and executive directors' shareholding and the association with earnings management.

As organizations are downsized, re‐engineering and the span of control inflates, the need for self‐regulation and control grows. This need has seen the growth in the provision of internal auditing services in the UK. Demonstrates the linkage between ensuring quality by benchmarking, and the required vehicle for understanding the internal audit development needs of UK organizations. Shows the requirements by the use of nine organizations where internal auditing has been developed to give the organization a competitive advantage. Focuses on the critical success elements that are required by developing internal audit departments.

This paper critically reviews the contents of the ‘Compliance Report’ published by the Cadbury Committee in May 1995. The Compliance Report could be seen as a rather self‐congratulatory farewell from the original Cadbury Committee before their successor body, known for the moment as Cadbury II, takes over the task of reviewing corporate governance issues and making recommendations. This paper concludes that the Compliance Report is both disappointing and complacent.

The Cadbury business started in 1824 when my great‐grandfather opened a grocer's shop in the centre of Birmingham. His first advertisement ran as follows: ‘John Cadbury is desirous of introducing to particular notice Cocoa Nibs prepared by himself, an article affording a most nutritious beverage for breakfast’. Soon the preparation of cocoa became his main business and the shop was handed over to his nephew Richard Cadbury Barrow. (It continued as Barrows Stores until it was bought by Fitch Lovell in 1965). This was the way in which most food manufacturers started and it is worth noting that it was the shopkeeper who blended the tea, ground the coffee, and prepared the cocoa nibs. The shopkeeper sold his wares on the strength of his reputation and his greatest problem was buying raw materials of consistent quality.

This paper is concerned with the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance under the Chairmanship of Sir Adrian Cadbury (Final Report 1st December, 1992). The paper analyses the recommendations of the Committee with particular reference to the establishment of a Code of Practice and offers a critical evaluation of the Committees proposals within the broader frame of the internal regulation of corporate power. It specifically analyses the recommendations made with regard to auditors' liability and offers an assessment of the importance of gaining a regulatory perspective on the operation of the accounting profession with regard to the auditing of public companies.

Based on a conference speech, examines one of the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance contained in the Cadbury Report. Discusses the four sections of the Code of Practice – The Board of Directors, Non‐executive Directors, Executive Directors and Reporting and Controls; also the issue of compliance with the Code.

Reports on corporate governance, suggesting there are some serious issues of concern. Examines the relationship between major economic problems and governance issues. Considers the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee. Concludes that improvements in the standards of corporate governance must continue, and this will contribute to improvement in the long‐term performance of United Kingdom companies.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect theoretically on a quarter-century of attempts to codify “best practice” standards related to oversight of and reporting on executive remuneration. Issues around the regulation of UK executive remuneration are analysed focussing on decision making by elite actors, informed by corporate governance codification artefacts and theoretical considerations inspired by notions of the social construction of reality.

Using documentary materials to trace evolution of executive remuneration regulation in the UK, consideration is given to the social antecedents of processes governing corporate board remuneration committee practices. The paper reconstructs the social construction of the UK Corporate Governance Code and draws on relevant theoretically inclined literature to help make sense of processes involved.

Shaping the problems, to be addressed as “legitimate problems”, is core to efforts intended to create “persuasive narratives” around how UK executive remuneration should be regulated.

The paper sketches an agenda for subsequent empirical “field” investigation to assess the social antecedents of UK executive remuneration outcomes.

Offering an alternative way of thinking about executive reward and on-going controversy as to how it may be legitimately regulated, informed by contextual considerations.

A novel look at executive remuneration from a social construction of reality perspective. Adding value to public debate on organisational effectiveness at a time of warnings from luminaries such as the Bank of England governor about the adverse social impact of “stateless companies” and calls for action against unfairness in income distribution.

The concept of the polygamous brand is defined, and Cadbury′s used to illustrate an emerging product concept, involving licensing a brand to other businesses, e.g. Cadbury′s Cream Liqueur, produced by Bass.

Examines the role of non‐executive directors. Argues that there is universal agreement on the need for outsiders to be involved in company direction and that shareholders are not able to provide the necessary checks and balances to supervise board activities. Examines research on the system of non‐executive directors. Argues that there is a need to develop procedures to select non‐executives that are rigorous and add value. Concludes that non‐executive directors will have increasing influence on company direction.