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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether disclosure as required by Islamic Financial Service Board Standard No. 4 (IFSB-4) influences information asymmetry among investors in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries. In addition, the paper investigates whether the influence of IFSB-4 on information asymmetry varies between Islamic and conventional financial institutions.

The paper tests the hypotheses using a sample of firms listed in the GCC over a period of 2000-2013. Ordinary least square regression and fixed-effects estimation techniques are applied to test the hypotheses.

The findings reveal that information asymmetry among investors is lower after the implementation of IFSB-4 than before, indicating that the standard has increased transparency. The results also reveal that information asymmetry after the implementation of IFSB-4 is lower for Islamic than for conventional financial institutions. This suggests that IFAB-4 promotes more transparency for Islamic than conventional institutions.

Owing to data availability, we were unable to use other proxies of information asymmetry, e.g. bid-ask spreads, and the level of disclosure, e.g. self-constructed disclosure index.

The paper concludes that disclosures under IFAB-4 reduce information asymmetry among investors. In this context, this study increases the awareness of standard setters academics investors regulators and many other stakeholders about the economic consequences of disclosure standards in the region.

This study takes a first step to fill evident gaps in the literature by investigating the influences of disclosure standard on information asymmetry in a unique setting that is often ignored by accounting researchers, which helps to widen our knowledge on accounting practices across the globe.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on earnings management (EM) within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. In addition, the impact of firm’s political connections (PCs) on EM is investigated, as well as whether it moderates the relationship between CG and EM.

Fixed-effects model is used on a sample of non-financial firms across the GCC countries to test the hypotheses. Moreover, a two-stage least squares method and a propensity score matching procedure are used to mitigate potential reverse causality and sample selection bias.

This study reveals that CG mechanisms such as board size and board independence are negatively associated with EM, while CEO duality is positively association with EM. In addition, this study shows that institutional ownership and blockholders do not influence EM. Furthermore, PCs are shown to play a moderating role in the relationship between CG and EM. The results of this study are robust to endogeneity testing and to alternative measures of CG.

Because of a lack of data, the authors do not consider additional CG attributes such as tenure, education and age of board members. Future research could explore the impact of these attributes when data becomes available.

This study provides valuable insights for government officials, policymakers, standard-setters, regulators and corporations by presenting new evidence on the relationship among CG, PCs and EM. Moreover, this study underscores that, in the absence of a strong institutional infrastructure and investor protection, relying solely on strong CG and Islamic values and GCC culture may have a limited impact on effective monitoring of opportunistic managerial behaviors.

This study contributes to existing literature with a specific focus on the unique political, legal, institutional, social and cultural setting of the GCC region. Moreover, this study provides new insights that PCs serve as a governance mechanism in mitigating EM because relatively little attention has been given to the impact of PCs in improving accounting outcomes, especially in the context of the GCC region where Islamic ethical norms often shape business practices.

The lessons and merits of changes in the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities are still debated and are a major policy issue. Prior studies provide mixed evidences on the economic consequences of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior. More importantly, this paper aims to investigate the role of product market competition on the impact of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure on managers’ risk-management behavior.

This paper tests the author ' s hypotheses using the fixed-effects estimation technique, where it includes firm dummies in all the regressions. This approach enables to control for unobserved firm effects (fixed effects) on firms’ risk-management behavior that are assumed to be constant through time but vary across firms.

The author finds that mandatory recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities, on average, decreases firms’ market rate risk exposure. This finding suggests that after the implementation of the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (SFAS 133), firms engage in more prudent risk-management activities to mitigate the potential cost of earnings volatility imposed by the standard. However, the decrease in market rate risk exposure is lower when the level of product market competition is higher. This finding is consistent with the idea that the recognition and disclosure of derivative instruments and hedging activities required by SFAS 133 unintentionally forces firms in competitive industries to engage in significant risk-taking. The result suggests that more disclosure in risk management may change risk-management incentives in undesirable ways if firms face the threat of entry in their product markets.

The results provide a new understanding on the role of product market competition on the effectiveness of mandatory derivative instruments ' recognition and disclosure. The findings imply that standard setters should take product market competition into consideration before making derivative instruments and hedging activities ' recognition and disclosure mandatory for all firms.

The paper contributes to the accounting literature by providing a new insight into the moderating role of product market competition in the accounting recognition and disclosure regulation and firms’ reporting behavior relation. Moreover, the paper extends the current literature on the effects of SFAS 133 on risk-management activities and sheds light on the impact of accounting regulations on firms’ real economic behavior.