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When in‐plant and college‐based courses are run for supervisors and managers, it is conventional to use a U‐shaped seating arrangement in the training room to promote participation and discussion. However, at each class session, people will tend to sit with the same companions habitually, which may be more comfortable, but less productive than if they sat with different people each time.

This study aims to explore the government’s subsidy preference and pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously under different government subsidy policies.

The authors establish a model consisting of a government, a set of heterogeneous consumers and a manufacturer. Three government subsidy policies are investigated without government subsidy (NS), government subsidy to consumer (CS) and government subsidy to the manufacturer (MS).

The results show that the government subsidy can increase both the green product’s demand and the manufacturer’s profit. The subsidy level and government’s utility under the CS policy are equal to those under the MS policy. Furthermore, if the government’s subsidy level is exogenous, there exists a Pareto improvement region when social welfare for unit greenness level is high. That is, if the government’s subsidy level under the CS policy is higher than that under the MS policy, both government and manufacturer prefer the CS policy; otherwise, they prefer the MS policy.

This paper considers the market where there is a monopoly green manufacturer and a government that only provides subsidy policy. In fact, competition from traditional manufacturers and carbon taxes are also worth exploring in future research.

This study provides some suggestions for government subsidy and provides guidance for the manufacturer’s pricing decisions under different government subsidy policies.

This paper is the first to compare government subsidy to consumer with a government subsidy to the manufacturer and investigate the pricing decisions of a manufacturer who produces traditional and green product simultaneously by considering an endogenous subsidy level of government.

In this paper we study a class of complexity measures, induced by a new data structure for representing k-valued functions (operations), called minor decision diagram. When assigning values to some variables in a function the resulting functions are called subfunctions, and when identifying some variables the resulting functions are called minors. The sets of essential variables in subfunctions of f are called separable in f.

We examine the maximal separable subsets of variables and their conjugates, introduced in the paper, proving that each such set has at least one conjugate. The essential arity gap gap(f) of the function f is the minimal number of essential variables in f which become fictive when identifying distinct essential variables in f. We also investigate separable sets of variables in functions with non-trivial arity gap. This allows us to solve several important algebraic, computational and combinatorial problems about the finite-valued functions.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the coordination mechanism of cost sharing for green food production and marketing between a food producer and a supplier who both contribute to the sales of green food.

This paper first develops demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on green degree of food and associated consumers’ acceptances. Then, cost-sharing contracts-based game models are proposed. At last, regarding to optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a real case.

When green cost is only shared by one side, the cost-sharing contracts cannot optimally coordinate the food supply chain, but it can improve profits for both the supplier and producer. When consumers’ sensitivity to the green degree of food increases, a mutual cost-sharing contract will bring more profits for both the supplier and producer than those under the non-coordination mode in a decentralized supply chain situation. A real case verifies the conclusions.

The models are in complete information, and the market demand is assumed to be linear to sales price. Mutual cost sharing is only for material processing and food production, which can be extended to include sharing for sales cost. Coordination ideas on the proposed contracts development and solutions for optimal decisions can be applied in the other industries.

The study shows that coordination between a supplier and a producer is needed to improve the food supply chain’s green performance.

This paper first extends the existing profit functions by considering the green efforts of both a supplier and a producer as well as their effects on green degree of products and consumers’ acceptances to the green degree.

This study explores how collaborative cost sharing between the buyer and the supplier in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising affects the performance of a fresh agricultural produce supply chain (FAP-SC).

We use a contingency approach to modeling different scenarios and analyzing how fairness perception, interplaying with corporative–retailer cost sharing., influences the performance of fresh agricultural produce cold chains.

The findings of the research highlight the crucial role of the retailer's fairness concern. When the retailer's fairness concern is absent, cost sharing (in cold chain equipment and marketing and advertising) is found to help boost demand and enhance the profits of members of the supply chain; bilateral cost sharing is found to have a more significant impact than unilateral cost sharing. When the retailer's fairness concern is taken into account, however, cost sharing is found to reduce demand at a lower level of fairness coefficient but increases demand at a higher level of fairness coefficient; bilateral cost sharing boosts both demand and profit of the supply chain when the retailer is in a “high concern, high anger” state.

The findings of the research highlight the important role of the buyer's farness perception when supply chain partners adopt collaborative cost sharing programs. This study contributes significantly to research and practice in supply chain collaboration and agricultural cold chain performance.

In this article we design an econometric test for monotone comparative statics (MCS) often found in models with multiple equilibria. Our test exploits the observable implications of the MCS prediction: that the extreme (high and low) conditiona l quantiles of the dependent variable increase monotonically with the explanatory variable. The main contribution of the article is to derive a likelihood-ratio test, which to the best of our knowledge is the first econometric test of MCS proposed in the literature. The test is an asymptotic “chi-bar squared” test for order restrictions on intermediate conditional quantiles. The key features of our approach are: (1) we do not need to estimate the underlying nonparametric model relating the dependent and explanatory variables to the latent disturbances; (2) we make few assumptions on the cardinality, location, or probabilities over equilibria. In particular, one can implement our test without assuming an equilibrium selection rule.

This paper aims to examine the blockchain introduction and altruistic preference decisions of the supplier in agricultural food supply chains and discuss how the supplier decisions are influenced by blockchain technology and altruistic preference levels.

The author considers a single period two-level supply chain model to describe the supplier’s decisions. The supplier, as the leader of the game, decides whether to introduce blockchain technology and his own level of altruistic preferences. Consumers have environmental awareness and heterogeneity in green trust. Supply chain members determine their own product pricing and green effort level under Stackelberg game.

The results reveal the negative impact of unit verification cost in the technology introduction process on the supply chain. In addition, the supplier can adjust their profits by adjusting their altruistic preferences after introducing blockchain to offset the impact of blockchain through the influence of altruistic preferences as discussed by the author.

This paper investigates how the profits and green efforts of supply chain members are influenced by blockchain technology and altruistic preferences.

This paper aims to study Irreversible conversion processes, which examine the spread of a one way change of state (from state 0 to state 1) through a specified society (the spread of disease through populations, the spread of opinion through social networks, etc.) where the conversion rule is determined at the beginning of the study. These processes can be modeled into graph theoretical models where the vertex set V(G) represents the set of individuals on which the conversion is spreading.

The irreversible k-threshold conversion process on a graph G=(V,E) is an iterative process which starts by choosing a set S_0?V, and for each step t (t = 1, 2,…,), S_t is obtained from S_(t−1) by adjoining all vertices that have at least k neighbors in S_(t−1). S_0 is called the seed set of the k-threshold conversion process and is called an irreversible k-threshold conversion set (IkCS) of G if S_t = V(G) for some t = 0. The minimum cardinality of all the IkCSs of G is referred to as the irreversible k-threshold conversion number of G and is denoted by C_k (G).

In this paper the authors determine C_k (G) for generalized Jahangir graph J_(s,m) for 1 < k = m and s, m are arbitraries. The authors also determine C_k (G) for strong grids P_2? P_n when k = 4, 5. Finally, the authors determine C_2 (G) for P_n? P_n when n is arbitrary.

This work is 100% original and has important use in real life problems like Anti-Bioterrorism.