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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how Islamic banks' financing affects corporate investment efficiency.

To achieve the research purpose, an empirical model was constructed to describe the relationship between Islamic banks' financing and corporate investment efficiency. The empirical model was tested through generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique using a panel data of 163 Malaysian listed firms for the period 2007–2017.

This study provides evidence that Islamic banks' financing plays an important role in enhancing investment efficiency and that this positive effect comes mainly from non-PLS contracts. Moreover, the results show that the effect of Islamic banks' financing in preventing suboptimal investments is stronger in the financial crisis period. The results also reveal that the contribution of Islamic banks' financing in reducing suboptimal investments is more prominent when firms face over-investment problems.

This research contributes to the debate on the financial implications of Islamic banks' financing modes by exploring their effect on corporate investment efficiency.

From a managerial perspective, the research findings are beneficial to Islamic bank managers to the extent that they highlight the role of Islamic financial contracts in improving corporate investment efficiency. In addition, the lower effect of PLS contracts on investment efficiency implies that policymakers in Malaysia should multiply their efforts to further expand the PLS financing.

This paper offers some insights on the role of Islamic banks' financing in mitigating agency conflicts and reducing asymmetric information problems. It is the first attempt focusing on the role of Islamic financing in fostering corporate investment decisions.

With the licence season 2013/2014 onwards Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Financial Fair Play (FFP) fully came into force. Among other things, FFP demands from the clubs to operate within their own revenues in order to counteract the increasing over indebtedness in European club football. The purpose of this paper is to cast further light on the relationship between UEFA and the clubs as the main actors of FFP and to derive implications to UEFA to improve the efficacy of this regulatory intervention.

This paper explicitly examines the case of FFP from an agency theory perspective. A positivist agency approach is applied in order to describe and explain (potential) problems in the relationship between UEFA and the clubs.

The paper demonstrates that the relationship between UEFA and the clubs corresponds in many aspects to a classic principal-agent problem. A potential conflict of interest between both actors is outlined which together with asymmetric information creates incentives for opportunistic behaviour on the part of the clubs. The necessity of a stronger emphasis and communication of the economic and sport ethical legitimacy of FFP is detected.

It is suggested that UEFA should consider taking a more proactive stance and endeavour to prevent non-compliance not only by limiting the opportunities to do so but also by providing information as well as education.

FFP is supposed to have ground-breaking consequences for European club football. This is the first paper to systematically examine (potential) agency problems inherent in FFP.

This paper aims to contribute to research on corporate governance in regulated sectors, with emphasis in the field of activity of foreign investors through the ownership structure and legal system that regulates companies in Brazil.

In the first moment, the investigation had a quantitative approach of relational nature. Based on the data about the valuation of actions, statistical methods were applied to a secondary database containing measurable information provided by the organizations that operate the Brazilian stock-market and documentary evidence provided by the companies. In the second moment, a qualitative approach was adopted, resorting on the use of semi-structured interviews with investors and agents of the sector.

The results lead to two paths: presenting the perspective that foreign investors play a key role in improving governance practices because foreign ownership mitigates agency problems, provides adequate follow-up and optimizes the use of corporate resources; and evidencing the existence of a mitigation of operational risks in the face of the various obligations imposed by the concession contract with the regulatory agency, without direct interference under the ownership structure of regulated companies.

The literature portrays a distinct economic scenario in Brazil, where stock control is pulverized and mechanisms of corporate governance and scope of action of investors and regulated sectors are well-defined and implemented.

A great part of the studies from this field discusses the same object: the impact of the adoption of corporate governance mechanisms on selected efficiency indicators or on the value of the companies' actions. This investigation, on the other hand, targeted a differentiated approach so that its contribution would lie in the investigation under the influence of the regulation on the legal attributions and the performance of the investors how many conflicts between the other shareholder/regulatory body, as the control measures import by the regulatory agent the concessionaires of the Brazilian highways and transportation sector.

The identification of the presence of foreign investors as a determinant for: better performance of companies in Brazilian regulated sector in terms of market valuation; better mitigation of requirements with the regulatory framework for the agencies that regulate the concession sector, targeting a reduction in the asymmetry of information and transparency among all stakeholders.

The fact that Brazil is an emerging country that lacks a rigid legal system and corruption-control measures in corporate environments and public sectors, stresses the importance of the application of the “Best Codes of Corporate Governance Practices” in the main developed countries. This also stresses the need for effective supervisory bodies that contribute to a better financial performance of companies, guaranteeing investors the legal system.

Proposes that decision making is part of all management tasks and that it is particularly important for emergency managers as they often need to take decisions quickly on very inadequate information. Briefly reviews some of the particular problems of emergency decision. Looks at the usefulness of Vroom and Yetton’s decision process model for emergencies, before proposing a simplified problem classification based on three problem characteristics. Concludes by reviewing a collection of “emergency” decisions and analysing some of the common factors to suggest a number of simple action rules to be used in conjunction with the simplified decision process model proposed, the “emergency manager’s decision cube”.

The purpose of this paper is two‐fold: to examine two approaches buying firms can utilize to manage supplier quality; and to investigate the ways in which factors inherent in supply chain relationships affect the use of these approaches in supply chain quality management.

Drawing on agency theory, this paper proposes a conceptual framework that relates the underlying factors of a supply chain relationship to the use of quality management approaches. Two types of approaches, outcome‐based and behavior‐based, are discussed in terms of their focuses, purposes, and methods. Propositions are developed about the effects of these factors on the decisions buying firms make about supply chain quality management.

This study suggests that rather than relying on one generic supply chain quality management approach for all suppliers, firms need to choose different management mechanisms for different suppliers based on the salient attributes of individual suppliers and their relationships with the buyers. Five types of agency‐based factors are discussed. These factors – information asymmetry, goal conflict, risk aversion of suppliers, length of relationship, and task characteristics – can be expected to influence how firms design and manage their quality management systems for supply chains.

A better understanding of the distinction between outcome‐based and behavior‐based approaches helps managers evaluate which approach is best suited to managing the quality of their suppliers. The propositions pertaining to the key factors provide managers with some guidelines about the critical conditions they should consider when building their firm's supply chain quality management system.

Having an effective quality management system of a supply chain is essential for maintaining a smooth supply of high quality products and services to customers. However, little is known about how a firm should design this supply chain quality management system. The paper addresses this gap by applying agency theory to examine the two essential approaches to managing supplier quality and to explore the critical factors that should be taken into account when considering the appropriate approaches for different suppliers.

This study aims to examine the effects of agency cost on auditor choice. This paper also deals with the moderating role of the board’s financial expertise (Bfe) and the status of the internal control (Intecon) system on the relationship between agency cost and auditor selection.

This study’s sample consists of 1,040 firm-year observations of Iranian nonfinancial companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2019. The information required for this research is mainly extracted from Comprehensive Database of All Listed Companies (in Iran Stock Exchange). Data from 130 companies were obtained during the research period. This study used logistic regression to test the hypotheses.

The findings indicate that companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from lower classes. As the proportion of financial expert members on the board increases, the intensity of this relationship will be reduced. Companies with higher agency costs choose the auditor from the lower classes, but the higher the ratio of financial expert board members, the more these companies will choose high-quality auditors. However, findings showed that the status of the Intecon system has no moderating effect on the relationship between agency costs and auditor selection.

The results of this study can expand the existing literature on the relationship between auditor selection and agency costs and the factors affecting this relationship, especially the Bfe and Intecon. This research has significant suggestions for regulators, stakeholders, shareholders and analysts in emerging economies that may encounter similar contextual implications.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of behaviour-based and buffer-based management mechanisms on enterprise agility using the lens of the agency theory.

This study is based on data collected from 185 manufacturing enterprises using a survey instrument. The authors employ structural equation modelling for data analysis.

The results of this study show that buffer-based mechanisms used for dealing with agency uncertainty of supplier/buyer not only have a positive impact on agility of enterprises, but are also contingent on the behavioural interventions used in the relationship with a supplier/buyer. Behaviour-based mechanisms also positively impact enterprise agility through mitigating the likelihood of supplier/buyer opportunism.

This study demonstrates that buffer- and behaviour-based management mechanisms can be used as complementary approaches against agency uncertainties for enhancing enterprise agility. Therefore, for enterprises to boost their agility, it is vital that their resources and capabilities are fairly distributed across entities responsible for creating buffers through functional flexibility, as well as individuals and teams dealing with stakeholder engagement, in particular, suppliers and buyers.

The authors use the lens of the agency theory to assimilate and model characteristic agency uncertainties and management mechanisms that enhance enterprise agility.

This study examines the effect of financial constraints on firms’ decision to form strategic alliances as a choice of growth strategies. Drawing on agency theory, we argue that financially constrained firms engage in strategic alliances to a greater extent due to the disciplinary role of financial constraints. Nevertheless, financially constrained firms may use strategic alliances as a means to gather more resources from alliance partners. Thus, we further examine agency perspective versus resource dependence perspective through institutional ownership and board size as boundary conditions respectively.

We test our hypotheses on a sample of all publicly traded industrial U.S. firms covering the years 1985–2017 that engaged in strategic alliances.

We find that financially constrained firms increase strategic alliances. Moreover, high institutional ownership acts as the monitoring mechanism, which weakens the positive association between financial constraints and strategic alliances.

This study provides a better understanding on financially constrained firms’ decision to form strategic alliances by examining the monitoring role of institutional investors and the resource provision role of the board of directors.

Partner firms to the same joint venture experience sharply different stock price reactions. These differences cannot be explained by mechanical factors related to differences in firm size and ownership share in the project, nor are they attributable to different partner roles in the project or differences in investor anticipation of the announcement. We conclude that the stock price reactions reflect a revaluation of non-project assets that is different for each partner. Additionally, we find evidence indicating that investors infer information about agency problems (in the sense of Jensen, 1986) from the joint venture announcements and subsequently, revalue the whole firm – not just the marginal project being announced. Finally, we find that free cash flow is value-enhancing for one type of partner firm after we control for the extent of agency problems.

This study aims to investigate and point out the variations of agency theory in the context of Sharīʿah governance in Islamic banking operations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA).

The study followed the approach of quantitative Corporate Governance Index (CGI) by computing the Gov-index (Gompers et al., 2003) and the Gov-score (Brown and Caylor, 2004; Saffieddine, 2009) to examine corporate governance (CG) issues using primary as well as secondary data. The primary data was generated from three full-fledged Islamic banks (IBs) and nine traditional banks with Islamic banking wings, all operating in the KSA. The approach was to provide an insight into the agency structure in the context of Islamic banking, which may lead to a trade-off between the conformity of Sharīʿah (Islamic law) rules and processes followed in safeguarding the rights of investors.

The majority of the Islamic banking services that are surveyed in this study acknowledge the significance of Sharīʿah governance and have implemented the fundamental methods, in conformity with this system. Certain flaws in Sharīʿah governance principles pertaining to audit, control and transparency are reported.

The research outcomes will be invaluable to IBs aiming to improve existing SG practices. It also has implications for IB managers to design strategies while complying with regulations and to protect the interests of all investors without breaching the ethics of Sharīʿah.

This paper adds original value to the body of knowledge on agency relationship by analysing the dynamics of agency theory in the unique and complex context of Sharīʿah governance of IBs or those offering Islamic products in the KSA. The results can be used as a valuable feedback for improvement of Sharīʿah governance in the banking system in the KSA and the Gulf region at large.