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A futures contract may rely upon physical delivery or cash settlement to liquidate open positions at the maturity date. Contract settlement specification has direct impacts on the behavior of the futures price, leading to different effects of liquidity risk on futures hedging. This chapter compares such effects under alternative settlement specifications with a simple analytical model of daily price change. Numerical simulation results demonstrate that capital constraint reduces hedging effectiveness and tends to produce a lower optimal hedge ratio. As the futures contract proceeds toward the maturity date, hedgers will take larger hedge position in order to achieve better hedging effectiveness. Finally, optimal hedge ratios are higher (resp. lower) under cash settlement for the bivariate normal (resp. lognormal) assumptions, whereas hedging effectiveness is almost always greater under cash settlement.

This study aims to examine the behavior of cash raised through market timing efforts and the success of such efforts in creating value to shareholders.

It is shown that in two quarters, subsequent to raising equity, cash balance of market timers is higher but after that, there is no significant difference between timers and non-timers. Results of speed of adjustment regressions indicate that market timers move faster toward their target cash levels.

Market timers are small firms that suffer from asymmetric information. They have limited access to capital market, and raising external capital is an opportunity that should be timed. The results suggest that, on average, these firms are managed by more able executives, who are 10 per cent more likely to time the market; however, it is found that timing efforts are unsuccessful in creating value to shareholders even after controlling for the mitigating effect of managerial ability. Subsequent to market timing, on average, market timers earn significantly lower abnormal return over different holding periods relative to their comparable non-timer counterparts.

Overall, the results undermine the validity of market timing as a value-maximizing financial policy.

The term ‘strategy’ is one of the most frequently used terms in business, and its application in marketing is particularly common. Company strategy, market strategy, marketing strategy, sales strategy, promotion strategy, distribution strategy, low pricing strategy – it would take a long time to list all of them. Although this term is so commonly in use, its definition is not as straightforward and it can be interpreted in different ways. In comparison with tactical decisions, strategy is much more significant for an organisation as it brings long-lasting consequences. It is implemented by higher level managers on a regular basis, and it is based on external, often subjective information, so decisions – especially at the time they are made – are difficult to evaluate.

Taking into consideration the fact that strategy refers to a long-term rather than a short-term period, strategic decisions serve as the basis for undertaking operational activities. However, marketing refers to the market and the competition. It is possible to claim that marketing strategy is trying to find an answer to the question to which path an organisation should follow in order to achieve its goals and objectives. If, for example, a company has a goal to generate a profit of PLN 1 million by selling 100,000 pieces of a product, the market strategy should answer at least the following two questions:

1. Who will be our target group, for example, who will purchase the 100,000 pieces of the product?

2. Why is it us from whom a potential buyer should purchase the product?

Who will be our target group, for example, who will purchase the 100,000 pieces of the product?

Why is it us from whom a potential buyer should purchase the product?

The target market will be defined if a reply to the first question is provided. The second question identifies the foundations of competitive advantage. These two issues, that is, target market and competitive advantage are the strategic marketing issues. You cannot change your target group unexpectedly while competitive advantage is the basis for changing decisions regarding prices, promotions and sales.

This chapter describes the measures of marketing activities which refer to strategic aspects and testify a company’s market position – the measures of the performance of target groups and competitive advantage. Readers’ attention should be also focused on the indices that are less popular in Poland and, therefore, may be underestimated. It seems that some of them, for example, the index of marketing resources allocation and the marketing risk index, provide a lot of valuable information and, at the same time, make it possible to show the value of marketing investments. Their wider use in the near future is only a matter of time.

On the basis of principal-agent and financing constraints theories, the purpose of this paper is to construct a unified research framework via mathematical models and to provide a logical and consistent explanation of the contradictory discovery of the relationship between dividend payment and I-CFO in the previous literature.

Establishing the economic mathematical models, this paper uses the comparative static analysis to figure out the equilibrium results, to further testify the conclusions, the authors initiate the empirical tests to make the discussion more realistic.

The authors observe that overinvestment caused by agency problems is the primary reason for I-C sensitivity when the investment expenditure is less than the internal capital; dividend payout suppresses the overinvestment caused by the agency problem, thus alleviating the investment’s dependence on the internal capital. However, underinvestment caused by the financing constraints is the primary cause of I-C sensitivity when the investment expenditure is greater than the internal capital. The payment of cash dividends increases the investment shortage caused by the financing constraints, thus increasing the sensitivity. Further, the authors explore the impact of dividend payments on I-CFO sensitivity. They argue that dividend payment is not an appropriate measure of financing constraints. Both I-CFO sensitivity and I-C sensitivity are functions of agency cost and information cost.

This study provides a logical and consistent explanation of the contradictory discovery of the relationship between dividend payment and I-CFO in the previous literature and provides a clear framework and reference for future studies on the impact of financial constraints, agency cost on the investment’s dependence on the internal capital.

The theoretical model of this paper supports this differentiated mandatory dividend policy and provides reference and evidence for China's financing policies and dividend distribution policies.

This study theoretically and empirically analyzes and verifies the roles of agency cost and financial constraints on the determinants of I-C sensitivity for the first time. First, different from earlier literature, this paper puts forward I-C sensitivity as a new measure of investment’s dependence on internal capital, making the measurement more accurate. In the case of a firm with positive liquidity reserves, using the I-CFO sensitivity as a measure of external financing constraints could overestimate the firm’s financial constraints. Second, by constructing an economic static analysis framework, this study analyzes how I-C and I-CFO sensitivities change with the agency cost, the financing constraints and the dividend payment ratio. The research provides a basic framework and explanation on the contradictions of the earlier literature. The results are supposed to serve as a foundation for estimations of investment’s dependence on internal capital and should be embedded in general empirical tests in future research.

The major objective of any business organization should be to create value for its stockholders or owners. If the stock of a publicly held corporation does not provide its shareholders with a return that increases their wealth, that corporation is not meeting its most fundamental obligation.

The purpose of this paper is to use fundamental models incorporating structural relationships within the firm in a terminal value model for the second stage of a two-stage valuation model utilized to estimate the value of a company.

The innovation is that growth options are identified within the structural relationships and a model capturing the value of the optionality is incorporated in the second stage of the two-stage valuation model.

Significant outcomes are that terminal value is shown to be a large portion of a company’s total value and the price behavior for initial public offerings produced by the model is consistent with the result of empirical studies.

This paper explicitly incorporates growth options in the second stage of a two-stage valuation model for the firm.

The present study aims to investigate the impact of working capital management (WCM) practices on the investment and financing patterns of listed nonfinancial companies in Pakistan for a span of 10 years.

The study is based on secondary financial data of 354 listed nonfinancial Pakistani firms during the period of 2005–2014. The two-step generalized method of moment (GMM) regression estimation technique is employed to ensure the robustness of results.

Empirical testing reveals that: excessive funds tied up in working capital have a negative impact on the investment portfolio of sample firms. Besides, a negative relationship between change in fixed assets and excess net working capital posits that, eventually, firms use idle resources tied up in short-lived assets to boost their investment activities. Furthermore, larger working capital levels were associated with higher leverage ratio which indicates that firms with inefficient WCM policies have to rely heavily on long-term debt to meet their short-term financing requirements. Additional results indicate that firms that take more time to sell inventory and convert receivables to cash, make more use of debt. Results of cash management models illustrate that cash-rich firms have lower leverage levels which signal the strong financial health and internal revenue generation capability of such firms.

There is a dearth of empirical studies that examine the implications of WCM decisions on a firm's capital structure. Besides, these studies are only confined to how a WCM policy influences the long-term investment activities of a firm. The research contributes to the extant literature by empirically revealing a link between the WCM practices and the firm's long-range investment and financing patterns. Hence, financial managers shall account for the impact of their short-term financial management decisions on the capital structure of the firm.

We identify a novel concept of discretionary idiosyncratic volatility proxied by the idiosyncratic volatility component not related to the non-systematic industry volatility as a source of agency problems that have implications for firms’ cash holdings and their investment decisions. We find that firms with low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility, which likely captures discretionary effort and risk-taking by managers, have smaller cash reserves. Moreover, while high discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms spend cash internally (internal capital building), low discretionary idiosyncratic volatility firms use it for external acquisitions, consistent with the “quiet life” hypothesis. Our findings thus indicate a need for reinforcement of existing regulations and corporate laws to control for agency costs, which could in turn reduce firm risk and the probability of financial meltdown at the aggregate level.

This paper aims to perform empirical analysis to test whether less severe agency conflict between managers and controlling shareholders may improve family firms’ corporate and stock liquidity, compared to non-family firms.

The authors use the ordinary least square and two-stage generalized method of moments regression analyses. They also use match-paired design for robustness check.

Focusing on Standard & Poor’s 500 firms, the authors find that family firms are more conservative by hoarding more corporate liquid assets (as measured by accounting balance sheet liquidity ratios) than their peer non-family firms to prevent underinvestment from external costly finance. These family firms also exhibit higher level of stock liquidity and lower liquidity risk as measured by effective bid–ask spread than non-family firms. The results are consistent with the motivation that organizations (i.e. family firms in this study) whose shareholders can efficiently monitor that their managers are associated with higher level of corporate liquidity and stock liquidity, and lower level of liquidity risk.

This study contributes to the literature on liquidity (both corporate liquidity and stock liquidity) and ownership structure, more broadly corporate governance. It provides insights into corporate and stock liquidity within a unique ownership context: family firms versus non-family firms. Family firms in the USA are subject to both Type I (agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control) and Type II agency problems (agency conflict arising between majority and minority shareholders). It is an ongoing debate whether family firms suffer more or less agency problems from one type versus the other than non-family firms. The finding that family firms have higher corporate and stock liquidity is consistent with that family firms being subject to less severe agency conflict due to separation of ownership from control.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of firms' cash holdings and ownership concentration on the firms' valuation using an unbalanced panel dataset of non‐financial listed firms in Australia.

The author used a generalized method of moments approach suitable for unbalanced panel dataset to examine the impact of firms' cash holdings and ownership concentration on firms' q‐ratios after controlling for the impact of financing, dividend and investment decisions, respectively.

The paper finds a positive relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio of Australian firms. The ownership structure moderates the effect of cash holdings on q‐ratio in asymmetric fashion, i.e. for widely held firms, there is a positive relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio; while for closely held firms, there is significant negative relationship between cash holdings and q‐ratio. Furthermore, changes associated with corporate governance reforms, also effect q‐ratio besides ownership structure. The paper also examined the impact of cash holdings on the market value of the firms over time. As the author predicted, increase in the cash holdings has a negative effect on the firms' market valuation, and this effect slows down over time. Overall, the empirical analysis finds support for similar findings documented for the developed countries in the literature.

The sample consists of non‐financial listed firms over the period of 1995 to 2010.

The results imply that widely‐owned firms have lower cash holdings because managers are able to access capital market easily compared to firms with concentrated ownership, which might have complex agency and information asymmetry problems. These findings are consistent with the agency costs. Managers in less widely‐held firms have more discretion over cash holding policies, and the value reduction imposed on these firms may reflect shareholders' recognition of the possibility of managerial expropriations.

This is believed to be the first paper to explore agency costs of cash holdings for Australian firms.