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The purpose of this paper is to explain the theory of speculation to corporate executives. It is important that corporate hedgers understand how bubbles develop to effectively adjust their corporate hedging strategies. Since excess speculation is always the primary cause of all bubbles, it is mandatory that corporate executives understand the basics of speculation theory.

The paper uses the case of Southwest Airlines to illustrate how corporate hedging programs can fail in an environment of asset price bubbles. Further, it reviews key academic theoretical articles on speculation, with emphasis on applied concepts.

Corporate hedgers must recognize inflating bubbles and acknowledge the positive feedback trading. Corporate hedgers must refrain from becoming the positive feedback traders themselves. Corporate hedgers can hedge the speculative bubbles by having insurance in form of options against potential bubbles at all times.

The paper can be a valuable reference source for corporate managers with diverse educational and business backgrounds because it widely disseminates the theory that only the closed circle of the trading community and narrowly specialized researches practice and fully understand.

This research applies the construct of bullwhip effect in a non‐traditional context. It is explored in intra‐organisational echelons. It is argued that the bullwhip effect in a company's inventory management of inbound and outbound logistics flows depends in part upon the gap between the degree of speculation and postponement of business activities. It is also argued that the bullwhip effect is caused by the value adding of business activities in supply chains. The study shows that there is a potential bullwhip effect between companies’ inbound and outbound logistics flows, i.e. two internal stocking levels. A see‐saw model of the bullwhip effect, and a typology of the bullwhip effect in intra‐organisational echelons, are introduced. The term “reversed bullwhip effect” is also introduced. Finally, a model of the bullwhip effect‐scenarios in a dynamic business environment positions these contributions in a wider theoretical and managerial context.

In 1967, Louis P. Bucklin proposed the principle of postponement‐speculation as a basis for predicting and explaining the existence of speculative inventories in the marketing channel: “The combined principle of postponement‐speculation may be stated as follows: A speculative inventory will appear at each point in the distribution channel whenever its costs are less than the net savings to both buyers and sellers from postponement.” In other words, for a middleman to intervene between a seller and a buyer, he must demonstrate his ability and willingness to perform certain marketing functions in such a way that savings result, or satisfactions are greater, for both of the original trading partners. Therefore, the economic justification for a middleman's existence is his superior efficiency in performing basic marketing tasks and functions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine users’ decision-making mechanism of speculative investment behavior and its sequential consequences in the Bitcoin context from a dual-systems perspective.

Original data were collected via a survey of 334 participants with experience in Bitcoin speculative investment. The partial least squares method was used to test the proposed model.

Speculative investment behavior in the Bitcoin context is driven by strong impulse and weak self-control, leading to negative consequences. The extent of the imbalance between the two cognitive systems is greater with the subjective norm than without it, thus facilitating speculative investment behavior. Noteworthy differences in the impulse and self-control effects on Bitcoin speculative investment are found with differences in Bitcoin objective and subjective knowledge.

This study is the first attempt to empirically investigate users’ decision-making mechanism used when speculating in Bitcoin.

Examines the economy of Southeast Asia during the period 1997 to 1999 against a background of socio‐economic theory and a transition from disequilibrium to general stable and equilibrium conditions. Discusses solutions towards establishing self‐regulating mechanisms needed for a free, just and stable economy and society: reform of officially organized securities commodities and foreign exchange makets; reform of the public budget and budgetary policies; and reform of the foreign exchange system and internaitonal commercial and financial relations.

The purpose of this study is to discuss the phenomenon of dual-role participants in public-private partnership (PPP) projects. Contractors who are also investors hold a dual-role that can improve project financing and technical ability. However, speculation without effort from the dual-role subjects can result in serious conflicts of interest between pure and dual-role investors. The authors considered contractors’ decisions regarding whether to invest and exert effort and discussed the distribution of interests between pure and dual-role investors based on different strategy combinations. The authors also analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of the dual-role phenomenon through the income model.

Based on game theory, this study constructed four types of revenue structure models for pure and dual-role investors in different decision-making choices. Then, the authors performed a comparative analysis of the dual-role participant’s income in different models.

When the contractor becomes a dual-role subject and expends significant effort (m1*), the revenue of stakeholders can be increased, which can achieve a win-win outcome. Meanwhile, the level of effort of the contractor can be guaranteed when the government or project company limits the investment proportion, rj. For a contractor, the channel of becoming a dual-role subject and expending effort is suggested for maximizing investment return.

The study optimized the PPP project system and investment structure and offered specific governance instruments for a PPP project company to prevent speculation by dual-role subject. Concretely, a dual-role subject was discussed in the context of PPPs; this discussion offers new insight for researchers. Four revenue models based on different contractor strategies were established, a finding that is beneficial for further improving the revenue governance of PPP projects. Finally, the study used a quantitative model to validate the advantages of the dual-role phenomenon, and the authors found that the proportion of equity can impact a dual-role investor’s effort level, thereby curbing speculation to produce a win-win outcome.

Having been trained in both engineering and philosophy, I am extremely sensitive to the use of words. I choose words as a result very carefully. One of the key words in my article was clearly “speculation.” No one was more aware than I that I was offering a bold speculation. Given this recognition, I was well aware of the “evidential support base” of my speculation.

Financialisation being but the end product of a complex process, countering it is not a question of modifying individual behaviour but of changing the law. In sharecropping, the standard contract between landowner and labourer gets shared only based on what has actually been produced: risk is being shared along the terms of the contract guaranteeing to both parties a share of the produce, not a fixed quantity of it. Imbalance creeps in when rent is being paid without being a true share of wealth having been created, in what is nowadays called ‘consumer credit’: when interest is charged and paid from wealth that has not been generated through combining human labour with the resources lent as an investment but by the borrower mortgaging wages yet to come. Got historically added to the dysfunction of consumer lending, speculation with the meaning traditionally assigned to it in finance of ‘wagers on the rise or fall of the price of financial products’. Speculation doesn't add any economic value but shifts only amounts of money between bettors, generating a number of risks. Counterparty risk: the loser possibly defaulting, triggering then a damaging chain reaction of defaults. Moral hazard risk: bettors attempt to push the market in the direction favouring their bet. Systemic risk: bettors take advantage of the well-established fact that should they lose, the public sector will act as a saviour of last resort, bailing them out. This all can be redressed by law, and by law only.

James G. March rejected relevance as a criterion for social science research, but he was concerned about the social implications of social science models. He argued that a focus on truth alone as a criterion for evaluating models meant that social scientists miss the implications of their models for beauty and justice. Here, we explore all three criteria to see what they bring to the practice of building social science models and how they interact in the models and in the world. We argue that the choices that social scientists make about these three criteria shape what they select to study in the models, what they see in the world, and what they imagine for the world. We also argue that how social scientists approach truth, beauty, and justice has implications for how they understand and engage the world.