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The purpose of this paper is to examine how business ecosystems evolve, what is the identity of business ecosystem and is the ecosystem identity static or dynamics. To understand the above questions, this paper is conducted on stone carving clusters in India.

The author engaged the ethnographic approach in this study. To sample stone carving clusters of India, the author followed the snowball sampling method. Further, the author did collect the information by informal personal discussions, focus group discussions and participant observations. Furthermore, the thematic analysis and interpretative phenomenological analysis were applied to process the data. The validity and reliability of the method was ascertained by testing the credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability.

The author found that the business ecosystem of stone carving was dynamic, and it was transformed from the buyer-driven ecosystem to the supplier-driven ecosystem. The identities of the early stage business ecosystem and the late stage ecosystem were analyzed through product, network and information flow. The author developed a structural framework to conceptualize the identity domain of the business ecosystem and the author named it as “nature-conduct-performance model.” Also, the author conceptualized the identity evolution, the influence of social system on business ecosystem identity, and identity-based conflicts and identity-based cooperation in the stone carving business ecosystem.

This study is making additional theoretical contribution in conceptualize the business ecosystem from the identity construct.

BACIE AND TRAINING OFFICERS — the Caxton Hall Conference ‘The Role and Function of the Education and Training Officer’ was the title of the recent Caxton Hall conference of BACIE's London and Home Counties Group, but no‐one present was in any doubt that more was in the air than self‐examination. Long before the talk by Mr J. H. Smith of the London School of Economics on ‘The Professions and Society’ the question of forming a professional body for Education and Training Officers had been raised — only to be gently put off for the moment by the Chairman.

This paper examines bread wheat quality and its effect on vertical co‐ordination in the wheat supply chain. Wheat quality is defined by many different characteristics, which poses limitations on the effectiveness of industry grading schemes in meeting the quality needs of end‐users. Consequently, individual processors may have an incentive to segregate wheat based on their own quality specifications. The costs and benefits of wheat segregation are analysed using a simple economic model, and illustrated with a case study of supply chain management taken from the UK bread industry. Warburtons Ltd procures bread wheat varieties with specific intrinsic quality attributes from Canada using identity preserved supply contracts. The paper concludes that the benefits of wheat quality control will encourage millers and bakers to develop closer vertical linkages with wheat suppliers in the future.

This paper aims to argue that in the short history of New Zealand banking, political experimentation, based at first upon socialist ideology of the 1940s led to the nationalisation of The Bank of New Zealand (BNZ), followed by a period of neo‐liberalism in the 1980s and early 1990s in which the bank was privatised. It further argues that the establishment of Kiwibank Ltd in New Zealand at the dawn of the twenty‐first century was a return to the political ideology of the 1940s.

The paper discusses the nationalisation and subsequent privatisation of the BNZ and draws a parallel between the perceived banking environment as it existed in New Zealand in the twentieth century and as it existed at the establishment of Kiwibank. By way of context setting it also discusses the political environment as it relates to the nationalisation of the Bank of England.

The paper finds that in New Zealand, political experimentation, not commercial pragmatism, was the underlying motivating factor for the state's involvement in banking.

The paper contributes to the pool of knowledge regarding the political motivations behind nationalisation and state ownership of banking assets. The article is of interest to economic and political historians as well as those who study New Zealand political party history. Future policy makers could do well to reflect upon the motivations for state ownership of banking assets by asking if their decisions are driven by ideology or economics.

Considers rhetoric and discourse in financial accounting and how rhetoric/discourse was employed by the directors of a New Zealand property company. The particular case cited is that of the New Zealand Land Company 1882‐1890. Shows how land may be transferred from indigenous owners and redistributed by means of various discursive and accounting techniques. The sources used include archival records, parliamentary reports and articles from contemporary colonial newspapers. Concludes that the accounting information available provided a legitimizing discourse, which enabled some to benefit at the expense of others. Many of these observations are believed to be timeless.

From what has been said in this journal regarding standards and associated regulations for jams and allied products, it appears that this is the only English‐speaking country where no standards and no regulations exist for this very important item of the food supply. We manufacture more jam than any other of these countries. We are the greatest consumers, per head of population, of jam. It is therefore a very serious disadvantage to the consumer that it should be left entirely to financially interested persons to formulate their own standards for their own advantage. It would be inexpedient in any case to allow this, but when such “standards” as those we have referred to have been adopted by a great combine, and the products made in conformity with those standards forced on the consumer, a case bad to begin with is made worse. The greater proportion of the jam and marmalade put on the market is either of poor quality or of very poor quality. The poor quality stuff may be labelled “Full Fruit Standard,” and the meaning that is to be attributed to these words is left to the purchaser to find out. We say that this legend is no recommendation, and in saying this we find our opinion to be supported by at least one important member of the combine. One of their labels is before us as we write. The words “This marmalade is guaranteed to conform to the agreed standard of the Food Manufacturers' Federation” is printed in such small type that it is by no means easy to read; it is printed at the very bottom of the label and in such a way that at first glance it appears to be merely an ornamental border. Now the object of making the marmalade is to sell it, and if in the opinion of the makers the words which we have quoted above would aid that sale they would have been conspicuously displayed and printed in large letters on the label. The label also says that the marmalade is made “from … oranges and sugar”; it does not say that it is made from oranges and sugar only. Now this label may be taken as a fair specimen of all the rest. It gives the purchaser no information about that which he is buying, and it is safe to say that not one person in ten thousand knows anything about the “standards” referred to. If the interests of the consumer were fairly balanced against the profits of the manufacturer, a label would read more or less as follows:—“This product conforms to the standard of the Food Manufacturers’ Federation.” “It consists of fresh (name) fruit or fruits and sugar only in the proportions — per cent. fruit and — per cent. sugar.” If there is nothing to fear there is nothing to conceal. Why then is such a label not used?

The Great Depression reached a turning point in the currency crises of 1931, and the German banking and currency crisis was a critical event whose causes are still debated. We demonstrate in this paper that the crisis was primarily domestic in origin; that it was a currency crisis rather than a banking crisis; and that the failure was more political than economic. German banks failed in 1931, but the problem was not primarily with them. Instead, the crisis was a failure of political will in a time of turmoil that induced a currency crisis.

This study aims to identify the political alignment and political activity of the 11 Presidents of Britain’s most important scientific organisation, the Royal Society of London, in its early years 1662–1703, to determine whether or not the institution was politically aligned.

There is almost no information addressing the political alignment of the Royal Society or its Presidents available in the institution’s archives, or in the writings of historians specialising in its administration. Even reliable biographical sources, such as the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography provide very limited information. However, as 10 Presidents were elected Member of Parliament (MP), The History of Parliament: British Political, Social and Local History provides a wealth of accurate, in-depth data, revealing the alignment of both.

All Presidents held senior government offices, the first was a Royalist aristocrat; of the remaining 10, 8 were Royalist or Tory MPs, 2 of whom were falsely imprisoned by the House of Commons, 2 were Whig MPs, while 4 were elevated to the Lords. The institution was Royalist aligned 1662–1680, Tory aligned 1680–1695 and Whig aligned 1695–1703, which reflects changes in Parliament and State.

This study establishes that the early Royal Society was not an apolitical institution and that the political alignment of Presidents and institution continued in later eras. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the election or appointment of an organisation’s most senior officer can be used to signal its political alignment with government and other organisations to serve various ends.