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Traditional models of full and open competition are generally applied for ordinary public procurement contracts, whereas special competitive procedures (such as unsolicited proposals) are permissible under various international and domestic frameworks for “Public-Private Partnership” (PPP) contracts. In case of the latter category of contracts, some concerns about relative lack of transparency and competition in the award process have begun to surface, while they are being increasingly relied upon for development of public infrastructure and services. This paper focuses on certain aspects of competition and transparency in the award of PPP contracts, vis-à-vis normal public procurement contracts. To facilitate a sharper identification of legal issues, it compares the relevant regulations and case law in India applicable to unsolicited proposals (UNPs) with that in the United States and those under available international frameworks. It concludes with recommendations on identified legal dimensions of UNPs with reference to government obligations on transparency and competition, so as to adequately preserve these elements in procurement of PPP infrastructure projects.

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has left nations around the world scrambling to procure emergency healthcare capacity, services and equipment. To meet this unprecedented demand on global healthcare systems, governments are increasingly looking to partner with the private sector via public-private partnerships (PPPs). However, the protracted procedures of traditional PPP procurements are not suitable for times of crisis. This is where unsolicited proposals (USPs) may play a pivotal role.

To explore the relevance of USPs for the current pandemic, this Viewpoint paper describes both the advantages and challenges of USPs, discusses the emergence of several PPPs to combat COVID-19 as well as some of the ad hoc processes governing current USP consideration, highlights an example of streamlined USP solicitation from Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation and articulates a pragmatic and practical approach for encouraging and procuring healthcare USPs.

This Viewpoint paper concludes that USPs could play a crucial role in the COVID-19 pandemic as boundary spanners between public agencies and the private sector in the PPP procurement process.

Deploying proactive and strategic healthcare PPPs at speed and scale through digital USP platforms may help mitigate the pandemic’s long-term effects. Digital USP platforms may also serve as crucial tools for effective crisis communication, decision-making and partnership.

Using the digital USP platforms proposed in this paper, infrastructure organizations can develop and maintain effective partnerships with other sector organizations prior to and during crises like COVID-19.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate consumers’ responses to unsolicited cross-selling of supplementary paid-for services made during delivery of a core service, and the contextual and personal variables moderating those responses.

Three formal experiments test the effect on participants’ responses of the perceived relevance of the supplementary service to the core service, personal psychological reactance, in the case of a high-relevance supplementary service, and self-monitoring, in scenarios in which a low-relevance supplementary service is proposed either in public or privately.

The experiments found that participants’ satisfaction ratings were reduced in response to cross-selling of a supplementary service that was of low relevance to the core service, and that satisfaction ratings if it was perceived to be of high relevance compared were not reduced despite the unsolicited attempt at cross-selling. However, the non-negative response to a high-relevance offer was limited to participants with a lower tendency to reactance. Furthermore, a high predisposition to self-monitoring evoked more positive judgments if a low-relevance supplementary service was proposed in public rather than privately. That of low self-monitors was no different in either case.

This paper examines the trade-off faced by a service provider between customer satisfaction and extra revenue from supplementary services, and explores conditions under which a provider can propose unsolicited supplementary services without offending customers.

In many countries that allow unsolicited proposals (USPs) for public–private partnership (PPP) projects, incentives are awarded to the initial proponent of the USP projects during the tendering process as rewards for initially making a proposal. Because of such a reward system, including the bonus system, USPs are commonly known to involve fewer tender participants. This paper aims to investigate the empirical relationship between the number of tender participants and the institutional factors of PPPs. Specifically, two institutional factors are examined: the use of USPs and the bonus system for initial USP proponents.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression analysis is used in this study to analyze PPP data in South Korea.

This paper demonstrated that USP projects have fewer bidders participating in tenders than solicited projects. Meanwhile, the analysis showed that the bonus system as another component of the institutional framework did not account for the number of bidders in tendering. In the analysis by three different facility types (“Roads,” “Environmental facilities” and “Other” types) of whether the bonus system discouraged participation in the bidding, the authors found heterogeneous responses among the types. For “Roads” and “Other” types of projects, the existence of the bonus system reduced the number of bidders for USP projects, while for “Environmental facilities,” there was no negative relationship between bonus points and the number of bidders. In the analysis of whether there were fewer bidders when no bonus points were awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the number of bidders for “Roads” and “Environmental facilities.”

This study shows the possibility that other institutional factors apart from bonus points affect competition. The characteristic factors of USPs can affect the decision to participate in the tender from the perspective of potential bidders.

Recent studies on USPs have mainly focused on the strategies that ensure the effective management of USPs for PPP implementation. However, quantitative effects of USPs on the tendering process have not yet been addressed. The quantitative effect refers to something that may be estimated by quantity or that relates to the describing or measuring of quantity, such as the present attempt to account for the number of bidders.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the procurement of public–private partnerships (PPPs) through unsolicited proposals (USPs). This chapter compares the policy framework and economic data of USPs in Brazil and Chile and provides some economic insights based on this analysis. In line with the existing literature, empirical evidence shows that non-proponents rarely win the tender for a project based on a USP. Differently from the existing literature, data analysis suggests that USPs may result on successful projects only in very specific conditions. USPs may work better in sectors where the government has developed higher in-house expertise to manage infrastructure projects. Also, USPs are more fit to projects that are clearly economically viable ex ante. However, even in these cases, USPs might generate a higher transaction cost to the government and less competitive tenders in comparison to solicited proposals. The analysis focuses on countries that have a very rich experience in USPs. Nonetheless, given the different legal and regulatory environments around the globe, it is difficult to provide a one-size fits-all USP policy. This chapter aims to provide some insights into how to manage a USP in order to improve the public policy framework of this procurement tool. This chapter contributes to the literature as it provides an economic analysis of the conditions in which the USP mechanism could result in a successful project.

This paper aims to investigate the current practices and deficiencies in the legal and regulatory structure of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in Sri Lanka and explore recommended practices by international model laws and guidelines addressing such deficiencies.

Firstly, a desk study review was conducted to explore the current practices of PPP in Sri Lanka. Secondly, nine expert interviews were conducted to comprehend further current PPP practices and identify the deficiencies of legal and regulatory structure of PPP in Sri Lanka, and content analysis was used to analyse the interviews findings. Finally, international model laws and guidelines were reviewed to explore recommended best practices.

The research explored non-existence of a national PPP policy, lack of clarity of executing a project’s preliminary affordability, and lack of guidance on risk assessment and feasibility studies as current major deficiencies of PPP legal and regulatory structure in Sri Lanka. Further, findings showed that setting-up two project governance structures, a steering committee and a project team, and develop clear guidelines and standard forms can be adapted to strengthen the PPP legal and regulatory structure.

The findings of this study may be useful to policy makers in tracing essential reforms to PPP legal and regulatory structure. This study is limited to legal and regulatory structure of first three phases of the PPP project life cycle: project identification, project preparation and project procurement.

This paper establishes a novel framework to visualise the current practices and deficiencies in the PPP legal and regulatory framework in Sri Lanka, and the way of incorporating recommended practices by international model laws and guidelines for its future reformations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Tanzanian practitioner’s readiness assessment for public–private partnership (PPP) adoption. This study is important as the readiness assessment enables the stakeholders to assess their capability and current status quo to implement new ideas such as PPPs.

Underpinned by the theoretical lenses of innovation diffusion theory (IDT), this research undertakes semi-structured interviews with PPP practitioners within the Tanzanian affordable housing sector. The content analysis was used for the data as collected.

“Lack of awareness and usage of PPPs framework models during the feasibility and subsequent implementation process”, “Limited knowledge and skills required for PPP practitioners”, “Poor capacity building”, “Lack of engagement of experts during the viability and assessment process” and “Poor selection process of private partners giving rising to unsolicited proposals” are the main PPP features influencing the readiness process and fostering of innovation.

The identification of the readiness approaches would support PPP policymakers and stakeholders with the government mechanisms for identifying the key areas needed to be addressed to improve the PPP implementation performance.

Outputs of this study provide insights on how to foster a better understanding of the readiness assessment strategies and approaches for successfully implementing PPP in affordable housing projects.

The European Commission has published a revised proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive to harmonise member states' rules on consumer protection in relation to the distance marketing of financial services. Financial services had been specifically excluded from the scope of the Distance Selling Directive which came into force in the UK on 31st October, 2000. Included in the proposal is the right of a consumer to receive a comprehensive set of information about the financial services supplier and the contract before the contract has been concluded, and the right to withdraw from the contract without penalty during a period of 14 days after entering into the contract. Questions have arisen as to whether the proposal is an example of wholly unnecessary intervention at European level and whether it is introducing unnecessary red tape for the financial services industry. One of the most important problems with the proposal relates, however, to a fundamental disagreement between member states as to whether the directive should be a maximum harmonisation measure or simply minimum harmonisation. With the current protracted state of negotiations, it remains unclear as to whether this proposal will ever achieve political agreement.

This paper aims to empirically investigate the differences and similarities on the implementation constraints in public–private partnership (PPP) in developing and developed economies/countries, represented by Ghana and Hong Kong, respectively.

A questionnaire survey was conducted with relevant experienced PPP practitioners in Ghana and Hong Kong. One hundred and three completed questionnaires were received for analysis. Kendall’s coefficient of concordance analysis, mean score ranking, Mann–Whitney U test and quartile grouping were used for data analysis.

The results show six implementation constraints with significant differences. Constraints related to the general investment climate of PPP projects (i.e. ecological conditions of PPP) are ranked higher in Ghana than in Hong Kong, whereas constraints related to the organisation and negotiations of PPP projects are higher in Hong Kong than in Ghana. Further, two constraints, lengthy delay in finalising negotiations and lengthy delay due to political debate, are very critical in both jurisdictions, whereas “negative public perceptions on PPP transactions” and “high use of unsolicited proposals” are of less challenge in the implementation of PPP in both jurisdictions.

The findings of this study contribute to knowledge on the international best practices of PPP. In addition, international private bidders would be informed of the mitigation measures to adopt when engaging in PPP arrangements in any part of the world, whether in a developing or developed economy country.

Perhaps the marvel is that there should exist at all a department in a British official body at national level dedicated to the support of research into information needs and the problems of providing and operating library and information services. That it does exist may be regarded as the product of a typically British combination of conscious decision‐making and historical accident.