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This paper aims to show that zakat solves the collective action problem by changing the framework of giving. An additional purpose of this paper is an attempt to fill a critical gap in the Islamic economics literature. This gap concerns the nature and role of zakat in effectively delivering aid to those in need while mitigating the potential for free riding. There is also a general gap in the current literature on Islamic economics that the issues of zakat and charity have not received the same attention as the focus remained mostly on money, banking and the issues of interest and usury. The paper is also an attempt to provide a refocus.

This paper attempts to build an argument to show how zakat can function as a unique solution to the free-rider problem in voluntary charity. The author’s argument is based on a precise theoretical framework, namely the “free-rider problem,” and how zakat can function as a unique solution to this problem. The author also uses game theory to show how reputation can lead to cooperation in a repeated game. The author uses an example from Pakistan to show how reputation can be a disciplinarian of zakat collection organizations.

Zakat solves both the free-rider problem in ordinary charity and the coordination problem between members in a large group. The free-rider problem is solved by changing the very framework of giving and the coordination problem between Muslims around the globe disappears because the rates and details of levying zakat are centrally created based on divine revelation.

This paper presents an important topic as it addresses one of the most popular giving practices in Muslim societies, called zakat. It also provides a framework in examining the meaning and function of zakat in Muslim societies.

This chapter discusses the extension of legal equality between male and female citizens in four states in North Africa – Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria – through one specific lens: A married woman's legal capacity to initiate and obtain divorce without the husband's consent. Building on the works of Stein Rokkan and Reinhard Bendix on the expansion of citizenship to the ‘lower classes’, it is argued that amendments in divorce law by introducing in-court divorce for women, in addition to out-of-court divorce, is a significant institutional change that extends legal equality between men and women. The introduction of in-court divorce expands female citizenship by bolstering woman's juridical autonomy and capacity in state law. Changes in divorce laws are thus part of state centralization by means of standardizing rules that regulate family law through public administrative institutions rather than religious organizations. Two questions are addressed: First, how did amendments in divorce laws occur after independence? Second, in which ways did women's bolstered legal capacity in divorce have a spill over effect on reforms in other patriarchal state laws? Based on observations on sequences of change in four states in North Africa, it is argued that amendments that equalize between men and women in divorce should be seen as a key driver for reforms in other state laws, that reduce legal inequality between male and female citizens. In all four states, women's citizenship was extended in nationality law and criminal law after amendments in divorce law gave women unilateral legal power to exit a marital relationship.