Search results

Corruption control in the Republic of the Philippines (RP) has hardly failed, but it is not (yet) a success story either. Dramatic “people power” episodes have occurred, but populism has also, at times, led to repression. Still, essential reform lessons are available.

This is a conceptual reassessment of corruption control. Central concerns include the types of corruption experienced in the country, incentives that might sustain collective action, the need to measure both corruption and reform, and linking reform to citizens’ quality of life.

Top-down, whole-country approaches to reform often treat corruption as if it were the same everywhere, thereby emphasizing “best practices”. However, that can be misleading: a best practice in one society might be irrelevant, impossible, or harmful in another. Contemporary reformers must carefully examine the historical, social, economic, and political contexts, as well as the consequences of corruption. Groups and activities seemingly unrelated to corruption control can prove essential. Reformers must fight corruption with people, not for them.

The ultimate goal of reform must be justice: redressing imbalances of power while building social and political trust.

To show that establishing an anti-corruption agency (ACA), by itself, is not likely to be a successful anti-corruption strategy. Instead, a solid base of social trust, participation, and support is just as essential as creating an ACA with significant powers and resources.

This is a historical review of the origins and development of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong, and an assessment of its three-pronged approach strategy at both strategic and tactical levels.

An ACA requires broad and deep social support and participation if it is to succeed. That the ICAC remains nearly unique in developing such a base of support provides important lessons for those countries with ineffective ACAs.

A reassessment of the ICAC after a half-century shows that the Hong Kong case, despite its familiarity, has much to teach us if we understand it in its broadest implications.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the challenges of Japanese political leadership in combating corruption with an emphasis on the 1970s and 1980s when Tanaka Kakuei and Miki Takeo led Japan.

This paper discusses the perceived extent of corruption in Japan, the importance of Japan’s gift-giving culture, and examines the efforts of Miki Takeo and the consequences of his political reforms for Japanese politics. Comparison is made with his predecessor, Tanaka Kakuei, to highlight the differences in combating corruption between both leaders.

Compared to Tanaka Kakuei, who was highly corrupt, Miki Takeo left a mixed legacy. He managed to revise campaign finance laws but lacked the political will and support from his party. The reforms he implemented failed to reduce money in politics, but they favoured the opposition in the collection of funds.

This paper will be useful to scholars and policy-makers interested in studying the role of leaders in curbing corruption and the challenges of political reform.