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In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the remanufacturing of components requires patent licensing from the supplier.

The authors consider three different models with government subsidy for remanufacturing: (1) no government subsidies; (2) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the supplier and (3) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the remanufacturer and use the Stackelberg game model to solve and analyze the equilibrium wholesale prices of components and the equilibrium outputs of new and remanufactured products under three subsidy modes.

The results show that the equilibrium wholesale prices of two kinds of components decrease with the unit patent licensing fee and the unit government subsidy, and the equilibrium quantity of the remanufactured products under the three modes is obviously higher than that of the new products.

Finally through numerical simulation, it is found that the equilibrium profits of the supplier, the manufacturer and the supply chain increase monotonously in relation to the unit government subsidy, while the optimal profit of the assembler in relation to the unit government subsidy tends to decrease first and then increase.

The purpose of this article is based on the unit patent license fee model in the closed-loop supply chain.

This paper analyzes the impact of the bundling strategy of the retailer selling new products and remanufactured products on the closed-loop supply chain under the condition that the original manufacturer produces new products and the remanufacturer produces remanufacturing products.

The results show that alternative products can be bundled, and in many cases, the bundling of remanufactured products and new products is better than selling alone.

If the retailer chooses bundling, for the remanufacturer, when certain conditions are met, the benefits of bundling are greater than the separate sales at that time; for the original manufacturer, when the recycling price sensitivity coefficient is high, the bundling is better than separate sales.

Gamification is a booming motivational approach in information systems. Leaderboards play a key role in gamification; however, there are mixed findings regarding the heterogeneous motivational impacts of leaderboard positions. This study aims to clarify the motivational effects of high and low leaderboard positions by assembling diverse behavioral measures and self-reports. The measures used in this study shed a light on the quantitative and qualitative dynamics of motivation facilitated by leaderboard positions. The authors inspect motivation in relation to satisfaction and frustration of competence need.

The authors conducted an online experiment set in a crowdsourcing context, asking the participants to compete in an image tagging game. Participants' leaderboard positions were manipulated to be either high or low for five consecutive rounds. The number of clicks, tags, duration of tagging and persistence on the task were measured as indicators of motivation.

High ranks on leaderboards induced complacent behaviors choosing easy ways to maintain their positions, while low ranks led the participants to stick to the right process of the task with intensified motivation round after round. However, neither of the motivations seemed to be of intrinsic nature.

The present study provides conclusive evidence on the varying motivational impact of leaderboard positions. The authors also demonstrate how the “needs-as-motive” model (Sheldon and Gunz, 2009) applies to gamification. Its implications in self-determination theory and gamification literature are discussed.