Deepak Verma, Varun Dawar and Pankaj Chaudhary
The present study's goal is to analyze the impact of audit quality (AQ) on earnings quality (EQ) using different audit attributes. The study shows empirical evidence from India…
Abstract
Purpose
The present study's goal is to analyze the impact of audit quality (AQ) on earnings quality (EQ) using different audit attributes. The study shows empirical evidence from India, considered an emerging market.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample selected represents the 376 non-financial firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). With a 20-year time frame, the authors used the absolute value of discretionary accruals (McNichols, 2002) (DA) as a proxy for EM, which is inversely related to EQ. The authors analyzed data using OLS, fixed effect (FE), 2SLS and Panel-IV estimators.
Findings
The authors found that most audit attributes positively affect EQ. In the Indian context, joint auditor (JA), auditor size (A_SIZE), auditor fee (A_FEE) and auditor tenure (A_TENURE) have a negative association with EM indicating high EQ. In contrast, auditor rotation (A_ROTATON) positively affects EM confirming low EQ.
Research limitations/implications
The present study uses Big-4 and its member firms as a proxy of auditor size (A_SIZE); instead, other bases may be taken for it, like the dominant audit firms in a particular industry in sample data, etc. The authors have started audit tenure from the base year, i.e. 2001, which may ignore the association of auditor and auditee just before 2001.
Practical implications
The study findings would enhance policymakers' willingness to prepare appropriate regulations regarding JAs and auditor rotation, which might improve financial market efficiency and reduce financial fraud among Indian corporates.
Originality/value
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study to incorporate “Joint Auditor” (JA) as a proxy for audit quality in the Indian context, which might significantly contribute to the literature.
Details
Keywords
The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms…
Abstract
Purpose
The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.
Design/methodology/approach
The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables.
Findings
The agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues.
Originality/value
This study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India.