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This paper examines the different features of China's economic development in different stages of economic globalization. The study finds that the investment- and export-based growth model drove China's high-speed economic growth between 2000 and 2007, which came into existence around 2000 when China plugged into the global production network.

This paper also finds that China slowed down to the New Normal because of the disruption to the socio-economic underpinnings of this growth model. As China adapts to and steers the New Normal, supply-side structural reforms can channel excess capacity to the construction of underground pipe networks in rural areas of central China and fix capital while advance rural revitalization.

At the same time, enterprises must strive to build a key component development platform for key component innovation and the standard-setting power in global manufacturing.

The establishment of a domestic production network integrating the integrated innovation-driven core enterprises and modular producers at different levels can satisfy the dynamic demand structure of China in which standardized demands and personalized demands coexist.

The modernization of China’s economy is an integral part of Chinese-style modernization. According to the principle of unifying theoretical, historical and practical logic, theoretically explaining the modernization of China’s economy is both a political necessity and a higher scientific requirement.

Following this evolutionary line – from modes of production to the general economic development mechanism and then to patterns of economic operation and development – this paper employs the principal contradiction analysis method to offer an interpretation of China’s economic modernization from the broad Marxist political economy perspective.

In economic terms, “get organized” primarily refers to the development and mutual promotion of team-based and market-based division of labor organizations, as discussed by Karl Marx. “Get organized” (specifically the development of team-based division of labor organizations) acts as the engine of China’s economic modernization and serves as the historical logical starting point. Division of labor is the theoretical logical starting point for interpreting China’s economic modernization. The two of them are congruent, achieving the unity of theoretical and historical logic at the starting point. The development and mutual promotion of these “two types of division of labor” inherently generate the general mechanism of economic development first comprehensively discussed by Marx and Friedrich Engels, which involves the division of labor development and market expansion accumulating cyclically and reinforcing each other. This mechanism drives both the high-speed and high-quality development of China’s economic modernization.

The broad Marxist political economy paradigm facilitates explaining China’s economic modernization theoretically, historically and practically with unified logic. “Get organized” serves as both the engine and the realization mechanism of this modernization, with the Communist Party of China (CPC) consistently being the core force of this organizational effort.

China's economic transition is essentially the process of China's institutional changes. During the changes, the appearance of institutional innovation is not regular; instead, it is intermittent and random. The purpose of this paper is to show that the fitful appearance of institutional innovation is the root of China's economic growth and fluctuations.

This paper constructs a real business cycle (RBC) model introducing the institutional factor expressed in the quantitative form under the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework by measuring China's institutional changes quantitatively.

By comparing the characteristics of the actual economic data with those of the simulated economic data, we find that this RBC model can explain 94.44%, 66.07%, 23.46%, 21.03% and 15.45% of the cyclical fluctuations in output, investment, labor, consumption and capital, respectively.

The impulse response analysis finds that the institutional shocks have a relatively long duration, lasting about 30 years, and decline slowly over time, while technological shocks decline relatively fast, lasting approximately ten years.