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The aim of this paper is to provide additional insights on the association between real earnings management (REM) and crash risk, particularly from the perspective of an emerging market economy. It also examines the moderation role that internal and external corporate governance may play in this area.

Relying on archival data from the RESSET and CSMAR databases over a timeframe from 2010 to 2018 of China listed company, the authors test the hypotheses by regressing common measures of crash risk on the treatment variable (REM) and crash risk control variables identified in the prior crash risk literature. The authors also introduce monitoring proxies (internal controls as an internal governance and institutional ownership as an external governance) and assess how effective internal and external governance moderate the relation between REM and stock price crash risk.

The results suggest firms with higher REM have a significantly greater stock price crash risk, and that this association is mitigated by external monitoring. That is, greater institutional ownership, particularly pressure insensitive owners, mitigates the impact of REM on stock price crash risk. However, internal control does not mitigate the association between REM and stock price crash risk.

Following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act, prior research has documented an increase in the use of REM and a positive association between REM and cash risk. The authors demonstrate that they persist in one of the largest emerging markets where institutional regulations, market conditions and corporate behaviors are different from those in developed markets. Also, the assessment of the moderation effect of internal and external governance mechanisms could have meaningful implications for investors and regulators in Chinese and other emerging markets.

Existing literature in experimental accounting research suggests that accounting professionals and people with accounting backgrounds tend to have a lower level of moral reasoning and ethical development. Motivated by these findings, this paper aims to examine whether chief executive officers (CEOs) with accounting backgrounds have an impact on firms’ earnings management behavior and the level of accounting conservatism.

The authors classify CEOs into those with and without accounting backgrounds using BoardEx data. Using discretionary accruals from several different models, they do not find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds are more likely to engage in income-increasing accruals. However, the authors find that CEOs with accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of conservatism, proxied by C-scores and T-scores (Basu, 1997). This finding suggests that CEOs with accounting backgrounds recognize bad news more quickly than good news, consistent with the accounting principle of “anticipating all losses but anticipating no gains”.

The authors show that firms whose CEOs have accounting backgrounds exhibit lower levels of accounting conservatism. However, these firms do not exhibit higher levels of income-increasing discretionary accruals. This study documents the impact of CEOs’ educational backgrounds on firms’ accounting choices and confirms prior findings in experimental accounting research using large sample archival data.

This paper is the first study that investigates the impact of CEOs’ accounting backgrounds on firms’ financial reporting policy. The findings may have some policy implications. If accounting backgrounds of CEOs can make a significant difference on firms’ behavior, it is reasonable to make CEOs accountable for the quality of financial reporting. This paper is one of the first to empirically test inferences drawn by experimental accounting research. There has been a gap between archival and experimental accounting studies. The authors propose that interesting research questions can be addressed by filling in such a gap.