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The purpose of this paper is to examine the practices of Islamic banks in managing the so-called profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) which they offer as a Shari’ah-compliant alternative to interest-bearing deposit accounts using an unrestricted Mudarabah contract. In particular, the paper aims to examine the risk-return characteristics of such accounts and to compare these to the returns and risks of shareholders in the same banks. It is relevant that PSIA holders (unrestricted investment account holders – UIAH) are exposed to losses on the assets in which their deposits are invested, while the bank as asset manager (Mudarib) does not bear these losses and as Mudarib typically receives more than 50 per cent of the profits earned on the PSIA. The issue is whether the UIAH are being treated equitably. The influence of a set of corporate governance variables on this issue was also analyzed.

A sample of 28 Islamic banks was selected from five countries for the period 2002-2013, with data being obtained from Bankscope and Bloomberg and, where necessary, from the banks’ annual reports. First, the risk-return characteristics of the UIAHs’ rates of return and shareholders’ rates of return on equity (ROE) were compared by calculating for each bank the coefficients of variation (CV) of the two series of rates of return. Second, a panel data approach was used to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance by examining the extent to which the size of the difference between the rates of return for shareholders and for UIAH was associated with a set of corporate governance variables. Third, a comparison was made between the risk-return characteristics of UIAH’s rates of return and shareholders’ dividend yield rate for a sub-sample of 20 banks for which the information was available.

For a significant proportion of the banks (9 out of 28), the CVs of the PSIA returns were higher than those of the shareholders’ ROEs, which suggested that in these cases the PSIA holders were receiving inequitable treatment. Likewise, for 7 out of the 20 banks in the sub-sample, the CVs of the PSIA holders’ rates of return were higher than those of the shareholders’ dividend yield rate. In explaining the size of the differences between the rates of return on PSIA and the shareholders’ ROEs, the variable with the greatest explanatory power was the return on assets, implying that when this was high the bank took a maximum Mudarib share of profits. Some other corporate governance variables had the expected signs, as did a country dummy representing the maturity of the market for Islamic banking, but there was little evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance in protecting the interests of the UIAH.

A limitation of the research was that the inefficiency of the stock markets in the relevant countries and the fact that a few of the banks were not listed made it impossible to use shareholders’ stock market returns. ROE is not a very good proxy, as it is unclear how much value should be placed on retained earnings. Dividend yield rates provide a better comparison with UIAH rates of return, but the data were available for only 20 of the banks. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis strongly suggest that in a significant proportion of cases, UIAH are not being treated equitably.

The implication is that the regulation of Islamic banks needs to be improved to provide better protection to UIAH.

Islamic banks operate mainly in emerging markets where the effectiveness of regulation is limited. The ethical basis of Islamic finance provides some mitigation of this problem but apparently fails to do so in a significant proportion of cases. This should be borne in mind when assertions are made about the ethical basis of Islamic finance.

There is a dearth of empirical studies of the practices of Islamic banks and in particular of their treatment of their customers. This is because of various factors: the relative novelty of Islamic finance, the paucity of data and the relatively small size of the body of researchers in the field. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap.

Sees the objective of teaching financial management to be to help managers and potential managers to make sensible investment and financing decisions. Acknowledges that financial theory teaches that investment and financing decisions should be based on cash flow and risk. Provides information on payback period; return on capital employed, earnings per share effect, working capital, profit planning, standard costing, financial statement planning and ratio analysis. Seeks to combine the practical rules of thumb of the traditionalists with the ideas of the financial theorists to form a balanced approach to practical financial management for MBA students, financial managers and undergraduates.

This paper aims to empirically analyze the success of European bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by an analysis of the shareholder value implications of stock market reactions to announced and canceled M&As in the period from 1999 to 2015.

The analysis of a sample of 467 announced and 54 canceled European bank M&As is conducted using event study methodology. The determinants of the shareholder value creations in M&A are observed in cross-sectional regressions. The likelihood of M&As being canceled is estimated in logit regressions.

The paper finds that European bank M&As have not been successful in terms of shareholder value creation for acquiring banks, whereas targets experienced significant value gains. Abnormal returns for bidders and targets exhibit the same characteristics upon the announcement of M&As that are canceled at a later date, whereas the results for transaction cancelations deviate. Targets experience negative abnormal returns at a larger size than upon the transaction announcement. The findings for bidders are striking, as they destroy shareholder value upon the transaction cancelation, also, consequently they suffer twice. In particular, banks with higher profitability, higher efficiency and lower liquidity experience negative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. Negative abnormal returns prior to the transaction announcement and provision for loan losses increase significantly the likelihood of M&A cancelation.

This paper contributes to the literature expanding existing analyses to the shareholder value implications of canceled European bank M&As in a 17-year long time period. The findings reveal the destructive characteristics of canceled bank M&As and provide innovative insights into European capital market reaction to canceled M&As.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the market risk (stock price return and volatility, exchange rate) and on the exchange rate and Treasury Bill during the financial crisis. In order to better clarify the firms’ resistance to financial crises, the effect of exchange rate, Treasury Bill and the market risk are also considered.

The study uses a sample data of the SBF 120 on a panel of 99 French firms over the period between 2006 and 2015 divided into three sub-periods: the first sub-period, which covers the period between December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2009, was characterized by the outbreak of the subprime crisis. The second sub-period considers the sovereign debt crisis in Europe between December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2012. The last sub-period includes the post-crisis period (December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2015). The GARCH and BEKK models are used to capture the effect of volatility and conditional heteroskedasticity of both corporate governance and market risk.

The paper found that during the financial crisis (first sub-period, the sovereign crisis period), the high shareholders’ protection had a positive and significant impact on the stock market returns. Furthermore, the shareholders’ protection, the Treasury Bill, the institutional investors, the board’s size, had a negative and significant effect on the stock returns volatility. During the post-crisis period, the high protection and the board’s size had a negative and significant effect on the volatility of the stock returns.

This result implies that during the financial crisis, the high shareholders’ protection played a role in increases the stock market return and minimized the stock return volatility.

This study helps in improving the legal protection of investors and helps managers, shareholders and investors to evaluate their investments. This study also provides implications for policymakers and legal environment in order to evaluate the importance of the current corporate governance frameworks in place.

This result implies that the institutional investors, as the results suggest, should follow the shareholders’ protection in all the countries to make decisions about their investments since the high shareholders’ protection increases the firm’s stock returns and decreases the stock return volatility.

The article investigates the wealth generation from takeover bids through an event study, analyzing the impact of announcements on stock returns of target and bidder firms across the industries and related and unrelated industry acquisitions. It aims to provide insights into financial implications for shareholders and market participants, contributing to understanding merger dynamics and informing investment decisions.

The methodology involves data collection of announcement dates, defining event and estimation windows. Market models and four-factor models are applied to compute abnormal returns. Linear regression estimates return, which is aggregated and tested for significance, providing insights into the wealth effects of takeover announcements.

Analysis reveals positive returns for both firms' shareholders on the announcement day, particularly significant for target firms. Pre-announcement, positive abnormal returns suggest potential information leakage, but reverse post announcement. Comparative model analysis emphasizes the role of systematic risk. Notably, a prolonged bidding process benefits the target firm. Trading in target company stocks under unrelated industry acquisitions appears to be more beneficial during the bidding.

This article introduces a novel approach by utilizing a four-factor model for computing abnormal returns, unlike previous research relying solely on the market model. It also focuses separately on related and unrelated industry acquisitions. This methodology captures comprehensive systematic risk, resulting in more conservative and robust abnormal returns. This methodological advancement addresses existing gaps in the literature and provides actionable insights for stakeholders in mergers and acquisitions.

Superior firms are those which create shareholder wealth. The most direct way to measure shareholder wealth is by examining the worth of dividends plus share‐price appreciation. The authors contend that the companies chosen as excellent by Peters and Waterman, in their book, In Search of Excellence, fail to show superior shareholder wealth creation.

The aims of this paper are: first, to draw attention to the issues of displaced commercial risk (DCR) which arise as a result of the risk characteristics of profit‐sharing investment accounts (PSIA), the main source of funding of Islamic banks in most jurisdictions; and, second, to present a value‐at‐risk approach to the estimation of DCR and the associated adjustments in capital requirements.

The paper is based on empirical research into the characteristics of PSIA in practice, which vary to a greater or lesser extent from what one would expect them to be in principle, on an analysis of the capital adequacy and risk management implications that flow from this, and on an econometric formulation whereby the extent of DCR in Islamic banks may be estimated.

The findings are, first, that the characteristics of PSIA can vary from being a deposit like product (fixed return, capital certain, all risks borne by shareholders) to an investment product (variable return, bearing the risk of losses in underlying investments), depending upon the extent to which the balance sheet risks get shifted (“displaced”) from investment account holders to shareholders through various techniques available to Islamic banks' management. Second, the paper finds that this DCR has a major impact on Islamic bank's economic and regulatory capital requirements, asset‐liability management, and product pricing. Finally, it proposes an econometric approach to estimating DCR but report that individual Islamic banks generally lack the data needed to apply this approach, in the absence of which panel data for a population of Islamic banks may be used to estimate DCR for that population.

Empirically, the paper is thus limited by the lack of data just mentioned. Furthermore, the application of the proposed panel data approach has been left for future research.

The analysis of the issues and the development of the econometric model represent in themselves an original research contribution of some significance.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on comparing the influence of majority and minority shareholders on executive compensation under conditions of CEO duality, examining majority and minority shareholder influences by measuring their investment and return activity. The paper seeks to uncover how CEO duality changes the impact the two categories of shareholders have on executive compensation, especially in an emerging nation.

In total, 30 corporations out of the 70 corporations listed on the BM&F Bovespa (a Brazilian stock market) were used for the paper. Quarterly data were collected on the companies from the Datastream database. The paper conducted a moderated regression analysis on the data to determine the conditional effects of majority and minority holders’ investment and returns on executive compensation.

There are incentives for executives meeting majority shareholder objectives, but minority shareholders’ influences act as a disincentive for executives. Only the influence of blockholders by their returns is affected by the separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman. The effect is such that firms with a separation of the roles have their executives rewarded in line with increments to the returns made to blockholders, but firms that have the roles merged pay a high wage that is inconsistent with managerial performance. Finally, the majority of variation in executive pay levels can be attributed to individual company traits.

The paper’s sample is biased to firm which had publicly available data on the total compensation payable to their top executives.

Advocates of minority shareholder rights may need to exercise patience with the implementation of more formalised governance structure, as they are not providing protection for minority shareholders within the period studied.

The paper provides empirical evidence within the Brazilian context of minority shareholder effects on executive compensation and the effect of CEO duality on the relationship.

Shareholder dividends are “rents”: they are paid out of a producer's surplus that, in a fully competitive market, would not exist. In any market system, no one has a right to rents. Why, then, do shareholders receive dividends? Most likely, share gains have been the result of the usefulness of the share-centered ideologies in justifying a tremendous shift of corporate wealth from employees to an alliance of top managers and shareholders. This alliance now shows signs of breaking down, as the managers learn they no longer need the ideological cover. Standard accounts conceal the struggle over corporate surplus and the weakness of shareholder claims to appropriate it. Recognizing that distribution of corporate surplus is a political struggle is the first step towards a less ideologically blindered discussion of how that struggle ought to be structured.

The paper aims to find out the information content of performance measures from accounting and value-based measures that best explain the total shareholder return.

To achieve this aim, static and dynamic panel data regression analysis is applied to the sample of 56 Indian companies taken from the Nifty Midcap 100 Index, between 2012 and 2019.

It is found that accounting-based measures have more relative information content in predicting total shareholder return as compared to value-based measures. Economic value added (EVA) and cash value added (CVA) do not add to the information content provided by accounting-based measures. A combination of accounting-based measures and value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) adds marginally to the information content provided by accounting-based measures in explaining the total shareholder return. Dynamic panel regression analysis shows that return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on equity (ROE) and EVA have a significant impact on total shareholder return.

In this study, along with EVA, other measures from value-based measures, i.e. CVA are empirically tested to explain the total shareholder return. Intellectual capital efficiency computed by VAIC is also empirically tested along with accounting-based measures, EVA, CVA and market value added (MVA). To bring robustness to findings, data are tested by using dynamic panel regression analysis.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

This paper aims to examine the role of Islamic banks’ (IBs) governance in the management of investment funds. This is achieved by comparing the returns to shareholders with those to the Unrestricted Profit-Sharing Iinvestment Account Holders (UPSIAHs), referred to as the spread.

This study is based on a dynamic panel data analysis using the generalized method of moments for a panel of IBs based in Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) and Southeast Asian (SEA) countries observed over the 2006–2019 period.

The authors find that governance quality reduces the spread of SEA-IBs compared to GCC-IBs, suggesting that Asian banks have access to a wider choice of investment and growth options. The authors also find a positive association between GCC-based IBs governance quality and the widening spread between returns to shareholders and UPSIAHs, which suggests that while IBs are enhancing profitability through better governance, this may not lead to fair profit-sharing with UPSIAHs.

It would be beneficial to expand the sample to include more representative IBs from various countries.

The widening spread between returns to shareholders and UPSIAHs makes the latter feel displaced, which could eventually exacerbate the displaced commercial risk. This highlights the need for targeted governance reforms and investment strategies to better align the interests of stakeholders, thereby improving bank performance and mitigating financial disparities.

This paper is, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first to empirically examine the effect of various governance mechanisms on the spread between returns to shareholders and Unrestricted Profit-Sharing Investors’ Account Holders (UPSIAHs) in IBs.

This paper seeks to compare target shareholders' wealth gains in domestic and cross‐border acquisitions in India. Two existing schools of thought namely, the industrial organizational theory and bid‐specific factors theory have been compared to identify which of these two theories affect the target shareholders' announcement wealth gains in India.

Standard event study methodology has been applied to compute the announcement returns for domestic and cross‐border acquisitions. Cross‐border effect is calculated to compare the value creation in the two sets of acquisitions. Furthermore, cross‐sectional regression analysis is conducted to capture the impact of bid‐related features on target shareholder's value creation.

The results indicate that both domestic and cross‐border acquisitions have created value for the target company shareholders on the announcement. Nonetheless, the analysis of cross‐border effect as well as regression analysis makes it evident that value creation is higher for domestic acquisitions as compared to cross‐border acquisitions due to the influence of various bid‐specific factors. Thus, in India, bid‐related variables are the fundamental drivers of the target's announcement wealth gains irrespective of the nationality of the acquirer.

The paper extends the discussion on the target's wealth creation in domestic and cross‐border acquisitions by segregating the existing literature into two schools of thoughts namely, the industrial organizational school and bid‐specific factors school in an emerging economy like India. Moreover, various reasons specific to Indian mergers and acquisitions have been forwarded to explain the subdued market reaction to cross‐border acquisitions.

The purpose of this paper is to model the announcement returns of merging firms based on managerial overconfidence about merger synergy.

The paper applies continuous‐time real options techniques and game theoretic concepts. Managerial overconfidence and strategic interaction between the bidder and the target are incorporated into the model.

This model implies that: abnormal returns to bidding shareholders will be negative with a high degree of managerial overconfidence; combined returns to shareholders are usually positive; and both the bidder's and the target's abnormal returns are related to industry characteristics, the degree of managerial overconfidence, and the way merger synergies are divided.

This paper, for the first time, reconciles theoretically the following stylized facts: combined returns to shareholders are usually positive; and returns to the acquirer are, on average, not positive. In addition, the model generates new predictions relating these returns to industry characteristics and the degree of managerial overconfidence.

The purpose of this paper is to examine which firm characteristics affect the usage of sustainability incentives in executive remuneration contracts, and whether these sustainability incentives have an impact on shareholders’ return.

The analysis is based on a sample of 212 firms from the FTSE 350 firms over the period of 2009-2011.

The results indicate that there is a significant relationship between the adoption of sustainability incentives in executive remuneration and firm size, compensation committee independence, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) sustainability committee, CSR sustainability index, and resource efficiency policy variables. Further, there is evidence to support a positive impact on the shareholders’ return.

The results of this study should be interpreted within two limitations. First, the limited numbers of the sample years due to the limited number of firms used sustainability incentives. Second, the use of a dummy variable in the measurement of the adoption of sustainability incentives in the analysis.

The paper includes implications for the development of sustainability incentives within the performance measurement system and compensation contracts that could be a solution for the agency problem.

This study provides empirical evidence on an increased use of sustainability incentives in UK firms, and identifies firm’s characteristics that explain such increase in the sustainability incentives, finally its positive impact on the shareholders’ return.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the short-term wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions (M & As) in Malaysia. In addition, this study also examines the factors that affect the short-term shareholders’ wealth during M & A announcements in Malaysia.

The short-term wealth effect is measured by the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs). For the purpose of this study, the wealth effects of a sample of 180 target and 196 bidding companies announced in Malaysia during the period from 2001 to 2009 are analyzed.

Results of the study revealed that there are positive market reactions by both target and bidding shareholders towards M & A announcements. However, target shareholders earned significantly higher CAARs than bidding shareholders. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that economic condition surrounding merger announcements, type of acquisition (diversified/related), premium paid and status of bid (successful/failed) affect the short-term wealth effects of target and bidding shareholders during M & A announcements. However, the impact on the target and bidding shareholders are different. Relative size negatively affects bidding shareholders’ wealth. Target with higher ROE also earned significantly higher returns.

There is high number of announced M & A deals in Malaysia, little is known about the determinants of short-term wealth effects of M & As in emerging market Malaysia, in particular the third M & A wave.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the impact on bank risk of portfolio diversification between traditional margin income and fee‐based income for banks operating in Australia.

Considering several performance variables, this analysis compares the benefits of diversification across different bank types relative to margin income and fee income. Further, regression analysis considers bank risk and revenue concentration.

This paper documents that fee‐based income is riskier than margin income but offers diversification benefits to bank shareholders. While improving bank risk‐return tradeoff, these benefits are of second order importance compared to the large negative impact of poor asset quality on shareholder returns.

These results have implications for all stakeholders in Australian banks. The results suggest that shareholders of banks will benefit from increased bank exposure to non‐interest income via diversification. From a regulatory perspective, diversification reduces the possibility of systemic risk, but caution must be offered with respect to banks pursuing absolute returns rather than monitoring risk‐return trade‐offs, and so exploiting the benefits of the implied guarantee offered by “too big to fail” However, shareholders should also monitor bank exposure to non interest income to ensure that they do not become over‐exposed to the point where the volatility effect outweighs the diversification benefits.

The results of this study suggest that Australian regulators should consider requiring increased disclosure of the composition of bank non‐interest income. Such disclosure would aid in understanding the changing nature of banking in Australia. Given the recent sub‐prime crisis in the USA and the role played by fee based income sourced from securitization, increased disclosure of the nature of bank non interest income is now of global importance. This disclosure is particularly germane within the context of the implementation of Basle II, with its increased emphasis upon market discipline, given that Stiroh found increased disclosure in this area is accompanied by improved market pricing for risk.

Corporate responsibility perceptions from stakeholders are becoming more difficult to manage. This is in part because of large amount of social media being projected to stakeholders on a daily basis. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate responsibility framing from the social media perspective firm’s performance as defined by abnormal-return (defined as the difference between a single stock or portfolios return and the expected return) and idiosyncratic-risk (defined as the risk of a particular investment because of firm-specific characteristics).

Hypotheses are developed through agenda-setting theory and stakeholder and shareholder viewpoints. The research model is tested using sentiment analysis from a collection of social media from several industries.

The results provide support that three corporate responsibility social media categories (economic, social and environmental-framing) will have different impacts (delayed, immediate) on abnormal-return and idiosyncratic-risk. This study finds differences between immediate (one-day lag) and delayed (three-day lag) associations on abnormal-return and idiosyncratic-risk.

This study also suggests differences between the amount and sentiment of corporate responsibility social media framing on abnormal-return and idiosyncratic-risk. Finally, results identify interaction effects between different corporate responsibility social media categories.

Director interlocks, with their extended resources and shared experiences, have the potential power to go beyond the basic role of providing advice and monitoring the activities of an organization. Interlocked directors can have a cross-cultural role in manipulating corporate choices and strategies in several areas, including capital structure, based on learned behavior in their internal company. Shareholders and creditors are the two main capital providers for a company. However, their risk return horizons are very different, and policies that benefit one group may not be optimal to the other. Interlocks can act as carriers of sub-par practices that affect the behavior of several organizations. Such transactional and relational activities may increase short-term value for equity shareholders, but increase the risk for the creditors. The purpose of this paper is to examine cross-cultural effects of interlocks on corporate strategies that affect this essential agency relationship.

This paper surveys the extant literature on board interlocks, board practices, equity valuation and credit risk to develop a link between such interlocks and creditor protection. Based on a brief survey of the central concepts of governance and the role of directors, this paper then provides various propositions on the role of interlocking directorships and their effect on the shareholder–creditor agency problem.

Director interlocks, through their linked common practices, have the potential to increase or worsen shareholder–creditor conflicts by magnifying strategic practices like short-termism, earnings management or through its effects on chief executive officer compensation. Such cross-cultural effects persist across ownership structures and cultural differences in governance.

The paper is not an empirical study of the conflict. This paper uses a literature review to arrive at propositions that may impact shareholder–creditor conflicts.

Several studies have shown cronyism and the dense corporate network has been a large factor in the financial crisis that affected both shareholders and creditors. As the influence of creditors grows with the current availability, and therefore increase in debt levels, this conflict can be magnified through homophily inherent in interlocks. For an organization to be successful in its role of protecting all stakeholders, especially the two major providers of equity capital, factors that cause conflicts must be taken into account while developing the tenets of governance policies and, on a regular basis, during the strategic planning process within the organization. Regulations affecting interlocks, including governance policies, must therefore take into account such influences.

Board interlocks act as channels of information between companies, creating a social network where processes and polices are shared and implemented as defined by the concept of homophily. Such management actions reduce both the quality of information available to creditors and their monitoring capabilities. This juxtaposition of shareholder and creditor interest can, therefore, be worsened by director interlocks.

Prior literature has not specifically linked director interlocks and their mutual impact on the culture and strategy of linked corporations to the shareholder–creditor conflict.

Shareholder value must remain central to the attention of corporate real estate officers (CREOs), even though senior executives have a number of competing agendas. One reason for this is that shareholder value is a vital performance indicator for any important ancillary service; another is that CREOs can help to improve shareholder’s wealth in a unique way. It is well known that occupancy costs directly affect the net earnings of the firm and thus the extent of any surplus it can generate over the annual charge for the use of capital. Occupancy costs also influence how large that charge for resources should be in the first place. Firms pay investors for the use of capital but, in efficient capital markets, the cost is only related to the risk that investors cannot remove by holding a basket of shares. This risk is the intrinsic variability of the cashflows derived from the activities of the firm. This variability is in turn influenced by the amount of company borrowing and by the ratio of fixed to variable costs. Even after allowing for the effect of gearing, the investor’s likely returns are determined by the amount of fixed costs required to generate sales revenues. This is important to CREOs because occupancy costs are a large proportion of most fixed costs. CREOs can therefore influence shareholder value both by the volume of all occupancy costs and by the proportion of fixed costs or leverage that their decisions incur. An indicator of the degree of real estate leverage (DREL) could therefore be a very valuable tool for CREOs. It would also give them more influence in key financial decisions and should raise more interest in real estate issues among shareholders and senior executives.