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We investigate how information about the refusal and acceptance of offered resources affects the distribution of benefits to self and others in reciprocal exchanges. We distinguish contexts that allow individuals to know whether offered benefits were accepted or refused from contexts that do not. In the process, we also examine how the perceived probability of possible refusal and the actual experience of refusal affect the distribution of benefits.

We conducted a controlled laboratory experiment.

Results show people give more when the context allows them to discern whether offers were accepted or refused, but having information about the structure of the network, which may increase the perceived probability of overt rejection, erases this effect. Results also show that in contrast to contexts that inform individuals about the acceptance or refusal of offers, the actual experience of being refused depresses giving.

This study examines giving behaviors in one specific network arrangement, leaving unanswered whether the findings reported here hold for larger, more complex networks. Future work should also examine how gender may affect giving behaviors in these contexts, with a particular focus on how it might affect responses to experiencing refusal.

Refusal in reciprocity has been undertheorized and methodologically excluded from exchange studies. We acknowledge that offering a resource does not mean one will accept it and investigate how uncertainty about whether an offered resource will be accepted or refused affects how people distribute resources. We also consider and experimentally test how the perceived probability and the actual experience of being overtly refused affect the distribution of resources.

This paper pairs insights from social exchange theory with scholarship on ingroup preferences. We ask: how do the structure and diversity of the exchange network in which an actor is embedded at time 1 impact subsequent trust toward an unmet individual at time 2? The goal is to understand whether and how the structures in which people are embedded have lasting, downstream effects on behavior, even toward those whom they might be inclined to distrust.

We randomly assign participants to repeated exchange tasks with different structures (productive, reciprocal, or generalized) with alters who either share or do not share a salient social identity. After a period of interaction in their exchange structure, participants decide whether, and how much, to trust a new alter who either shares or does not share their social identity in a one-shot trust decision.

Participants embedded in productive exchange networks are more likely than those in generalized or reciprocal exchange networks to trust an unmet interaction partner. Moreover, while trust is higher when the trustee is an ingroup member, this relationship is moderated by the form of exchange. Trust is not lower toward outgroup trustees when the truster was previously embedded in reciprocal exchange.

Our findings collectively suggest that prior exchange structures can affect the extent to which people trust unmet others from different groups. They also imply that extended exposure to, and prosocial interactions with, outgroup others may not be a core prerequisite of intergroup trust.

Lacking lecturers in higher education is an international issue where society faces insufficient educational services to enlighten one’s future, and lecturer work satisfaction also merits higher attention. Work satisfaction is closely associated with turnover rates, lecturer retention, overall university cohesion, lecturers’ well-being, professional teaching improvement and research and publication performances. This study aims to explore how causes of actions (work–family conflict [WFC] and workload) influence consequences (stress and burnout) which affect the overall attitude (lecturer work satisfaction).

Researchers collected data from 450 Thai lecturers from different universities via survey questionnaires. Furthermore, a structural equation model method was used to analyze the data.

Results showed that lecturer stress was significantly influenced by WFC and workload. Next, stress, workload and WFC were the main predictors of lecturer burnout. Then, lecturer work satisfaction was significantly influenced by burnout, except stress. Finally, a relationship between lecturer stress and work satisfaction was mediated by burnout.

This research proposes a theoretical mechanism to analyze how causes of actions (WFC and workload) influence consequences (stress and burnout) which lead to a development of lecturer attitude (work satisfaction) in higher education.

A large number of studies indicate that coercive forms of organizational control and performance management in health care services often backfire and initiate dysfunctional consequences. The purpose of this article is to discuss new approaches to performance management in health care services when the purpose is to support innovative changes in the delivery of services.

The article represents cross-boundary work as the theoretical and empirical material used to discuss and reconsider performance management comes from several relevant research disciplines, including systematic reviews of audit and feedback interventions in health care and extant theories of human motivation and organizational control.

An enabling approach to performance management in health care services can potentially contribute to innovative changes. Key design elements to operationalize such an approach are a formative and learning-oriented use of performance measures, an appeal to self- and social-approval mechanisms when providing feedback and support for local goals and action plans that fit specific conditions and challenges.

The article suggests how to operationalize an enabling approach to performance management in health care services. The framework is consistent with new governance and managerial approaches emerging in public sector organizations more generally, supporting a higher degree of professional autonomy and the use of nonfinancial incentives.