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Variations of human-versus-structure and within-humans at the organizational and the project level are critical in shaping the internal arrangement for effectiveness of project-based organization’s (PBOs) governance. Recent discourse presents governmentality at the organizational level and leadership at the project level as human agency of governance, whereas governance structures to be their counterpart. However, project-level mechanisms of governmentality that can help to understand possible variations among these governance dimensions remained veiled. This study uses institutional theory to explore these internal arrangements accommodated by variations of PBOs governance dimensions at the project level.

The study followed Eisenhardt protocols of multiple case study design using an abductive research approach. Considering the heterogeneity of governance as a phenomenon in literature, boundary conditions were established before theorizing the model of the study to avoid ambiguities and define the research scope. Five PBOs were chosen using theoretical sampling, yielding 70 interviews. Data were analyzed by constant comparison with theory, using replication logic and cross-case analysis.

Findings revealed that project managers perform a buffer function for governmentality at the project level. Identified mechanisms of governmentality at the project level included two downward mechanisms, i.e. communication and informal interactions of governors, and two upward mechanisms of adaptation and reciprocity by project managers and project team members. Cross-analysis for variations among PBOs’ governance at the project level revealed seven arrangements showcasing synergies or contrasts.

The study adds to organizational project management literature by advancing the significance of congruence between humans and structures in project governance. Furthermore, the synchronization of the project manager’s leadership style with the governmentality approach and governance structure of PBOs is of crucial importance at the project level. Findings suggest the same by showcasing synergetic versus contrasting internal arrangements accommodated in varying PBOs governance dimensions. Implications highlight that synergies among PBOs governance dimensions and project manager’s styles can minimize conflicts and inconsistencies in governance implementation, whereas contrasts might trigger them.

Scams are indeed malicious attempts to influence people and can take many forms, including online scams. With the increasing availability of technology, scammers have more tools at their disposal to create convincing and sophisticated communications that appear to come from legitimate sources, such as emails, text messages or social media posts. These scams can be designed to trick individuals into clicking on malicious links, downloading malware or ransomware or providing sensitive information such as login information, financial information or personal details. Scammers often use social engineering techniques to persuade their targets to take specific actions, such as creating a sense of urgency, offering a reward or prize or posing as a trusted authority. These tactics can be highly effective, particularly if the target is unaware of the warning signs of a scam or is unfamiliar with how to protect themselves from online fraud. This paper aims to explore the extent and nature of this problem and evokes the concern that the general public is vulnerable and susceptible to scams if they are not resilient and aware. This paper also explores why victims fall for online scams and uncovers preventive measures to enable a direction in tacitly strategizing ways to create more impactful and effective awareness campaigns.

This study explores these aspects through a holistic qualitative approach. Using in-depth interview techniques with six victims, six non-victims, four law enforcement officers, four scammers and seven stakeholders from various agencies such as banks, telecommunication agencies and the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission involved in combating the issue of scams.

The findings generally revealed that participants who were victims of scams felt Malaysians were susceptible to scams, easily fooled and had a nonchalant attitude. Most participants also highlighted that public safety is important for ensuring a high quality of life for citizens that should work closely between the government and non-government agencies, including effective law enforcement and crime prevention strategies.

The uniqueness of this study is the feedback from scammers themselves and their input towards authority and victims. Overall, the respondents provide their views drawing strength from the ever-changing technological background as well as the susceptibility of security features and vulnerability of human engagement.

Adverse cyber events, like death and taxes, have become inevitable. They are an increasingly common feature of organisational life. Their aftermaths are a critical and under-examined context and dynamic space within which to examine trust. In this paper, we address this deficit.

Drawing on pertinent theory and reports of empirical studies, we outline the basis of two alternative subsequent trajectories, drawing out the relationships between trust, vulnerability and emotion, both positive and negative, in the aftermath of an adverse cyber event.

We combine stage theory and social information processing theories to delineate the dynamics of trust processes and their multilevel trajectories during adverse cyber event aftermaths. We consider two response trajectories to chart the way vulnerability arises at different levels within these social systems to create self-reinforcing trust and distrust spirals. These ripple out to impact multiple levels of the organisation by either amplifying or relieving vulnerability.

The way adverse cyber events aftermaths are managed has immediate and long-term consequences for organisational stakeholders. Actions impact resilience and the ability to preserve the social fabric of the organisations. Subsequent trajectories can be “negative” or “positive”. The “negative” trajectory is characterised by efforts to identify and punish the employee whose actions facilitated the adverse events, i.e. the “who”. Public scapegoating might follow thereby amplifying perceived vulnerability and reducing trust across the board. By contrast, the “positive” trajectory relieves perceived vulnerability by focusing on, and correcting, situational causatives. Here, the focus is on the “what” and “why” of the event.

We raise the importance of responding in a constructive way to adverse cyber events.

The aftermaths of cyber attacks in organisations are a critical, neglected context. We explore the interplay between trust and vulnerability and its implications for management “best practice”.