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This research aims to investigate the disciplinary functions of depositors and subordinated debt holders within Indonesia's dual banking system, examining the impact of regulatory changes on market discipline.

The study employs a comprehensive analysis of the dual banking system in Indonesia over 15 years. Utilizing a non-public dataset from the Financial Services Authority and the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, the study employs propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis.

The findings reveal distinct patterns in the exercise of market discipline by depositors over different regulatory regimes. During the blanket guarantee regime (2002–2005), depositors lacked the incentive to monitor banks but resumed their disciplinary role under the limited guarantee regime (2005–2017). Islamic banks faced simultaneous market and regulatory discipline, with market discipline prevailing.

This study contributes to the literature by providing novel insights into the interplay between regulatory changes, market discipline and depositor behavior within Indonesia's dual banking system. The utilization of a comprehensive non-public dataset from regulatory authorities adds to the originality of the research.