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The purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.

The authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.

The results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.

This study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

This study examines how local governments and enterprises can implement ecological restoration of abandoned mines based on ecology-oriented development (EOD), which will be more beneficial to local environmental protection and economic development under the central government’s policy of outcome incentives or process subsidies.

We construct a dynamic differential game model to simulate the interactions between local governments and enterprises during the ecological restoration of abandoned mines from an EOD perspective.

The findings suggest that under the central government’s outcome incentive policy, cooperation between local governments and enterprises is an optimal strategy. Under the process subsidy policy, while neither cooperative nor non-cooperative models significantly affect the investment levels of local governments and enterprises, a cooperative approach ensures optimal investments from both without solely relying on the process subsidy. Additionally, incorporating altruistic preferences can lead to Pareto improvements in economic and environmental results under central government outcome incentives.

This research offers a policy foundation for governments to encourage the EOD model in the ecological restoration of abandoned mines. It provides theoretical support for achieving environmental sustainability and high-quality economic development, and is particularly significant for resource-depleted cities seeking to transform their development strategies.

Through a dynamic differential game model involving government agencies and enterprises to simulate decision-making in the ecological restoration of abandoned mines, incorporating altruistic preferences into this restoration process, and identifying optimal strategies and policies for ecological restoration.