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The purpose of this viewpoint is to comment on the implications of the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) Review and Consultation Documents expected to update regulation governing the determination/reporting of executive remuneration in UK stock market listed companies. Practical points from actors involved in executive remuneration decision-making/reporting are presented, set within the context of neo-institutional theory.

This qualitative research systematically analyses UK Corporate Governance Codes, the FRC’s recent Review/Consultation and peer-reviewed published studies of executive pay determination based on in-depth interviews with non-executive directors, institutional investors, executive pay advisers and human resources (HR) professionals.

Further regulation, while providing coercive influence over executive remuneration decision-making, is likely to lead to only limited change in processes and reporting due to benchmarking, the make-up of Remco membership and shareholders' preferences. Mimetic and normative isomorphic forces work against coercive isomorphism leading to resistance to change as decision-makers strive to safeguard their social status/reputations.

Reviewing executive remuneration package components and paying attention to company strategy, sustainability and values in pay determination are welcomed but recognised as difficult to achieve. Drawing upon a wider range of information sources/voices can assist in broadening the discussion. HR professionals can help widen stakeholder input to executive remuneration decision-making.

The authors’ viewpoint is grounded in peer-reviewed empirical data that draws directly upon the views/experiences of executive remuneration decision-makers to identify problems in adhering to FRC recommendations for change. The authors extend the meta-theoretical perspective of neo-institutional theory – specifically institutional isomorphism – as providing explanatory and predictive power to understand executive pay decision-making.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how those involved in executive pay determination in large publicly quoted UK businesses see the role of diversity within remuneration committees (Remcos) as enabling the input of different perspectives, which can enhance their decision-making and potentially improve pay outcomes.

Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 18 high-profile major-enterprise decision-makers and their advisers, i.e. non-executive directors (NEDs) serving Remcos, institutional investors, executive pay consultants and internal human resources (HR) reward specialists, together with data from three focus groups with 10 further reward management practitioners.

Remco members recognise the benefits of social category/demographic diversity but say the likelihood of increasing this is low, given talent pipeline issues. The widening of value diversity is considered problematic for Remcos’ functioning. Informational diversity is used as a proxy for social category/demographic diversity to improve Remcos’ decision-making on executive pay. While the inclusion of members from wider social networks is recognised as potentially bringing a different informational perspective, the social character of Remcos, reflecting their elite nature and experience of wealth, appears ingrained.

Our original contribution is to extend the application of upper echelons theory in the context of Remco decision-making to explain why members do not welcome widening informational diversity by appointing people from different social networks who lack value similarity. Instead, by drawing views from employees, HR acts as a proxy for social network informational diversity. The elite, upper-echelons nature of Remco appointments remains unchanged and team functioning is not disrupted.