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This study aims to investigate the extent to which audit committee (AC) members who are formally independent are truly independent in practice, and what challenges they face that undermine their independence.

The study utilizes semi-structured interviews with 18 members of the AC in Jordan.

The responses indicate that AC is mostly labelled as independent but fails to play an effective monitoring role due to different institutional factors. These factors include family ownership, government ownership, culture, compensation package and the lack of qualified directors.

This research addresses this gap by presenting qualitative evidence from a civil law jurisdiction, featured by a developing financial market, a prevalence of family businesses, limited investor protection and a low risk of litigation. Additionally, this study aims to rectify the current imbalance between qualitative and quantitative studies on AC and bridge the gap between research conducted in developed countries and their developing counterparts.

This study offers valuable insights for regulatory authorities to engage in a more profound contemplation of extant governance regulations. Also, this study offers useful feedback for nomination committees of public companies, and it also has an implication for shareholders as they rely on independent directors to protect their investment. Furthermore, implications of the findings derived from this research possess the potential for generalization to other developing nations characterized by akin institutional contexts, notably encompassing the countries situated in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

This research introduces novel qualitative empirical evidence from a distinctive jurisdiction governed by civil law, thereby enriching the existing scholarly discourse. It also contributes to the AC literature by suggesting that it is not only the existence of conventionally independent ACs that affect the integrity of financial statements, but also the absence of social ties and other contextual obstacles.

This study aims to examine whether the age and tenure of the chair of the board of directors are related to research and development (R&D) investment in China.

This study uses A-share manufacturing firms that traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange between 2009 and 2018. This study uses OLS regressions, controls for self-selection bias, and uses an instrumental variable to alleviate the concern of endogeneity.

This study finds that chair tenure has a negative relationship with R&D investment. This study does not find a significant relationship between chair age and R&D investment.

This study contributes to corporate governance and strategic management literature by highlighting chair tenure as a new factor affecting R&D investments. It also adds a significant contribution to the limited literature on the chair’s role in strategic decisions. Moreover, companies that are eager to strengthen corporate governance and maintain sustained innovation may reconsider the chair tenure. Given that many proposals for board governance reform explicitly stress the importance of limiting board tenure, this study contributes to policymakers by providing evidence in support of these proposals.