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This paper examines how board structure influences real earnings management and the interaction effect of CEO narcissism on board structure-real earnings management relationship.

The authors used panel data derived from secondary sources from publicly listed firms in Kenya during 2002–2017. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses.

The results indicate that board independence, board tenure and size have significant negative effect on real earnings management, while CEO duality positively affects real earnings management. Further, the interaction results show that CEO narcissism moderates the relationship between CEO duality and real earnings management.

The results suggest that real earnings management reduces when boards are independent, large and comprising of long-tenured members. However, when the CEO plays dual role of a chairman, real earnings management increases. The authors also find that when CEOs are narcissists, the monitoring role of the board is compromised.

The study adds value to the understanding of how board structure and CEO narcissism influence the monitoring role of the board among firms listed at Nairobi Securities Exchange.

The purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of institutional ownership on the relationship between board gender diversity and earnings management (EM) among listed firms in East African Community (EAC) partner states.

The study used a sample of 71 firms listed in the EAC partner states over 2011–2020. Data were handpicked from the individual firm's audited annual financial reports. Based on the results of the Hausman test, the study used the results of the fixed-effect regression model to test the hypotheses. To test the robustness of the results, the study employed an alternative measure of EM and two additional econometric techniques, including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and the system generalized method of moments (GMM).

The empirical findings revealed that female directors improve the board's effectiveness in monitoring managerial roles. Specifically, the results showed a significantly negative relationship between the proportion of women in the corporate board and EM (as measured by discretionary accruals (DAs)). The findings further revealed an inverse relationship between the proportion of institutional ownership and EM. Finally, the results further demonstrated that institutional ownership enhances the role of board gender diversity in mitigating EM among listed firms in the EAC.

The findings of this study may be useful to managers, investors and regulators in assessing the role of institutional ownership and women's participation on corporate boards as a strategy for alleviating unethical manipulation of earnings.

The findings of this study contribute to the growing concern on gender inequality, especially the marginalization of women from the paid labor force and decision-making. The findings highlight the importance of having more women in the corporate board since this may help in mitigating corporate fraud. Similarly, the findings highlight the importance of institutional ownership as a corporate governance (CG) tool.

Previous studies have reported mixed empirical results on whether board gender diversity mitigates EM. To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper to fill the existing gap by exploring whether institutional ownership moderates the relationship between board gender diversity and EM among listed firms in the EAC.