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The study aims to examine how different types of green brand ritual (GBR) influence customer engagement behavior and the mediation mechanisms and boundary conditions of the positive and negative pathways.

The study conducts two online experiments to collect data from a total of 940 consumers in China. Hypotheses are tested by independent samples t-test, two-way ANOVA and Hayes' PROCESS model.

Different kinds of GBR have different effects on customer engagement behavior. Internal GBR is more likely to play a positive role by inciting connectedness to nature. External GBR is more likely to play a negative role by inciting psychological resistance. This dual effect is especially pronounced for warm brands rather than competent brands.

The study pioneers the brand ritual into the field of interactive marketing and enriches its dual effect research. Additionally, the study figures out whether the category of brand ritual can trigger negative effect.

Inappropriate brand rituals are worse than no rituals at all. The results provide guidance for green companies to design effective brand rituals to strengthen the connection with consumers. Green brands should describe brand rituals in vivid detail and consciously lead consumers to immerse themselves in them.

Contract Manufacturers (CM, factory) can cultivate factory brand products by imitating Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM, brand owner) National Brand products, and compete with OEM through the online retailer, that is, factory encroachment. In practice, few consumers can identify the quality of those two products in the online market. Implementing blockchain technology (BTI) can help all consumers identify product quality but may change the operation decisions and incur implementation costs. This study aims to explore how will the BTI strategies affect participants' operation performance under the factory encroachment and delve into the decisions regarding NB product quality and CM encroachment.

This study constructs a three-level outsourcing supply chain comprising one contract manufacturer (CM, factory), one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one online retailer. By utilizing the Stackelberg game, the authors first compared the results between two strategic decisions of BTI and no-BTI by online retailers under the factory encroachment scenario. Then, the NB product quality decision and the CM's encroachment decision are also investigated.

BTI strategy can benefit all participants (triple win), which both occurs in exogenous and endogenous quality cases, and the triple win area will expand (shrink) as the BTI cost decreases (increases). In addition, the OEM will improve product quality to confront competition from the CM, and the OEM may not always benefit from the BTI, it depends on the maturity of the market. Interestingly, BTI could improve the consumer surplus when the proportion of novice consumers is low. Finally, this study also investigates the extended case that CM always encroaches into the market whether the online retailer choose BTI or not, which hurts OEM's profit and decreases the product quality.

This study sheds light on the strategic decisions of online retailers' BTI regarding supply chain members' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under factory encroachment. It also demonstrates that the BTI strategy, under different quality decisions (endogenous and exogenous), can be more profitable for chain members and consumers.

Inventory pledge financing (IPF) serves as an effective means to address the financial constraints faced by supply chains. This study develops an IPF system involving a bank, SMEs and a third-party logistics provider (3PL) to explore the impact of varying cost structures and regulatory environments, specifically the strategic interactions within IPF system before and after the blockchain implementation. Also, provides theoretical foundations for improving the overall efficiency of financing and advancing the application of blockchain technology.

An evolutionary game framework is employed to analyze the dynamics of financing behaviors before and after the blockchain implementation. Simulation methods are utilized to examine how different factors, including concealing costs, penalty structures and disposal prices, influence decision-making processes within IPF system.

Under IPF, the interactions of participants are shaped by asset management capabilities, reinvestment returns and penalties for fraud. As concealing costs increase, the likelihood of reaching a (loose regulation, compliant pledge) equilibrium rises. Post-blockchain implementation (IPFB), the equilibrium is influenced by default losses and compliance gains. Blockchain technology enhances regulation, effectively reducing fraud risks.

This study bridges significant gaps by offering a dynamic and behavioral perspective on IPF in the context of blockchain technology. Using an evolutionary game framework, the study uncovers how blockchain reshapes decision-making processes, mitigates fraud risks and enhances regulatory efficiency. By integrating cost structures and compliance incentives, it offers novel insights into behavioral shifts and systemic improvements in financing ecosystems.