Jing Li, Rui Ling, Fangjie Sun, Jinming Zhou and Haiya Cai
This paper adds risk perception and personalized human-computer interaction to the technology acceptance model, and further analyzes the impact of personalized unmanned ride…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper adds risk perception and personalized human-computer interaction to the technology acceptance model, and further analyzes the impact of personalized unmanned ride hailing on users' behavior intention.
Design/methodology/approach
This study model was tested using a sample of 299 social media users from China and we apply structural equation modeling (SEM) to build the theoretical framework.
Findings
Our results show that perceived ease of use has a greater positive impact on behavior intention compared to perceived usefulness. In addition, we find that the impact of risk perception on behavior intention is manifested in a number of ways, including people’s risk perception of the new technology, people’s risk perception of data leakage, and so on. Finally, we find that users’ personalized human-computer interaction has a positive effect on their perceived ease of use, perceived usefulness, and behavior intention.
Originality/value
Our study contributes to illuminate the pivotal role of tailoring the human-computer interface to individual preferences and needs for ride-hailing platforms from the perspective of behavior intention.
Details
Keywords
Bing Han, Tianze Chi, Fangjie Hu and Mengjun Wang
This paper divides the dyadic supply chain into three power structures according to the relative channel power of the supply chain members and consequently examines the optimal…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper divides the dyadic supply chain into three power structures according to the relative channel power of the supply chain members and consequently examines the optimal supply chain pricing decisions when both suppliers and retailers are concerned with fairness issues.
Design/methodology/approach
Three models are constructed, namely the Stackelberg game model with the supplier as the leader, the Nash game model with the balance of power and another Stackelberg game model with the retailer as the leader. The equilibrium solutions are solved, and their results are analyzed.
Findings
The retail price of a product increases with an increase in the fairness concerns of the leader in a supply chain in which the supplier or retailer is the leader, while the fairness concerns of the member with less channel power have no effect on the retail price. In a power-balanced supply chain, both suppliers and retailers increase their retail prices as their fairness concerns increase. The relative size of the members’ fairness concerns affects member profits and total supply chain profits.
Originality/value
The main contributions are as follows: First, this paper proposes a new approach to studying supply chain pricing strategy, considering fairness concerns and power structure. Secondly, three game models are constructed. The Nash equilibrium solution is introduced to study the fairness of supply chain participants in pricing decisions and overall supply chain profitability. Finally, the supply chain management theory is expanded by this study on pricing decisions and supply chain performance.