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This paper investigates whether disclosure quality and a history of overpaying for acquisitions are associated with differences in the value-relevance of gains on bargain purchase with high disclosure prominence.

Findings are from multivariate regression results, using a sample of firms listed in South Africa from 2010 to 2019, where a mandatory earnings reconciliation provides high disclosure prominence for gains on bargain purchase.

Given high disclosure prominence, disclosure quality is not associated with differences in the pricing of gains on bargain purchase. Instead, most gains on bargain purchase are priced as future losses (unrecognised liabilities). However, when a firm has a history of overpaying for acquisitions, gains on bargain purchase are priced as transitory economic gains.

Further research is required to determine if overpaying for acquisitions similarly communicates the credibility of gains on bargain purchase when disclosure prominence is low.

Disclosure prominence can reduce disclosure processing costs and increase the value-relevance of complex acquisition accounting. High disclosure quality cannot compensate for a weak acquisition track record.

Findings deepen our understanding of the pricing of gains on bargain purchase. This paper presents empirical results that reconcile previously conflicting theoretical views of gains on bargain purchase (as unrecognised assets or as unrecognised liabilities), by shedding light on the role that a record of overpaying for acquisitions plays in the value-relevance of gains on bargain purchase.