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This paper aims to examine the role of local/provincial government in influencing corporate social and environmental reporting (CSER) in China, and more specifically, how the underlying economic and political factors associated with local government have influenced the quality of CSER.

The authors used 234 environmentally sensitive companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2013 and 2015 as the research sample to test the relationship between CSER and local government’s political connection and economic prioritisation and the potential mediating effect of local economic prioritisation.

The analysis provides evidence that local/provincial government’s political geographical connectedness with the central government has directly and positively influenced the level of CSER, while local prioritisation of economic development has a direct but negative effect on CSER in China. In addition, local/provincial prioritisation of economic development has mediated the relationship between local–central political geographical connectedness and CSER.

While local/provincial governments are heavily influenced by the coercive pressure from the central government, they also act in their own political and economic interests in overseeing CSER at the local level. This study raises the question about the effectiveness of the top-down approach to improving CSER in China and suggests that the central government may need to focus more on coordinating and harmonising different local/provincial governments’ interests to enable achieving a common sustainability goal.

The authors provide evidence revealing how the economic and political contexts of local government have played a significant role in shaping CSER in China. More specifically, this paper addresses a gap in the literature by highlighting the importance of local government oversight power for CSER development and how such oversight is determined by local prioritisation of economic development and political geographical connectedness of local and central governments.

This paper studies the determinants for the desirability of the public-private partnership (PPP) mode in infrastructure development.

The author manually collects data on over 12,000 PPP projects in China, and regard the successful transition and abnormal termination as signals for the mode’s desirability and undesirability, respectively. Then, guided by relevant theories in the literature, the author investigates the impact of various project characteristics on the projects’ successful transition and abnormal termination.

First, execution-stage projects in industries where government support is indispensable, or where quality improvement is more important than cost reduction, face higher likelihood of abnormal termination. But such negative effects are mitigated if state-owned enterprises (SOEs) participate in the social party. Second, the structure of social party matters. The participation by private firms in the social party increases the termination likelihood, while the decentralization of the social party decreases it. Third, pre-execution projects with government payment or subsidies are more likely to enter into the execution stage.

Regulations on participation by SOEs in PPPs, such as policy [2023 No. 115] announced by State Council, should take industrial heterogeneity into consideration.

Using a large sample, the author empirically tests the seminal PPP-related theories in the literature. The author also uncovers some unique stylized facts about PPPs in China, especially the impact of SOE participation in the social party on PPP survival.