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This study aims to investigate the effect of top management team (TMT) stability on outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) of Chinese firms and the moderating effects of state ownership and managerial ownership on this relationship.

An empirical analysis based on the ordinary least square regression model is conducted using Chinese A-share listed firms that engaged in OFDI from 2008 to 2021.

TMT stability has a positive effect on firms’ OFDI. Moreover, state ownership significantly strengthens the positive relationship between TMT stability and OFDI, while managerial ownership weakens this positive relationship.

The findings help firms to effectively retain TMT talents and promote the smooth internationalization of firms, thereby enhancing their long-term development capabilities and competitive advantages.

This study expands the investigation of the factors influencing OFDI at the micro level of the TMT, providing valuable decision-making insights for firms.

This study examines how CEOs-elect navigate power dynamics with incumbent CEOs during leadership transitions, focusing on their strategic choices – cooperate, defect or disengage – based on perceptions of the incumbent’s behavior.

Using the game theory framework and insights from 22 interviews with executives from large Canadian organizations, we analyze CEOs-elect’s decision-making from nomination to ascension.

CEOs-elect cooperate when they anticipate the incumbent to cooperate and defect when they anticipate defection. When faced with uncertainty or signs of disengagement from the incumbent, CEOs-elect strategically choose to disengage, adopting a “No Play” strategy to preserve board trust and organizational stability.

Findings are based on large Canadian organizations, which may limit applicability to smaller firms, family businesses or different cultural contexts. Future research should examine CEO transitions across diverse organizational and cultural settings.

Boards should recognize proactively manage power struggles during transitions, ensuring support for CEOs-elect and promoting cooperation with incumbents. Understanding perceived incumbent strategies can improve transition planning, minimize conflicts and improve organizational outcomes.

This research introduces “No Play” as a novel strategic option in CEO transitions, contributing to game theory and power dynamics literature. It also bridges gaps in understanding by linking strategic choices of CEOs-elect to perceptions of incumbent behavior and stakeholder trust.

This study aims to contribute to the academic disciplines of entrepreneurship and management by developing a new theory that explains Founder-CEOs’ succession in family and non-family firms. Many scholars failed to generate a specific theory to describe the succession of Founder-CEOs. Family firms remain complex enterprises comprising interconnectedness of cultural interests in which corporate governance occurs by families, Founder-CEOs and sometimes a board of directors.

This study’s design/methodology/approach reflects post-modernist epistemological and ontological perspectives for conducting systematic literature reviews. To identify relevant studies in the review, the several databases (Australian Business Dean’s Council Journal Quality List; EBSCO Database, including PsycINFO and Psych studies; Web of Science) and a mix of ranked journals from entrepreneurship, management and psychology were used.

The findings and results in this paper reflect the purpose, methodology and literature analysis culminating in 1,582 peer-reviewed studies. A total of 182 peer-reviewed studies met the criterion for review. Throughout the research process, a systematic literature review uncovered management literature gaps overlooked for decades during the theory-building process. Hence, developing a theory of Founder-CEOs succession used a combination of systematic, inductive, comparative and interactive approaches.

A Theory of Founder-CEOs Succession explains the strategic process of replacing a founder systematically. The promotion of, and incentives for, internal executives have been topics of great interest and deliberation among scholars and practitioners for a long time. This study contributes research implications for theory building in the academic disciplines of entrepreneurship and management by offering scholars and practitioners a theory that does not exist to describe Founder-CEOs’ succession encompassing both strategic successes and failures. By incorporating successes and failures, this study provides realistic reflections of Founder-CEOs.