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The purpose of this study is to examine two opposing approaches to the effects of power on negotiation: a “collaborative approach” of power and a “competitive approach” of power. Accordingly, the authors state oppositional hypotheses based on each approach. This study further investigates the mediating role of the perceived threat of the negotiation and the moderating role of negotiation topic (i.e. topics that touch on one’s power position versus topics that are related to the tasks one needs to perform) in this relationship. Finally, the authors state a moderated mediation hypothesis where they expected that the negotiation topic would moderate the indirect effect of power on negotiation strategies.

A vignette study (N = 279) and a negotiation game (N = 138) were conducted where the power within dyads was manipulated.

Study 1 showed that powerholders prefer collaborative strategies, whereas powerless negotiators prefer competitive strategies. Perceived threat of the negotiation mediated this effect. Furthermore, both Studies 1 and 2 showed that the negotiation topic moderates the effect of power on negotiation strategies providing further support for the collaborative approach of power. Finally, Study 1 provided partial support for the moderated mediation hypothesis.

Both Studies 1 and 2 are experimental studies. A field study should try to replicate these results in the future.

This study illuminates the effects of power on negotiation and addresses inconsistent findings in the negotiation literature. The results might be of great importance to large organizations where power asymmetries constitute an integral part of the employee/manager interactions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to show the moderating role of negotiation topic in the relationship between power and negotiation.

Two experiments investigated negotiators' information search strategies as a function of other's personality (cooperative vs. competitive vs. unknown) and own social value orientation (pro‐social vs. selfish). In Experiment 1, participants selected questions about other's intention to cooperate or to compete. In Experiment 2, participants generated questions themselves, which were coded as asking about cooperation or competition. Consistent with the false‐consensus hypothesis (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and inconsistent with the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970), selfish negotiators who had no information about the other's personality asked more questions about other's intention to compete, and pro‐social negotiators asked more questions about other's intention to cooperate. Furthermore, both selfish and pro‐social negotiators engaged in confirmatory information search. Implications in terms of a self‐fulfilling prophecy are discussed.