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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between voluntary disclosure of intangibles and financial analysts’ earnings forecasts properties.

Disclosures about intangible assets were hand-collected through content analysis of annual reports of a sample of US non-financial firms, while analysts’ earnings forecasts properties were collected from Bloomberg Professional database. The authors relied on correlation and multivariate regression analyses to test the research hypotheses.

The results show that increased intangible disclosures affect analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy, dispersion, and favourable consensus recommendations. However, this effect varies according to the nature of intangible assets.

The results may be of interest to different market participants such as corporate managers, financial analysts, and standards setting bodies that recently published guidelines on voluntary disclosure of intangibles.

This study develops a new comprehensive index to measure the content of narrative disclosures about a large number of intangibles, such as human, structural, and relational assets. The findings contribute to the current debate on the value-relevance of narrative disclosures on intangibles to investors and financial analysts.

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on how climate change risk reporting might evolve in various world regions in the post COVID-19 pandemic era.

Using a multiple-case study approach and adopting an institutional theory lens, we assess whether the pandemic is likely to strengthen or weaken institutional pressures for climate change risk disclosures and predict how climate-related risk reporting will evolve post-pandemic.

The authors find that climate change risk reporting is likely to evolve differently according to geographical location. The authors predict that disclosure levels will increase in regions with ambitious climate policy and where economic stimulus packages support sustainable economic recovery. Where there has been a weakening of environmental commitments and economic stimulus packages support resource intensive business, climate change risk reporting will stagnate or even decline. The authors discuss the scenarios for climate change risk reporting expected to play out in different parts of the world.

The authors contribute to the nascent literature on climate change risk disclosure and identify future directions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the link between ownership structure, earnings management (EM) preceding mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and the acquiring firm's subsequent long‐term market performance.

The authors measure the magnitude of discretionary current accruals using two methodologies, that of Teoh et al. and that of Kothari et al. The latter methodology is used to control for the presence of extreme performance prior to the event. The calendar‐time Fama‐French three‐factor model was used to evaluate long‐term stock performance and to minimize potential problems related to the cross‐sectional dependence of the returns.

It was found that firms using stock as a financing medium exhibit significant positive discretionary accruals during the year preceding the M&A and during the year of the acquisition. It was also documented that voting right concentration and control‐enhancing mechanisms are not associated with any significant level of earnings management. Finally, a negative association was found between EM and abnormal stock returns over a three‐year period following the acquisition.

These results suggest that the concentrated ownership alignment effect dominates the entrenchment motives and acts as a deterrent mechanism to prevent controlling shareholders from managing earnings in stock‐financed M&A.

The authors’ results highlight the importance of maintaining good legal and extra‐legal protection of minority shareholders. Regulators can play an important role in preventing dominant shareholders from engaging in opportunistic EM in stock‐financed M&A.

The paper extends prior literature by taking a closer look at dominant shareholders’ motivations to manage earnings in stock‐financed M&A. Large shareholders have strong incentives to manage earnings upward prior to stock‐financed transactions to limit the dilution of their controlling position.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between board of directors' independence and executive compensation disclosures transparency.

The paper examines compensation disclosure practices of a sample of 181 firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Board independence from management is assessed through an aggregate score which takes into account the proportion of independent directors, board leadership structure (i.e. CEO is the board chairperson), and the existence and independence of board committees. A cross‐sectional regression analysis is used to examine the relationship between board independence and the extent of compensation disclosure.

The paper finds that board independence from management is positively related to the transparency of executive compensation‐related information. In addition, this study documents a positive (negative) relation between firm size, US cross‐listing, growth opportunities (leverage) and the extent of executive compensation disclosure.

The study's results provide support to the managerial opportunism hypothesis in executive compensation. These findings highlight the importance of the board of directors as an effective governance mechanism which limits managerial rent‐seeking in the design as well as the disclosure of executive compensation practices.

This paper extends prior disclosure studies by examining the impact of board characteristics on the transparency of executive compensation disclosures in a principles‐based governance regime. Furthermore, executive compensation disclosure provides an interesting setting in which to examine the ability of the directors to act independently from managers in a conflict of interests situation.

Accounting research has emphasized target and bidder managers' incentives to manipulate earnings during corporate control contests. However, prior studies examining earnings management by takeover targets have obtained mixed results. Moreover, the existing evidence is mainly based on US data and hostile mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions. The purpose of this study is to examine earnings management by friendly takeover targets in the year preceding the deal announcement in Switzerland.

The paper examines earnings management practices of a sample of 50 Swiss firms that were targets of a friendly takeover proposition during the period 1990‐2002. Discretionary accruals are used as a measure of earnings management. It uses a matching approach and a cross‐sectional regression analysis to test the hypothesis of earnings management by takeover targets.

The paper expands and provides further international insights to the existing literature through the investigation of earnings management by takeover targets managers in a European setting and in a friendly corporate control environment.

These empirical findings document the existence of a significant downward earnings management during the year preceding the transaction. These results suggest that earnings management incentives may differ between negotiated friendly and hostile disciplinary transactions.

The generally accepted method of presentation with respect to going-concern reporting in a global context is to modify the auditor’s report with an explanatory paragraph in addition to having a separate note to the financial statements. In Canada, however, the auditor’s report is clean, and the going concern uncertainty is restricted to the endnotes. This research, using Canadian students as subjects and conducted as a between-subjects experiment, examines unsophisticated investor’s behavior to the signal conveyed by different reporting formats by auditors (U.S. versus Canadian). The results indicate that the form of the auditor’s report does significantly influence subjects’ decisions to invest and their perception of risk.