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As a potentially disruptive technology, blockchain technology ensures that all the data cannot be merely tampered with once they are recorded on-chain. However, the fake source information may be input into the blockchain, which is mistaken for truthful data and results in a trust divide between the on-chain and the actual world. One missing perspective from previous studies is information manipulation at the source still exists under the blockchain mode. The authors’ goal was to analyze how blockchain technology affects the information deception of the agricultural product supply chain (APSC) under this premise. Also, the authors further analyzed some factors that influence the effectiveness of blockchain technology.

The authors build an APSC game model consisting of a farmer and an agricultural product broker, which employs the principal–agent game model to explore the conditions for achieving the mutual trust equilibrium between the two parts. Then, through numerical simulation, the authors further analyze how the quality of on-chain information and the numbers of on-chain firms affect blockchain’s effect on deception in APSC and examine the circumstances in which blockchain technology is more suitable.

The authors demonstrate that only by meeting the threshold of high-quality on-chain information and having a sufficient number of on-chain firms, can the blockchain-based supply chain initiate a better information ecosystem, which helps eradicate deception in the APSC.

This paper provides valuable insights for participants in supply chains as well as is probably generalizable to other industrial products that require similar services in the early stage of blockchain.

This paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings and leverage manipulation and the moderating effects of internal and external supervision.

The authors draw on a sample of Chinese non-financial A-share-listed firms from 2013 to 2020 to explore the effect of ESG ratings on leverage manipulation. Robustness and endogeneity tests confirm the validity of the regression results.

ESG ratings inhibit leverage manipulation by improving social reputation, information transparency and financing constraints. This effect is weakened by internal supervision, captured by the ratio of institutional investor ownership, and strengthened by external supervision, captured by the level of marketization. The effect is stronger in non-state-owned firms and firms in non-polluting industries. The governance dimension of ESG exhibits the strongest effect, with comprehensive environmental governance ratings and social governance ratings also suppressing leverage manipulation.

Firms should strive to cultivate environmental awareness, fulfil their social responsibilities and enhance internal governance, which may help to strengthen the firm’s sustainability orientation, mitigate opportunistic behaviours and ultimately contribute to high-quality firm development. The top managers of firms should exercise self-restraint and take the initiative to reduce leverage manipulation by establishing an appropriate governance structure and sustainable business operation system that incorporate environmental and social governance in addition to general governance.

Policymakers and regulators should formulate unified guidelines with comprehensive criteria to improve the scope and quality of ESG information disclosure and provide specific guidance on ESG practice for firms. Investors should incorporate ESG ratings into their investment decision framework to lower their portfolio risk.

This study contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, it is among the first to show that high ESG ratings may mitigate firms’ opportunistic behaviours. Secondly, it identifies the governance factor of leverage manipulation from the perspective of firms’ subjective sustainability orientation. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the relationship between ESG ratings and leverage manipulation varies with the level of internal and external supervision. Finally, it highlights the importance of governance in guaranteeing the other two dimensions’ roles by decomposing overall ESG.