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Gary Parr, deputy chairman of Lazard Freres & Co. and Kellogg class of 1980, could not believe his ears. “You can't mean that,” he said, reacting to the lowered bid given by Doug Braunstein, JP Morgan head of investment banking, for Parr's client, legendary investment bank Bear Stearns. Less than eighteen months after trading at an all-time high of $172.61 a share, Bear now had little choice but to accept Morgan's humiliating $2-per-share, Federal Reserve-sanctioned bailout offer. “I'll have to get back to you.” Hanging up the phone, Parr leaned back and gave an exhausted sigh. Rumors had swirled around Bear ever since two of its hedge funds imploded as a result of the subprime housing crisis, but time and again, the scrappy Bear appeared to have weathered the storm. Parr's efforts to find a capital infusion for the bank had resulted in lengthy discussions and marathon due diligence sessions, but one after another, potential investors had backed away, scared off in part by Bear's sizable mortgage holdings at a time when every bank on Wall Street was reducing its positions and taking massive write-downs in the asset class. In the past week, those rumors had reached a fever pitch, with financial analysts openly questioning Bear's ability to continue operations and its clients running for the exits. Now Sunday afternoon, it had already been a long weekend, and it would almost certainly be a long night, as the Fed-backed bailout of Bear would require onerous negotiations before Monday's market open. By morning, the eighty-five-year-old investment bank, which had survived the Great Depression, the savings and loan crisis, and the dot-com implosion, would cease to exist as an independent firm. Pausing briefly before calling CEO Alan Schwartz and the rest of Bear's board, Parr allowed himself a moment of reflection. How had it all happened?

An analysis of the fall of Bear Stearns facilitates an understanding of the difficulties affecting the entire investment banking industry: high leverage, overreliance on short-term financing, excessive risk taking on proprietary trading and asset management desks, and myopic senior management all contributed to the massive losses and loss of confidence. The impact on the global economy was of epic proportions.

Ann Taylor was founded in 1954, and its classic black dress and woman's power suit were staples for years. In 1995 Ann Taylor LOFT was launched to appeal to a more casual, costconscious consumer. Under Kay Krill's leadership, the division began to outperform the original flagship. When Krill was promoted to President/CEO of Ann Taylor Stores Corporation in 2005, she was challenged with rebuilding the Ann Taylor brand - (i.e., meeting the “wardrobing needs of the updated classic consumer”) while maintaining the image and market share of LOFT. By mid-2008, an additional problem appeared: the macroeconomic climate was posing considerable uncertainty, especially for retail businesses. Krill was firmly committed to long-term growth. However, given the 2008 situation, what could she do to unleash what she believed was the firm's “significant untapped potential”?

The case opens with Martha Stewart's 2005 release from prison following her conviction for obstructing an insider-trading investigation of her 2001 sale of personal stock. The scandal dealt a crippling blow to the powerful Martha Stewart brand and drove results at her namesake company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (MSO), deep into the red. But as owner of more than 90 percent of MSO's voting shares, Stewart continued to control the company throughout the scandal.

The company faced significant external challenges, including changing consumer preferences and mounting competition in all of its markets. Ad rates were under pressure as advertisers began fragmenting spending across multiple platforms, including the Internet and social media, where MSO was weak. New competitors were luring readers from MSO's flagship publication, Martha Stewart Living. And in its second biggest business, merchandising, retailing juggernauts such as Walmart and Target were crushing MSO's most important sales channel, Kmart. Internal challenges loomed even larger, with numerous failures of governance while the company attempted a turnaround.

This case can be used to teach either corporate governance or turnarounds.

Students will learn:

• How control of shareholder voting rights by a founding executive can undermine corporate governance

• The importance of independent directors and board committees

• How company bylaws affect corporate governance

• How to recognize and respond to early signs of stagnation

• How to avoid management actions that can make a crisis worse

• How weaknesses in executive leadership can push a company into crisis and foster a culture that actively prevents strategic revitalization

How control of shareholder voting rights by a founding executive can undermine corporate governance

The importance of independent directors and board committees

How company bylaws affect corporate governance

How to recognize and respond to early signs of stagnation

How to avoid management actions that can make a crisis worse

How weaknesses in executive leadership can push a company into crisis and foster a culture that actively prevents strategic revitalization

The Beringer Wine Estates Company has been expanding its market share in the premium segment of the wine industry in the 1990's. After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant Nestlé food company for almost a quarter of a century, the firm was sold in 1996 to new owners, in a leveraged buyout. For the next year and a half, management and the new owners restructured the firm and expanded through internal growth and strategic acquisitions. With a heavy debt load from the LBO, it seemed prudent for management to consider a significant rebalancing of its capital structure. By paying off a portion of its debt and enhancing the equity account, the firm would achieve greater financial flexibility which could enhance its growth rate and business options. Finally, a publicly held common stock would provide management with another “currency” to be used for enhancing its growth rate and overall corporate valuation. With the equity markets in turmoil, significant strategic decisions had to be made quickly. Should the IPO be completed, with the district possibility of a less than successful after market price performance and these implications for pursuing external growth initiatives? A variety of alternative courses of action and their implications for the financial health of the Beringer Company and the financial wealth of Beringer stockholders are integral components of this case.

This case considers the unusual terms under which Rhone-Poulenc, the large French chemicals producer, acquired the U.S.-based Rorer Group, Inc., in August 1990. Set a year later, in August 1991, the case reviews the terms of the merger and the experience of the new entity in its first year, and invites the student to evaluate the “contingent value right” (CVR) issued by Rhone-Poulenc in the merger.