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The purpose of this paper is to examine credit usage by beginning farmers and ranchers (BFR). BFR credit usage is stratified by location (state) and by socially disadvantaged farmer and rancher (SDFR, also known as historically underserved) status. SDFR groups are defined to include women; individuals with Hispanic, Latino or Spanish Origin; individuals who identify as American Indian or Alaskan Native, Black or African American, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Non-SDFR is defined as individuals who identify as non-Hispanic, White men.

The US Department of Agriculture’s Census of Agriculture, Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) is linked with Farm Service Agency (FSA) loan program administrative data to estimate shares of BFR operations using FSA credit. Census data provided information on population changes in total farms and BFR operations from 2012 to 2017 which are compared by SDFR status.

Results reveal differences among BFR operations active in agricultural credit markets by SDFR status and state. BFR were more common among SDFR groups as well as in regions where farms tend to be smaller, such as the Northeast, compared to a more highly agricultural upper Midwest. Among BFR, non-SDFR are more likely to utilize credit than SDFR, however, FSA appeared to be crucial in enabling BFR and especially beginning SDFR groups to access loans.

The results are timely and of keen interest to researchers, industry and policymakers and are expected to assist in developing and adjusting policies to effectively promote and improve BFR success in general and for beginning SDFR groups.

A potential farm policy concern is that if nontraditional (vendor/point-of-sale) financing represents increased risk, it may have an aggregate effect on sector-wide farm financial risk. This analysis examines the use of nontraditional lender credit among borrowers in the US Department of Agriculture (USDA)'s Farm Service Agency (FSA)'s direct farm loan programs.

Data source included the USDA FSA direct operating loan program for 2011–2020. A Cox proportional hazards model was used to estimate the occurrence of default over seven-year term direct operating loans.

Results indicated that point-of-sale financing has a significant and positive relationship with risk for FSA direct operating loan borrowers. The presence of intermediate point-of-sale financing (mostly from machinery and equipment vendors) is associated with an increased probability of default of 9%, and the presence of such loan balances in the amount of $50,000 or more had a higher probability of default of 21%. Short-term nontraditional financing (for example from fertilizer vendors) was found to be positively related to borrower risk of default as indicated by a 22–25% increase in the likelihood of loan default.

Through FSA Farm Business Plan data, the authors were able to distinguish specific vendors and their loan purpose, which advances the knowledge beyond what is currently available through survey data. Findings indicate a minor increase in borrower risk for those with intermediate-term nontraditional financing. However, borrowers with short-term nontraditional financing and having large balances or greater number of nontraditional loans had increases in risk of default by substantive amounts.

The purpose of this paper is to identify determinants of feasible outcome events (expired with no loss, settled for loss, still performing) and time to event of Farm Service Agency (FSA) operating and farm ownership (FO) loan guarantees.

Data on 19,126 FSA guaranteed loans, which were made by various lenders to farmers who have limited ability to obtain loans from normal sources without the Federal guarantee, were collected. Cox proportional hazards models for operating loans (OLs) and FO loans are estimated to identify borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, lender types, and farm and macroeconomic environment factors that influence guarantee outcomes.

Loans with different characteristics (loan amount, loan term, lender type, region originated) and assistance programs (Beginning Farmer, Interest Assistance) have differing guarantee outcomes. Contemporaneous variables, in particular delinquency status, have a significant impact on guarantee outcomes.

All loans were originated in calendar years 2004 and 2005. Since FO loans may have as long as 40 year terms, results are not as robust for FO loans as for OLs.

Different loan characteristics and macroeconomic conditions significantly influence the occurrence of possible guarantee outcomes and time to the outcomes.

Guaranteed loans are the primary method of government credit assistance to US farm operators. Data on individual borrowers have been difficult to obtain for much of the life of the guaranteed program because loan applications are held privately. This study provides insight on how various factors drive guarantee performance which is useful to policy makers trying to increase guaranteed loan program efficiency.

Agricultural credit markets are dominated by two institutional retail lender groups, the cooperative Farm Credit System (FCS) and commercial banks. Analysis of farm loans made over the 1991S1993 and 2001S2002 periods indicates that FCS lenders were more likely to serve full‐time commercial farmers and farmers located in regions with less competitive credit markets. In contrast, commercial banks were more likely to serve small, part‐time, and hobby farmers. This segmentation of farm credit markets is consistent with federal regulations requiring the FCS to provide credit to “bona fide” farmers with a basis for credit.

The purpose of this paper is to examine changes in the structures of US farms and lenders and identify prospective implications for federal credit.

Data from US farm operations for 1996-2014 were adjusted to 2014 values using commodity price indices. Farm size groups were constructed by value of farm production to analyze changes in farm numbers, production, assets, debt, leverage, liquidity, profitability, land tenure, commodity type, contract production, organization type, and use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) direct and guaranteed loans by farm size. Bank, Farm Credit System (FCS), and FSA data from 1996 to 2015 were adjusted to 2014 values. Lender size groups were constructed to analyze changes in bank and association numbers, farm loans, and use of FSA guaranteed loans by lender size.

The greatest consolidation has been by farms with over $2 million in production. More farm debt is held by large, complex organizations, frequently with multiple operators, more variable income, and greater reliance on production contracts and operating and nonreal estate credit. Large farms have greater leverage, are more profitable, and have a larger share of household income from the farm. Banks and FCS institutions are fewer and larger, yet smaller institutions use FSA guarantees to a greater extent. Larger farms tend to be more reliant on both direct and guaranteed FSA loans and are likely to become more dependent on FSA credit.

Changing farm and lender structure together with softening farm income may require FSA farm loan program changes to meet any increase in loan demand. Policy alternatives are provided to meet changing demand for farm credit.

USDA direct and guaranteed farm loan programs exhibit significant geographical variation in lending activity. County‐level estimations made using Tobit procedures indicate that use of Farm Service Agency (FSA) farm loan programs is greater in counties with lower per capita income and regions experiencing greater farm financial stress. Use of direct FSA loan programs was lower in counties with fewer private‐sector lenders. Guarantee loan program usage was found to decline when commercial agricultural lenders are absent from the county. FSA loan programs were more highly utilized in counties with an FSA loan service center and in states receiving greater FSA farm loan funding in past years.

This study adds a new dimension in the study of racial and gender bias in farm lending. Most previous studies analyzed the separate effects of race and gender attributes on loan approval decisions. The analysis focuses on the stipulation of loan terms (loan amount, interest rate and maturity) among approved farm loan applications. The time period analyzed spans from 2004 until 2014 during which the government has undertaken reforms to improve delivery of loan services to its clientele of minority farmers. Thus, this study's findings could help validate the effectivity of such institutional reforms affecting Farm Service Agency (FSA) lending operations.

This study utilizes a national direct loan origination data from the FSA of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) collected from 2004 to 2014. The analysis begins by identifying significant differences in cross-tabulations of loan terms among different racial and gender classes. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) regression techniques are then applied for a system of equations involving the three loan packaging components. The combined effects of the prescribed loan packaging terms are subsequently analyzed under a simulation-optimization framework.

Regression results validate that indeed, relative to White American borrowers, certain minority borrowers are accommodated with lower loan amounts at higher interest rates and with shorter maturities. However, these decisions seem to be prompted by credit risk management considerations. The most compelling findings include the insignificance of all double minority labeling variables, except for the interest rate equation that even produced favorable results for Hispanic American females. Simulation-optimization results further reinforce that even when one or two unfavorable loan terms are included in the packaging, double minority borrowers end up with better profitability and liquidity positions.

This study provides a different perspective in dealing with the controversial minority bias in lending by presenting evidence gathered from a government farm lending institution. The USDA-FSA has been sued in numerous occasions by minority borrowers. Since then, however, it has deliberately implemented institutional reforms to rectify previous errors. This study provides empirical evidence strengthening FSA's claim of its intention to improve its delivery of loan services, especially for its socially disadvantaged borrowers with double minority classification.

This study pioneers the analysis of the double minority labeling effect on farm lending decisions. Its contributions to literature are further enhanced by its goal to validate the effectiveness of FSA institutional reforms undertaken since the early 2000s in order to improve credit access of and delivery of credit services to minority farm borrowers, especially those that belong to more than one minority classification.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the characteristics of borrowers likely to benefit from loan modifications (restructuring) which includes concessions provided to the borrower from the lender.

Data were drawn from the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency (FSA) for borrowers who had received an operating loan modification during 2005-2010. A logistic regression model is estimated to identify the characteristics associated with the likelihood of a borrower paying the modified loan as agreed or receiving a subsequent loan modification within seven years. Explanatory variables included financial condition, type and year of loan modification, farm type, organizational type, borrower demographics, and region.

Loans requiring more complex loan modifications and borrowers with previous loan restructuring, larger farms, little equity in loan collateral, little or no capital, and/or little to no liquidity are less likely to perform following loan restructuring, which could suggest a possible futility in providing concessions to these types of borrowers. Many of these borrowers ended up having a subsequent restructure within a short period of time. Most of the regional variability in loan performance appears to have been a result of land values and commodity prices and not jurisdictional laws.

FSA has followed a policy of providing loan modifications to the borrowers experiencing repayment problems for more than 25 years. Though farm financial conditions have remained relatively strong through 2016, a continuation of the low farm incomes and declining farm real estate values could increase farm loan repayment problems in upcoming years and increase interest in farm loan modifications from both lenders and policymakers. FSA’s experience provides a rich data source to examine and provide a better understanding of the costs and benefits associated with loan modifications.

An established paradigm in small business lending is segmented by bank size with large banks more likely to lend to large informationally transparent firms while small banks are more likely to lend to small informationally opaque firms. In light of banking consolidation, this market segmentation can have implications for credit availability. Federal loan guarantees, such as those provided by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) may reduce the risks of lending to informationally opaque firms thereby mitigating the impacts of the bank size lending paradigm. This paper aims to discuss these issues.

This analysis utilized a binomial logit procedure to determine if there was any empirical evidence that smaller community banks served a unique clientele of farmers when making FSA-guaranteed loans. The analysis relied on a unique data set which incorporated detailed data on farm businesses receiving FSA-guaranteed loans, loan characteristics, as well as information about the originating bank and characteristics of the local credit markets.

Results were consistent with the bank size lending paradigm with smaller banks being less likely to engage in fixed-asset lending, and more likely to serve a riskier and less established clientele when making guaranteed loans.

Data limitations did not permit detailed analysis of banks larger than $250 million in total assets nor for consideration of non-bank lenders. An expansion by these lender groups into serving more informationally opaque borrowers could mitigate any adverse impacts arising from fewer small community banks.

The results suggested that Federal guarantees do not completely eliminate the relative informational advantages of large and small size banks. And, continued bank consolidation, such that there are fewer small community banks, could result in less credit availability among smaller, less creditworthy farm businesses.

While FSA guarantees may not enhance a large banks propensity to serve informationally opaque farm borrowers, they may enhance the ability of smaller community banks to serve groups specifically targeted through FSA lending programs; the provision of credit to family farmers who, despite being creditworthy, are unable to obtain credit at reasonable rates and terms.

The analysis examines relationship between bank size and the use of FSA guarantees using a unique data set which incorporated information on FSA-guaranteed loans, farm financial characteristics, along with characteristics of commercial banks which participated in the FSA-guarantee program.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate a three‐equation model of US commercial bank usage of the Farm Service Agency's (FSA) guaranteed operating loan and interest assistance programs. Also, to identify the key farm and banking variables that affect the decision to use loan guarantees and the volume of loans with interest assistance.

A triple hurdle, three‐equation system is estimated to model three decisions: to participate in the FSA operating loan program; whether to use interest assistance given the decision to participate in the operating loan program; and then the degree of participation in the interest assistance program. Statistical selection is modeled. Data on almost all commercial banks in the USA from 1995 to 2003 are used in the estimation sample.

Statistical selection is statistically significant so selection must be included in the models. Variables reflecting state‐level characteristics such as farm debt servicing ratio, individual bank loan‐to‐asset ratio, bank size and the general guaranteed loan and interest assistance environment are significant in all three equations. Intensity of interest assistance use varies markedly across states.

The interest assistance program has high subsidy costs and is an important source of support for financially marginal farmers. Scant prior research has investigated this program. The present study also shows that modeling interest assistance usage must be embedded in a larger model to give a complete specification.