Abstract
In a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutability and observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. The model suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest rate, affect the likelihood of dumping.
Keywords
Citation
Banik, N. and Gilbert, J. (2006), "Reciprocal Dumping under Antidumping Enforcement", Journal of International Logistics and Trade, Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.24006/jilt.2006.4.1.1
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2006 Jungseok Research Institute of International Logistics and Trade
License
This is an Open-Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited