Banks, ABS's and CDS's: Information production, risk bearing, and incentive compatibility

Abstract

Purpose – We discuss the microeconomic pros and cons of bankloan-backed securities and credit default swaps, that is, the passing on of bank loans or their default risk from originator to the general investor. By ‘micro’ we mean that our focus is on comparative advantages for banks versus other holders of the loans or risks, not the macro pros and cons of higher credit volumes.

Methodology/approach – We apply standard ideas from the corporate finance literature on the choice between loans versus public debt, related to information asymmetries and signaling at the time of origination. We also add new arguments related the possibly unhappy end of the loan.

Findings – Quite apart of the by now familiar quality-preservation incentive issue we think that securitization and CDS destroy value because they move loans and risks away from the party best informed about the risk and best placed to deal with default toward worse-placed parties.

Limitations – The analysis takes the volume of loans as given.

Practical/social implications – ABS and CDS should be confined to the highest-quality type of chapter where no information asymmetries exist, like in Europe where the traditional MBS have not caused problems for centuries.

Originality/value of the paper – To the best of our knowledge, the literature on bank loans versus public debt has not been applied to ABS/CDS before, whereas the issue of who is best placed to bear the risks has not even been raised elsewhere.

Citation

Ngoc Tuan Bui, T., Tuong Van Nguyen, T. and Sercu, P. (2010), "Banks, ABS's and CDS's: Information production, risk bearing, and incentive compatibility", Kim, S.-J. and Mckenzie, M.D. (Ed.) International Banking in the New Era: Post-Crisis Challenges and Opportunities (International Finance Review, Vol. 11), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 315-333. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3767(2010)0000011014