Genetically modified politics

Citation

Rankin, A. (2001), "Genetically modified politics", European Business Review, Vol. 13 No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.2001.05413aab.015

Genetically modified politics

Genetically modified politics

Aidan RankinA Reply

Keywords Europe, European Community, European Union, Politics, Gender

In challenging my title, The "Straight Banana" Republic, Mr Benedetto displays a worrying lack of irony. Worrying, for two reasons: first, because I know that he has an excellent sense of humour; second, because I associate lack of irony with political dogma and abstract schemes to reshape human nature. Certainly lack of humour characterises the entire European "project", with its grandiose absurdity and its disregard for the way real people think and behave.

Benedetto's first point is more a quibble than an argument. He assumes automatically that Euroscepticism implies uncritical support for US foreign policy and appeasement of "US multinationals with dubious ethical standards." Many left-wing Europhiles genuinely believe this propaganda. A united Europe, they fantasise, can be a "progressive" rival to the USA. In reality, European unification has been promoted assiduously by the Clinton Administration. One reason for this is the sentimental internationalism of the "Baby boom" generation, who dodged the draft but let poor blacks and Puerto Ricans do the fighting for them. The second reason, more pragmatic and so more important, is that a federal Europe might (it is thought) shoulder more of the burden of defence. This is why US criticism of the "European defence identity" has been so muted until now.

"US multinationals" also favour European political union. It takes away the inconvenience of negotiating with the governments of individual nations, or taking account of idiosyncratic local laws. And it is only a few flimsy pieces of British legislation that prevent our markets from being flooded with GM foods. The European Commission approves of genetic modification, much as it approves of the dissolution of national identities. Both, according to the simplistic and curiously old-fashioned reasoning of Europhiliacs, are indicators of "progress". Conversely, the British public's increasing revulsion for both GM and the European "project" stem from the same healthy instinct. For despite the stupefying process of modern mass "education", enough of us still know that politics and science are bringing forth monsters. This is not through the sleep of reason, but an ideology of hyper-rationalism, based on the idea that all differences between nations, between cultures, between the sexes and between individuals can be swept away by legislative fiat. Yet that approach can never work, because, as Pascal wisely said, the heart has reasons which reason does not understand.

Benedetto accuses me of "overlook[ing] the reasons that lay behind the formation of the European Communities in the 1950s". That might be true. My intention in the pamphlet was to look at the ideology of pan-Europeanism today. Supporters of the European Union, and Britain's incorporation therein, are adept at using "peace in Europe" as a form of emotional blackmail, as if to be opposed to the EU is somehow to be against peace. Yet there is very little evidence that locking disparate peoples into political unions abolishes animosities between them. Similar claims were made for Yugoslavia, after all, and for federal Nigeria after independence. Indeed the similarity between pro-EU rhetoric today and the Titoist rhetoric of the 1940s is quite remarkable, the difference being that Tito showed strength and courage against both Nazi and Soviet powers. Europe's "Commissioners" are moral weaklings in comparison.

Friendship between nations is not brought about by artificial, bureaucratic political unions. Instead, it evolves through independent nations deciding to live in peace and treat each other with dignity. The Scandinavian countries learned this lesson in the early twentieth century. After centuries of making war on and occupying each other they agreed to live together as free and equal nations. In the larger European context, the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights are both flawed institutions, but they have done more to preserve peace and freedom than any section of the EU. Benedetto argues that by accepting membership of NATO, we are "pooling" our sovereignty already, and so why not accept a common foreign policy and army for "Europe?" The analogy is false. NATO members are fully sovereign nations with independent armed forces. No state within NATO can be compelled to alter its foreign or defence policies to fit in with other states and the right of withdrawal from the alliance is clearly stated. The EU's "defence identity," by contrast, offers no possibility of withdrawal or even dissent.

Revealingly, for a critic of "US multinationals", Benedetto speaks of politics as if it were purely a business transaction. He speaks of an "emerging market" of pressure groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which traditional parties have to appease. Yet it is the increasing use of corporate models by the parties that is responsible for increasing cynicism by voters. To the "spin doctors," the electorate does not consist of responsible individuals, but groups to be "targeted" as consumers. Parties are ceasing to be broad-based coalitions, while single-issue protest movements gain momentum. Benedetto is right when he says that parties should respond to grassroots pressure for devolution, environmental protection and the lowering of taxes (direct and indirect). Nonetheless, many single-issue groups are fanatical and divisive. Many NGOs – especially those concerned with Third World "development" – are staffed by secular missionaries of political correctness, far more intolerant than their religious antecedents. Single-issue pressure groups are often parasitic organisms, not "non-governmental" at all, but dependent on state handouts. They create bureaucracies with a vested interest in preserving, rather than resolving social problems. Benedetto accepts on trust that the pressure groups represent those they claim to speak for, even though none of their spokesmen have ever been elected. In this sense, they resemble European Union officials, and the unrepresentative bodies of which the EU is composed.

Benedetto sees "no evidence" that politically correct interest groups are responsible for "social engineering" at the European level. He clearly has not realised that the European Commission has been colonised by "gender feminists". The EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights, an embryonic "constitution" for the Union, reflects this bias in its third Chapter, entitled "Equality." Articles 20 and 21 respectively guarantee equality before the law and non-discrimination. Article 22 guarantees respect for cultural and religious diversity. Article 23, "Equality between men and women", cancels these principles out:

Equality between men and women must be ensured in all areas, including employment, work and pay.

The principle of equality shall not prevent the maintenance or adoption of measures providing for specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex.

All areas? The definition of "all" will presumably be determined by the courts. But if "all" extends beyond the public sphere and into private associations or religious bodies, then we reintroduce to Europe a form of tyranny that was banished after the Berlin Wall was heroically torn down. The doctrine of "specific advantages" – inequality in the name of equality – reflects the looking glass logic characteristic of both the EU and gender feminist ideology.

When I read this section of the Charter, I wanted to find out whether the "under-represented sex" could ever be male. For this, I turned to the latest "Social Policy Agenda" from the European Commission (Brussels, 28 June 2000) which devotes a section to "Promoting gender equality." The "objective" is "to promote full participation of women in economic, scientific, social, political and civic life." Dogmatically, it states that this goal is "a major component for promoting social and economic progress". There is a proposal for "an equal treatment directive on areas other than employment and occupation" (my emphasis) and shrill calls to "develop, monitor and evaluate gender equality in public administration at all levels," "develop, monitor and evaluate gender equality in the field of science and technology at all levels" and promote "gender desegregation of the workplace".

There is no reference anywhere to high levels of male unemployment, created by the decline of manufacturing industry, the reduction in size of the armed forces and the unfavourable climate for men and boys produced by family breakdown, along with feminist influences on social policy and education. There is no recognition that differences between the sexes are biological as well as socially conditioned, or that equality and fulfilment can be provided by differing spheres of influence and complementary roles. Nor is there any recognition that discrimination against men is also discrimination against women – mothers, wives, partners and friends. To gender feminists, such relationships between women and men count for nothing. Clearly, it is the intention of the Commission to institutionalise discrimination against men in the interests of doctrinaire "equality" for women. If that is not social engineering, then what is?

Rightly, Benedetto reminds me that "British political thought has been part of the wider European tradition for centuries". This I have never denied. Indeed I remind readers that Aristotle, who is unrivalled as a "European" political philosopher, believed that there should be limits to the size of states, just as there are limits to the sizes of animals and plants. Benedetto is right, again, to point out that we can look at the example of other countries, including EU countries, when we seek to reform British law. This we have often done, but on our own terms and with reference to British conditions. Other countries, in Europe and the world, have learned from us in similar ways. We can learn from the example of other countries without being chained to them in economic and political unions. I would like to learn from the example of Norway, which has stayed outside the EU and in the process saved its fishing industry.

The idea that there has to be a monolithic "European" political system, a single "European" standard, is oppressive and, again, curiously old-fashioned. The main British contribution to European political thought has been the empirical approach, the solving of problems on a case-by-case basis and a recognition of the value of the individual rather than the group. Voltaire, and other Enlightenment thinkers, admired and identified with this tradition. The EU owes little to Voltaire and more to Rousseau, the dysfunctional Genevan who believed that man must be "forced to be free", and that an ill-defined, collectivist "General Will" was superior to public opinion.

Like Benedetto, I believe that international relations should be based on "give-and-take". That requires independence. I oppose the Single European Act and Maastricht not merely because they contain social provisions, but because they compromise the rights of free peoples to govern themselves. The irrational, Student Union-style campaign against Austria reveals the shape of things to come, should moves to political union intensify. And it is not the sceptics, but the Europhiles, who are on the defensive, since their threats against the Danes have counted for nothing. The formation of social policy works better at national level, through popular consent. That is how social democracy developed in Scandinavia, and how welfare provision evolved in Britain. Benedetto points out that the French and Italian constitutions include "social rights". It does not follow from this that France and Italy provide properly for their poorest inhabitants. They contain shameful pockets of deprivation and have vast "black economies" where social provisions do not apply.

Unlike the Council of Europe, the EU shows little concern for individual freedom. Instead it is concerned with group rights. This means rights as claims, made on behalf of one group and to the detriment of others. With the example of sex equality, above, we have seen where this process leads: discrimination in reverse. The emphasis on the group rather than the individual, and the state as enforcer of "equality," resembles closely the Soviet constitution, which is why I drew that parallel. The EU's conception of rights, and the role of the state, owes much to Napoleonic law as well. Conveniently, Benedetto ignores the difference between the British idea of rights, and the Napoleonic ideal which underlies European legislation. In the former, rights belong to the individual. They are, in the words of the American Declaration of Independence, "endowed by the Creator" and so they are inborn, natural rights. Napoleonic rights, by contrast, are endowed by the state. The state does not exist to protect natural rights, but to define rights, parcel them out and, when "necessary" take them away.

A recent memo from the Advocate General's office, likening criticism of the EU to "blasphemy", is evidence of how conditional EU "rights" could be. Article 52 of the Charter allows for the "limitation" of "rights and freedoms" where this meets "objectives of general interest recognised by the Union". The phrase "general interest" bears a sinister resemblance to Rousseau's "General Will" and the power of "the Union" to interpret that interest appears unlimited.

Benedetto takes me to task because I "use the French Revolution as an example of how bloodthirsty elites imposed changes on the people". Yet what else was the Terror of 1793? I cite the example of the French Revolution to demonstrate that abstract, codified rights do not necessarily guarantee freedom, but can be used as an excuse to deprive people of their liberty. To work effectively, constitutions must have cultural roots. This must confer political power on institutions which have an historic base, and with which citizens can clearly identify. The European Union's institutions fulfil none of these criteria. Benedetto argues that the French Revolution "symbolically marks the end of absolutism and the creation of the modern state in Europe". There is much truth in this argument, when we apply it to France, Germany and Italy, which are his examples. But it does not apply to the British nations. Benedetto ignores this fact, once more for political convenience.

Benedetto points out, again correctly, that "some nation states are not so widely accepted or legitimate as others". He talks of "stateless nations", deprived of independence by their absorption in larger nations. Yet the link between devolution or outright secession and European political union makes no sense. The whole point of devolution, after all, is to provide more representative institutions, closer to the people concerned. The point of secession is to restore national identity. European political union makes all of us members of "stateless nations." If that "solves" the problem of independence, then we must solve the problem of poverty by making everyone poor and abolish stupidity by stupefying the whole populace.

"Elites," Benedetto says, "have always held sway in the political process, which is precisely what makes them elites". True, as far as it goes, but one of the purposes of representative government is to curtail the power of elites. European political union devolves power upwards: from individuals to interest groups; from local and national governments to transnational bureaucracies; from elected politicians to foreign courts. Revealingly, Benedetto admits that the "real reason" for the single currency was political, not economic. He gives no clear reason why Britons should give up their independence – monetary or political – for the sake of a Franco-German unity that will not necessarily last. Nor does he explain why further "unity" is preferable to independence and friendship. Revealingly, also, he regards agriculture as a "low saliency" issue. Clearly, like "Townie" Blair, he has no understanding of the countryside, its economic significance or its importance to national life. The farmer and rural craftsman have always been natural foes of bureaucracy. Their independent spirit challenges the designs of "liberal" intellectuals and so is always suspect in their eyes.

Benedetto claims that widening the scope of European power would make the "project" more attractive. That, too, is looking-glass logic. It calls to mind the Labour left in the 1980s. They argued that their party was defeated by the Tories because it was not "left" enough! Clearly, the electorates of Britain, Denmark – and increasingly Germany herself – have had enough of European integration. They value their national identities and wish to address social questions in their own ways. Benedetto claims that the EU would be humanised by giving more power to "a Parliament that enjoys public support and legitimacy". Yet the European Parliament has no public support or legitimacy. Even ardent Europhiles are hard put to it to name their MEPs. The low turnout at European elections reflects a robust popular scepticism, a recognition that "supranationalism" cannot provide representative government. By staying at home, the people have shown that European political union is a failed experiment.

The "Straight Banana" Republic, by Aidan Rankin (E-mail: aidanr@dircon.co.uk), is available from New Europe, 52 Walnut Treet Walk, London SE11 6DN. Tel. +44 (0)20 7582 1001; Fax: +44 (0)20 7582 5852; E-mail: info@new-europe.co.uk Web site: www.new-europe.co.uk. Price: £5.