OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, UNDERPRICING, AND MARKET LIQUIDITY OF NEW EQUITY ISSUES

Abstract

We argue that uninformed subscribers to an initial public offering (IPO) of common stocks are exposed to greater ex ante risk of trading against informed traders in the secondary market because the advent of public trading conveys hitherto private information and thereby mitigates adverse selection. The going‐public firm underprices the new issue to compensate uninformed subscribers for this added secondary market adverse selection risk. We test this market liquidity‐based explanation by investigating the ex‐post consequences of ownership structure choice on the initial pricing and the secondary market liquidity of a sample of initial public offerings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Consistent with our argument, we find that initial underpricing varies directly with the ex post trading costs in the secondary market. Further, initial underpricing is related positively to the concentration of institutional shareholdings and negatively to the proportional equity ownership retained by the founding shareholders. Finally, the secondary market illiquidity of new issues is positively related to institutional ownership concentration and negatively to ownership retention and underwriter reputation. Thus, the evidence based on our NYSE sample supports the view that the entrepreneurs' choice of ownership structure affects both the initial pricing and the subsequent market liquidity of new issues.

Citation

HEGDE, S.P. and VARSHNEY, S.B. (2003), "OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, UNDERPRICING, AND MARKET LIQUIDITY OF NEW EQUITY ISSUES", Studies in Economics and Finance, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 1-39. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb028767