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EPISTEMICS AND THE FRAME CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE

L. JOHNSON

Kybernetes

ISSN: 0368-492X

Article publication date: 1 March 1983

72

Abstract

Minsky's frame conception of knowledge and its two precursors (Kuhn's “paradigms” and Bartlett's “schemata”) are considered. Against this background, a theory of knowledge is developed. This theory of knowledge draws on a model of argumentation. This model is illustrated by discussing the notion of “defeasibility” in law. The model is shown to capture the concepts of presumption and plausibility and these notions are shown to capture the diverse features of both precursors to the frame conception of knowledge.

Citation

JOHNSON, L. (1983), "EPISTEMICS AND THE FRAME CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE", Kybernetes, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 177-181. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb005652

Publisher

:

MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1983, MCB UP Limited

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