Action to prevent runway collisions

Citation

(2007), "Action to prevent runway collisions", Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 79 No. 5. https://doi.org/10.1108/aeat.2007.12779eac.001

Action to prevent runway collisions

Action to prevent runway collisions

National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark V. Rosenker recently told a gathering of airport executives that prompt action is needed to prevent potentially catastrophic accidents on the nation's runways.

Speaking at a conference on new developments in airport technology, jointly hosted by the American Association of Airport Executives and the FAA, in Atlantic City, NJ.

Rosenker noted that the worst accident in aviation history was a runway collision that cost 583 lives, and that the number of serious runway incursions continues to climb.

He pointed to several recent near- collisions that were avoided only “through flight crew actions sometimes bordering on the heroic – along with a lot of luck. That is not good enough,” he said.

Rosenker stated that airport surface operations present some of the most challenging situations for pilots and controllers, and in many cases leave the least room for error. The potential for traffic conflicts, he said, are exacerbated by the numbers of ground support vehicles, including maintenance vehicles, baggage carts, catering trucks, fuel tankers, snow plows and other ground traffic vying for space on a busy airport.

“In the air,” said Rosenker, “we try to maintain miles of space between aircraft. But on the tarmac, taxiways and runways, the tolerances are comparatively small; the difference between being in a safe place and an unsafe place is measured in feet, not miles.”

Rosenker said that the hazards of airport surface operations have been a concern of the Safety Board for many years, noting that the runway incursion issue has been on the Board's Most Wanted List of safety improvements since its inception in 1990. Board recommendations related to runway incursions have addressed improvements in air traffic control operations, training and hardware, pilot training, airport signage, lighting and markings, aircraft visibility, and incident reporting.

To ensure that all commercial passengers are effectively protected against the dangers of runway incursions, Rosenker said, the Board has urged FAA to develop and demonstrate ground movement safety systems appropriate for use at airports ranging from large international facilities to the smaller regional fields served only by commuter airlines. He said the Board did not expect the answer to be a one-size-fits-all system but would instead “require creative use of different combinations of sensors, processors, and warning methods tailored to the requirements of each situation.”

Rosenker acknowledged that delivering effective technological solutions takes time but noted that there are some technologies already available that could help prevent runway incursions. The dangers of incursions are here now, he said, and “the continuing occurrence of hazardous incidents show that we still have work to do.”

The complete text of Chairman Rosenker's speech can be found on the Board's web site at: www.ntsb.gov

All passengers should have the same level of safety regardless of the age of the aircraft

Mark V. Rosenker also recently addressed an aviation conference in California at which he reiterating the agency's concern with aging aircraft.

“We have investigated several accidents and incidents that have highlighted the safety implications resulting from aircraft ageing and these accidents repeatedly demonstrate the importance of effective airworthiness programs throughout the service life of aircraft,” Rosenker said. “With the proper maintenance program, these accidents involving ageing aircraft could have been prevented.”

During his speech in Palm Springs, California before the Ageing Aircraft Conference, he noted that there is no single criterion that defines an aircraft as “old”. The age of an aircraft depends on a number of factors that include, but are not limited to the chronological age, number of flight cycles, number of flight hours and the environment in which the aircraft operates. Furthermore, determining the overall health of an aircraft is complicated by the fact that individual aircraft components can age differently in different portions of the same aircraft and by the nature of certain ageing mechanisms, such as fatigue.

Some common themes identified in each of these accidents involving ageing aircraft have been:

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  Unknown service histories as is the case with military surplus aircraft.

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  Poor fatigue design details. The regulations did not require fatigue analysis for these aeroplanes.

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  Most older aeroplanes have no inspection program.

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  The continued operation of aeroplanes beyond their useful lifespan.

On April 28, 1988, one person was killed when the top of the fuselage of Aloha Airlines Flight 243 separated from the rest of the hull due to fatigue and corrosion. As a result of the NTSB's investigation, the FAA's Ageing Aeroplane Program was developed in 1991 to focus on regulatory initiatives related to structural fatigue and corrosion.

In 1996, when the center fuel tank of TWA flight 800 exploded, the Board's investigation found that wiring found in the wreckage had numerous cracks in the insulation that were attributed to age, bringing to light the problem of ageing systems.

The Safety Board began documenting numerous systems problems in fleet aircraft starting in May of 1997, with the TWA-800 investigation, and continued that documentation when SwissAir flight 111 crashed in September 1998.

In October of 1998, the FAA released the Ageing Transport Non-Structural Systems Program a concept based on the 1991 ageing structures program that followed the Aloha 737 accident.

However, ageing aircraft continue to be a problem. The in-flight separation of a wing from three Forest Service fire fighting aircraft occurred within a short timeframe several years ago. Most recently, during the ongoing investigation of a Chalk's Ocean Airways accident in Miami, Florida in December 2005, it was discovered that the wing of a Grumman Mallard seaplane, manufactured in 1947, separated from the aircraft in flight and the resulting accident killed the 20 passengers and crew on board.

“The Safety Board feels that the continued commercial operation of these 50 to 60 year old aeroplanes that were not certified to the standards of today's modern aeroplanes is not safe – all passengers should have the same level of safety,” Rosenker said. “The FAA should require records reviews, ageing aeroplane inspections, and supplemental inspections for all aeroplanes operated under Part's 121, 129 and 135 regardless of the year they were type certificated, the number of passengers they carry or their maximum payload, and has issued related safety recommendations to that effect.”